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SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION:
HOW RATING AGENCIES ALLOW PREDATORY LENDING TO 
FLOURISH IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
[David Reiss*]
I. INTRODUCTION
Predatory lending is today’s most pressing consumer protection issue, costing 
American families over an estimated nine billion dollars a year.1  Predatory lending is 
particularly rampant in the subprime home equity loan market – inhabited largely by 
unsophisticated borrowers – where lenders have made billions upon billions of dollars of 
loans with abusive terms.2 After years of legislative and regulatory neglect, state 
governments have, in recent years, produced a variety of reforms and regulations on the 
terms and methods of lending in the subprime market, in an attempt to ameliorate the 
worst aspects of predatory lending.
Specifically, in the last few years, many states have enacted laws to limit abusive 
home lending practices within their own jurisdictions.3  Large segments of the lending 
industry opposed these laws, claiming that the resulting regulatory patchwork increases 
their compliance costs, exposes even the most law-abiding lender to liability, and thereby 
ultimately increases loan costs for consumers.4
In large part as a result of these complaints, momentum is building on three 
fronts to standardize the operations of the subprime mortgage market.  First, federal 
banking regulators in the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) and Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS) have already preempted the application of state predatory 
lending laws to a broad array of lending institutions.  Following the regulators’ leads 
Congress also considering legislation to preempt more broadly their application to the 
remaining financial institutions still subject to state laws.5
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. Christopher A. Richardson, Predatory Lending and Housing Disinvestment, at 19-20 (Feb. 2003) 
(estimating annual cost of predatory lending to be $9.53 billion), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=338660; Stein, Eric, Quantifying the Cost of Predatory Lending at 3 (2001) 
(estimating the annual economic cost of predatory lending to be $9.1 billion), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Quant10-01.pdf.
2
. See infra Part II.B.
3
. See infra Part V.
4
. See id.
5
. See infra Part VI.A.
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Second, two Government-Sponsored Entities6 (“GSEs”) Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac (sometimes referred to collectively as “the GSEs” and sometimes as “Fannie and 
Freddie”) , the two largest purchasers of residential mortgages on the secondary mortgage 
market (the “secondary market”),7 indicated that they would not purchase loans from 
loan originators that contain certain terms they deem abusive, such as harsh prepayment 
penalties, as well as those loans that are most heavily regulated by predatory lending 
laws.8
Finally, Standard & Poors, Moody’s Investors Services and Fitch Ratings, the 
three major bond and securities rating agencies (collectively, the “Privileged Raters”), 
indicated that they will not rate securities9 backed by pools of residential mortgages if 
any of those mortgages violate their rating guidelines relating to acceptable liability risk 
stemming from state  predatory lending laws.10  Rating agencies are in the business of 
providing credit ratings11 for pools12 of mortgages that are sold to investors throughout 
the world, a process known as securitization.  The lack of a rating from at least one of the 
Privileged Raters, which effectively grant regulatory licenses to institutions who wish to 
issue securities,13 is the financial equivalent of a death sentence for a residential 
mortgage-backed securities14 offering.
6
 The term “GSE” refers to “a federally chartered, privately owned, privately managed financial institution 
that has only specialized lending and guarantee powers and that bond-market investors perceive as implicitly 
backed by the federal government.”  Carnell, Richard Scott, Handling the Failure of Government-Sponsored 
Enterprise, 80 WASH.L.REV 565 (forthcoming, August 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=745486, 
at 2.  I use the term “GSEs” as a shorthand for Fannie and Freddie, unless otherwise noted, notwithstanding 
the fact that other entities such as the Federal Home Loan Bank System (the “FHLBS”), are also GSEs.  See
id.
7
. The market for mortgage-backed securities is known as the “secondary mortgage market” or “secondary 
market,” for short.  Amy Crews Cutts, et al., Adverse Selection, Licensing and the Role of Securitization in 
Financial Market Evolution, Structure and Pricing at 2 n.1 (July 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=280388.  The secondary mortgage market is easiest to 
visualize as “a network of lenders who sell and investors who buy existing mortgages or mortgage-backed 
securities. This infusion of capital from investors provides mortgage lenders such as banks, thrifts, mortgage 
bankers and other loan originators with a market for their interests.”  KENNETH G. LORE AND CAMERON L. 
COWAN, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 1.1 (2003).
8
. See infra Part VI.B.
9
. There is no single legal definition of a “security.”  For the purposes of this article, “security” shall mean 
any instrument, such as a mortgage note, “that might be sold as an investment.”  Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 
U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (defining “security” for purposes of the Securities Acts).
10
. See infra Part V.
11
. Generally, a credit rating is an evaluation of creditworthiness. Moody's has defined it as an “opinion of 
the future ability, legal obligation, and willingness of a bond issuer or other obligor to make full and timely 
payments on principal and interest due to investors.”  Philippe Jorion et al., Informational Effects of 
Regulation FD: Evidence from Rating Agencies, J. FIN. ECON. at 7, (May 2004) (citing Moodys’ Investor 
Service, Ratings Definitions. (2003)), forthcoming at http://ssrn.com/abstract=556824
12
. A “pool” is a group of similar financial instruments combined for resale to investors on the secondary 
market.  See LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.1.
13
. See infra Part IV.B.
14
. “Mortgage-backed security” is the general term for “any investment security representing an interest in, 
or secured by, one or more pools of mortgage loans.” LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.1.  “The term 
"mortgage-backed security" is often used to describe securities backed by a wide variety of mortgage 
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Advocates for the lending industry frequently promote the increased 
standardization of the secondary market as an approach that will reduce predatory 
behavior without hurting legitimate lenders.15  But each of the three methods of 
standardization described above must be independently evaluated to determine whether it 
is desirable.
As a preliminary matter, one should also consider the legitimacy of the entity 
promoting each method of standardization.  Obviously, the federal government has broad 
constitutional authority to regulate financial institutions.  This legitimacy, however, must 
be balanced against the significant role in banking, consumer protection and real estate 
law that is granted to the states in our federalist system of governance.  While the GSEs 
are private companies, they are federally chartered to provide ongoing assistance to the 
secondary market so as to help low- and moderate-income individuals become 
homeowners.16  Thus, the GSEs have been granted some legitimacy in setting policy in 
this sphere.
The Privileged Raters, however, have no similar mandate.  They define their role 
first and foremost as protectors of investors.17  And while they have been granted a 
privileged regulatory status by the Securities and Exchange Commission and other 
government regulators,18 they have not been assigned a reciprocal responsibility to the 
public, as the GSEs have been. As a result of this mismatch between privilege and 
responsibility, those concerned with the rights of homeowners should meet the Privileged 
Raters’ efforts to impose standardization on the mortgage market with greater skepticism.
The most significant criticism of the federal preemption of state predatory 
lending laws is that it is too soon to do so.19  Predatory lending has only arisen as a 
significant problem in the last decade and not enough time has passed to say whether 
legislators and regulators have come up with the best solution to the problem.20  States, 
playing their traditional role as laboratories for policy experimentation, should be left 
alone a while longer until the relative merits of different approaches to the problem can 
be compared.
The GSE approach is probably the most limited of the three and the one least 
likely to harm homeowners.  This is because GSEs must balance their profit-seeking with 
the effectuation of their public purpose.21  Because Congress and the media watch them 
interests in almost every conceivable form of real property.”  Id.   For some historical accident, securities 
backed by HELs and HELOCs are sometimes referred to as asset-backed securities.  See W. Alexander 
Roever et al., Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) Securitizations, in, THE HANDBOOK OF NONAGENCY 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, 115, 115 (Frank J. Fabozzi et al., eds., 2d ed., 2000) [hereinafter 
HANDBOOK].  Securities backed by any other asset (such as credit card receivables) are referred to as “asset-
backed securities.” MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, GLOBAL CREDIT ANALYSIS 451 (David Stimpson ed., 
1991) [hereinafter STIMPSON]. 
15
. See id.
16
. See infra Part III.B.
17
. See infra Part IV.C.
18
. See infra Part IV.B.
19
. See infra Part VI.A.
20
. See id.
21
. See infra Part III.B.
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carefully and because they have competitors in the secondary market, the GSEs’ 
incremental approach is likely to do some good:  it should reduce the number of loans 
with abusive terms without exercising an effective veto over state predatory lending 
laws.22
Unsurprisingly, the most worrisome of the three approaches to standardization is 
that of the Privileged Raters.  The Privileged Raters have implemented guidelines relating 
to predatory lending legislation that do not accurately measure the risk that such statutes 
pose to investors.  In particular, they exaggerate the risk posed by assignee liability and 
punitive damages provisions in such legislation.23 Ultimately, these guidelines have had 
two major impacts:  (i) they promote the interests of issuers and investors over those of 
homeowners and (ii) they promote the growth of the residential mortgage-backed 
securities market.24  Not coincidentally, the Privileged Raters make more money in such 
a growing market because they charge issuers for their work in rating new securities; 
thus, it is in the Privileged Raters’ self-interest to keep states from passing laws that slow 
secondary market growth and cut into their income.25
There is no way to formally or informally appeal the decision of the Privileged 
Raters.  And because there is no adequate way to exercise public pressure on them, their 
misjudgments interfere with legitimate state policies to the benefit of the Privileged 
Raters themselves, which amounts to an abuse of the privileges that they have been 
granted by government regulators.  The Privileged Raters’ actions have caused some state 
legislatures to water down predatory lending bills under consideration and have caused 
others to amend and dilute existing predatory lending laws so that the Privileged Raters 
will continue to rate pools containing loans from states with such laws.26  This is because 
funds for loans can dry up in a jurisdiction that has enacted a tough predatory lending law 
that falls afoul of the Privileged Raters’ guidelines.  As this catastrophic scenario has 
already occurred in one state, others have quickly learned that the Privileged Raters have 
an effective veto over their predatory lending laws.27
This article will review all three efforts to standardize the subprime mortgage 
market, but will focus on the Privileged Raters’ actions because they present a serious 
and unjustified impediment to the remediation of serious abuses in the home mortgage 
market that has not yet received thorough scholarly attention.
* * *
In order to understand how Privileged Raters became so enmeshed with 
predatory lending, we must first understand how two related processes work:  (i) the 
marketing of subprime loans to consumers and (ii) the role of the Privileged Raters in the 
expansion of the subprime mortgage market.  
22
. See infra Part VI.B.
23
. See infra Part V.
24
. See infra Part VI.C.
25
. See infra Part VI.C.
26
. See infra Part V.
27
. See id.
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To explain these processes, this article builds on a growing body of predatory 
lending and rating agency literature.  Professors Kurt Eggert, Kathleen Engel and Patricia 
McCoy have documented and explained the link between predatory lending and the 
secondary market.28  Professors Claire Hill, Frank Partnoy and Steven Schwarcz have 
documented and explained the role of rating agencies in the broader financial markets.29
The aim of this article, building on these two bodies of work and on the significant 
economics and finance literature relating to rating agencies, is to demonstrate that 
Privileged Raters are playing an active, albeit hidden, role in permitting predatory lending 
to thrive.  A limitation of the existing rating agency literature, at least for my purposes, is 
that it has not evaluated their impact on predatory lending and, thus, on the public 
interest.  The term “public interest”, for the purposes of this article, refers to the 
expressed preferences of a political entity, such as one might find in a law passed by a 
state legislature.  As far as this body of literature is concerned, the only relevant parties 
are investors, issuers and the agencies themselves.  I add the public to that list.
In Part II of this article, I describe the process of marketing subprime loans to 
consumers and describe the way predatory lending grew alongside the extraordinary and 
rapid expansion of the subprime lending market.
In Part III, I explain how mortgages are securitized and sold. Part III also 
describes how the GSEs created a standardized secondary market for prime loans and 
how they are in the process of standardizing aspects of the subprime secondary market.
In Part IV, I describe the function of rating agencies in the securitization process 
as well as the process by which they arrive at their ratings.  Part IV also describes how 
the Privileged Raters have been granted a privileged regulatory status by financial 
services regulators.  Finally, this Part reviews recent finance scholarship that suggests 
that the Privileged Raters are biased against the public interest in general and the interest 
of homeowners in particular.
In Part V, I outline existing remedies for predatory lending and describe in detail 
the impact of the Privileged Raters on the structure of three state predatory lending laws 
enacted in North Carolina, Georgia and New Jersey.  In Part V, I also document how the 
Privileged Raters had overreacted – and continue to overreact -- to those statutes.  The 
state-specific detail of Part V is necessary for my argument for two reasons.  First, states 
are the battleground upon which financial companies like the Privileged Raters have 
fought against increased regulation of the secondary market.  Second, the events in each 
state are merely battles in a broader war between local control and international capital 
28
. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due 
Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 511-13 (2002) [hereinafter Eggert, Held Up]; Kurt Eggert,
Held Up in Due Course:  Codification and the Victory of Form Over Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 363 (2002) [hereinafter Eggert, Codification]; Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, 
A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002) 
[hereinafter Three Markets]; Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory Lending: What Does Wall 
Street Have to Do with It? 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 715 (2004) [hereinafter Engel & McCoy, Wall Street].
29
. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. REV. 43, 44 (2004); Frank 
Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 
WASH. U. L. Q. 619, 711 (Fall 1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating 
Agency Paradox, 2002 U.ILL.L.REV. 1, 15 (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=267273.
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market standardization and this intangible and ongoing war cannot be understood without 
those details.  In sum, Part V provides a case study of how the Privileged Raters’ 
privileged regulatory status distorts the efficient functioning of the financial markets to 
the advantage of financial market participants and to the detriment of the public interest.
In Part VI, I review the impact that federal preemption, the GSEs and the 
Privileged Raters have on the healthy standardization of the subprime secondary market.  
I conclude that federal preemption is premature; GSEs are having an incremental and 
beneficial impact on the subprime market; and the Privileged Raters are having a 
negative impact.
In Part VII, I build on various reforms suggested in the rating agency literature to 
propose public policy responses to the standardization imposed by rating agencies on the 
secondary market.  A thorough exploration of such proposed solutions must be left to a 
later article.  Nonetheless, by applying the insights of the predatory lending and rating 
agency literature to the events surrounding the adoption of recent state predatory lending 
legislation, this article makes visible the distortions that the Privileged Raters have 
caused in the secondary market, particularly as it affects the public interest.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING
A. The Explosive Growth of the Subprime Mortgage Market 
The way that Americans borrow money to buy their homes has changed radically 
since the 1980s.30  Before that time, Americans who wanted to buy a home would 
typically walk into their local savings and loan and speak to a loan officer who would 
evaluate their application.31  Depending on income, wealth and ties to the community, 
the loan officer might approve a loan.  And typically, only those with a healthy, or 
“prime,” profile were approved.32  That is, they had a steady work history; a large down 
payment; and no problems with their credit.33
30
. See AMY CREWS CUTTS et al., ON THE ECONOMICS OF SUBPRIME LENDING at 1 (January 27, 2004) 
(Freddie Mac), available at http://www.freddiemFac.com/news/pdf/subprime_012704.pdf; Michael J. Lea, 
Innovation and the Cost of Mortgage Credit:  A Historical Perspective, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 147 (1996) 
[hereinafter Historical Perspective] (describing history of mortgage lending in United States from 1830s to 
1990s); Michael J. Lea, Sources of Funds for Mortgage Finance, 1 J. HOUSING RES. 139, 150 (1990) 
[hereinafter Sources of Funds] (describing role of government in mortgage lending from Great Depression 
through 1980s). 
31
. See Robert Van Order, The U.S. Mortgage Market:  A Model of Dueling Charters, 11 J. HOUSING RES. 
233, 233 (2000) (“Between the end of World War II and the 1970s, U.S. residential mortgage markets were 
dominated by the primary market, which was comprised primarily of specialized depository institutions 
(mainly savings and loan associations [S&Ls], more broadly “thrifts”), which both by regulation and tax 
incentive were induced to hold most (about 80 percent) of their assets in mortgages.”).
32
. “Prime” mortgages share certain characteristics relating to their “type, duration, age, performance, and 
other specific criteria.”  Rating agencies generally agree that prime mortgages share the following 
characteristics in common:  
first lien on single family detached properties for use as a primary residence located in the United States; 
fixed-rate level fully amortizing payments; 80% Loan to Value, as established by a competent appraiser; 
$400,000 (Standard & Poor’s limit); [and] standard, complete Freddie Mac/ Fannie Mae documentation.  
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Thrifts34 were not only the dominant type of lender, but they also vertically 
dominated the residential mortgage market:  they originated and serviced the mortgage 
typically holding it until paid off by the borrower.35  Now, technological,36 financial37
and legal38 innovations allow global finance companies to offer a range of mortgage 
products to a broad array of potential residential borrowers.  As a result of these 
innovations, there has been an unbundling of the submarkets of the mortgage industry.  
Now, a mortgage can be 
1. originated by a mortgage broker who makes money only from origination;
2. serviced by a mortgage banker who did not originate the loan and may have 
bought the right to service the loan from another mortgage banker;
3. originated with the credit risk taken by one of the secondary market 
institutions, perhaps along with a mortgage insurance company; and 
4. funded by a mortgage-backed security (MBS) sold into the capital markets, 
and the MBS can be packaged as a bundle of derivative securities that 
separate interest rate and prepayment risk among different investors. 39
A highly beneficial consequence of this change has been the economies of scale that 
specialized firms have been able to achieve, which has resulted in rated MBS transactions 
trading at only a small discount to Treasuries Bills of comparable maturity.40  This has 
driven down the average interest rate paid by homeowners.41 In part because of those 
changes, American homeownership had reached a historic high of 69 percent and 
SECURITIZATION:  ASSET-BACKED AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 9.04.B. (Ronald S. Borod, ed., 
2003) [hereinafter BOROD].
33
. Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep’s Clothing:  A Legislative Proposal, 21 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 129, 131-32 (2005) (describing typical post-World War II loan application 
process).
34
. The term “thrifts” is a catchall that includes savings and loans, savings banks, mutual savings banks and 
credit unions.
35
. Van Order, supra note 31, at 233.
36
.  See Andrea Heuson et al., Credit Scoring and Mortgage Securitization: Implications for Mortgage Rates 
and Credit Availability, J. OF REAL EST. FIN. AND ECON. 23:3, 337-363 (2001) (“With the recent advent of 
automated underwriting, much of the informational advantage [of mortgage originators] has disappeared. As 
the argument goes, computerized credit scoring gives the securitizer more accurate and timely information 
about borrower creditworthiness.”).
37
. CUTTS & VAN ORDER, supra note 30, at 1 (“U.S. mortgage markets have evolved radically in recent 
years. Innovations in underwriting, mortgage products, and mortgage funding have expanded mortgage 
lending and reduced costs.”).
38
. See, e.g., US GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION:  FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN 
COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 21[hereinafter CONSUMER PROTECTION]  (“Report to the Chairman and 
Ranking Minority Member, Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate) (January 2004). (“Several factors 
account for the growth of the subprime market, including changes in tax law that increased the tax advantages 
of home equity loans . . ..”). 
39
. Van Order, supra note 31, at 233 -34;.
40
. Id. (“Pools of mortgages (MBS and their derivatives) and debt backed by pools of mortgages now trade in 
national and international markets, almost as efficiently as Treasury securities.”).
41
. Id.
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Americans had 9.6 trillion dollars in home equity in 2004.42  Indeed, lenders refinanced 
trillions of dollars of mortgages in 2003 and 2004.43
“Subprime” lending has been a significant and growing portion of this activity, 
reaching nearly 20 percent of all originations in 2004.44  Subprime lending is the 
extension of credit to those with lower incomes, less wealth and riskier credit profiles 
than traditional, “prime,” borrowers.45 A negative consequence of the change in the 
mortgage industry away from dominance by the thrifts and toward relatively unregulated 
specialty firms has resulted in a variety of abuses in the subprime portion of the 
secondary market.
Subprime lenders typically offer three types products to borrowers.46  First, 
refinance and purchase mortgages are offered to borrowers with poor credit histories.47
In many cases, borrowers refinance mortgages for an amount greater than the balance of 
the original mortgage, thereby taking “cash out” of their homes.48  Second, “Alt A” 
mortgages are made to borrowers with FICO scores similar to those in the prime 
market.49  Alt A mortgages are typically made to borrowers who cannot document all of 
the information in their loan application (“low doc” or “no-doc” loans); Alt A mortgages 
can be used either for a purchase or a refinance.50  Third, high loan-to-value (“LTV”)51
refinance mortgages are originated to borrowers with relatively good credit but who have 
LTV ratios that sometimes are as high as 150 percent.52
42
. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING
2005 at 1 (2005) [hereinafter HOUSING STUDIES].
43
. Id. 
44
. Id.
45
. CUTTS & VAN ORDER, supra note 30, at 1; see HUD, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, 
SUBPRIME MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSES, AND RISK-BASED PRICING at 8 (March 2002) [hereinafter THE ROLE 
OF GSES]. (Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 USC § 1735f-7a, and 
Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of 1982, 12 USC § 3801 et seq., “provide the legal framework 
for subprime lending, except in states that opt out of the legislation.”); Baher Azmy and David Reiss, 
Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, 35 
RUTGERS L.J. 645, 652 (2004) (discussing range of factors that have led to increase of subprime lending).
46
. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 4.
47
. Id.
48
. Id.
49
. Id.  The FICO ratings system, created by the Fair Isaac Corporation, gives individual consumers credit 
scores that are meant to predict whether they will pay their debt obligations as expected by lenders.  See Fair 
Isaac Website, http://www.fairisaac.com/Fairisaac/Solutions/Scoring+-
+Predictive+Modeling/Credit+Bureau+Risk+Scores.htm.  Some argue that Alt A mortgages are not as safe as 
genuine “A” mortgages; see CUTTS & VAN ORDER, supra note 30,  at 4.
50
. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 4.  “No document” loans are made to borrowers who have irregular 
income, such as those working on commission.  Because their recent income statements may not reflect their 
income accurately, lenders will rely on high credit scores and a higher interest rate to ensure that they are 
adequately protected against the additional risk of lending to such individuals.  Id.
51
. That is, the principal amount of the loan is very high in relation to the value of the house that is 
mortgaged to secure that loan.  Until the 1990s, residential lenders typically limited the LTV to 80%.
52
. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 4.
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Subprime loans have higher interest rates than prime loans, a fact that lenders 
ascribe to the subprime borrowers’ greater risk of default.53  A number of studies have 
estimated that subprime interest rates for “C” and “D” subprime loans are on average four 
percentage points higher than those for prime loans.54  Generally, subprime lenders also 
charge higher points and fees – charges assessed at the outset of the loan and paid either 
in cash or financed into the overall loan proceeds – to compensate for higher origination 
and servicing costs that lenders claim that subprime loans have.55  In the aggregate, loan 
performance data appears to support the view that a significant portion of the excess 
spread56 covers the higher risk of default among subprime loans:  as of September, 2002, 
3.36 percent of subprime mortgages in the A- range and 21 percent of D mortgages were 
seriously delinquent.57  These rates of delinquency were far higher than those in the 
prime market, where only 0.54 percent of loans were seriously delinquent as of that 
date.58
Most subprime loans are now originated by mortgage and consumer finance 
companies, with a smaller amount issued by banks and thrifts.59  And only 16 percent of 
subprime mortgages are used for home purchases.60  That is, most subprime mortgages 
are used to refinance existing mortgages.  The growth of subprime lending has been 
utterly explosive.  In 1994, subprime mortgage originations were $34 billion;61 in 2003 
they represented more than ten percent of all originations, over $300 billion.62  The 
secondary market provides much of the liquidity and capacity for growth for the 
53
. HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING
27-28 (2000) [hereinafter JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT].
54
. JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 53, at 28.  Within the subprime market, grades of A -, B, C, 
and D are assigned to represent progressively higher credit risks carrying correspondingly higher interest 
rates. See JOHN WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING MORTGAGES FOR 
BORROWERS WITH IMPAIRED CREDIT (1997).
55
. Id. at 67.  It remains unclear, however, the extent to which subprime loan terms accurately reflect an 
inherent market risk of default associated with their borrowers.  See CUTTS & VAN ORDER, supra note 30, at 
5.
56
. Excess spread is “the difference between (1) interest received at the weighted average interest rate on the 
mortgage collateral and (2) the sum of interest paid at the passthrough rate on the bonds and any monthly 
fees.  Abner Figueroa, The Evaluation of Excess Spread in Sub-Prime Transactions, in HANDBOOK, supra 
note 14, at 209, 209.  For instance, if the weighted average interest rate of a pool of mortgages was seven 
percent and the sum of interest paid (including fees) was six percent, the excess spread would be one 
percentage point.  That excess spread may be used to cover the higher costs of subprime lending and any 
remainder may be kept by the issuer and /or shared with investors.
57
. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 19.
58
. Id. 
59
. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 21.  In 2001, 178 lenders concentrated primarily on subprime 
mortgage lending.  59 percent of those lenders that concentrated on the subprime market were independent 
mortgage companies such as mortgage banks and finance companies; 20 percent were nonbank subsidiaries 
of financial or bank holding companies; 10 percent were federally regulated banks and thrifts; and the 
remaining lenders were other types of financial institutions.  Id.
60
. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 5.
61
. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 21.
62
. Id.
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subprime market.63  Indeed, in 2003, “approximately two-thirds of the outstanding 
subprime/home equity loans in the United States were securitized . . ..”64
This growth has allowed many people who had not been able to access the prime 
market to access the equity in their homes.  This greater access to credit in the subprime 
market has come at the cost of significantly higher fees and interest rates than a prime 
borrower would face.65  It has also come at the cost of significantly higher fees and 
interest rates for minority borrowers as compared to white borrowers and these higher 
costs are not efficiently related to the comparative credit risk of white and minority
borrowers.66  In other words, the subprime market in the aggregate appears to 
discriminate to some extent against communities of color.
Communities of color have been disproportionately represented in the subprime 
market in contrast to their representation in the prime market.  African Americans and 
Hispanics combined made up less than eight percent of the prime home purchase 
mortgage market in 1998, but such borrowers made up nearly 20 percent of subprime 
home purchase mortgage market in that same year.67 Similarly, African American and 
Hispanic borrowers combined make up about six percent of all prime conventional 
refinance mortgages and 17 percent of subprime refinance mortgages.68  And fully half 
of all loans in predominantly African-American communities are subprime, compared to 
only 9% of loans in predominantly white communities.69
B. Predatory Lending in the Subprime Market
The subprime market is far less regulated and standardized than the prime 
market.  As such, it presents an opportunity for those seeking to separate financially 
unsophisticated borrowers from the equity that they have in their homes, that is, it 
presents an opportunity to engage in predatory lending.70 Most predatory behavior takes 
63
. See THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 9.
64
. Engel & McCoy, Wall Street,, supra note 28, at 719 n.4.
65
. See  Michael S. Barr, Modes of Credit Market Regulation, in BUILDING ASSETS, BUILDING WEALTH; 
CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky, eds., 2005) 
(reviewing credit market price discrimination literature), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=722611, at 6.
66
. Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories of 
Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 321- 326 (2005).
67
. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 5.
68
. Id.
69
. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME 
LENDING IN AMERICA 3 (2000) [hereinafter UNEQUAL BURDEN].  In 1998, 26% of refinance loans in low-
income communities were subprime, compared to a national average of 11% and to 7% in upper income 
communities. Id. This may partially be the result of the lower income-to-asset ratios and shorter or weaker 
credit histories found amongst such borrowers.  
70
. See Eggert, Codification, supra note 28, at 511-13 (surveying variety of definitions of predatory lending 
proposed by scholars and regulators); See also Three Markets, supra note 28, at 1260 (suggesting that 
predatory loans include those that (i) are structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to 
borrowers; (ii) engage in rent seeking; (iii) involve fraud or deceptive practices; (iv) lack transparency; and 
(v) require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress).
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place between a mortgage broker or mortgage banker and the borrower.71  But such 
thinly funded entities could not exist with funding from secondary market investors.  This 
article focuses on how states have attempted to make secondary market investors 
accountable for their role in propagating predatory lending, thereby incentivizing them 
stop it.72
While the extent to which predatory lending has infiltrated the subprime market 
cannot be known precisely,73 “it is rare to find a case of a predatory lending that does not 
involve a subprime lender,” as opposed to a prime lender.74  Predatory lending is also far 
more common in the “refinance” or “home equity” market75 than in the home purchase 
market because home equity borrowers have much more equity in their home than 
purchasers; this existing home equity gives predatory lenders a greater opportunity to 
pack a loan with excessive fees that might not be readily identifiable by the borrower 
who need not pay such increased costs out-of-pocket as a new homeowner would.76
While there is no generally accepted comprehensive definition of predatory 
lending,77 the United States Government Accountability Office has cobbled together a 
good working description:  it is “an umbrella term that is generally used to describe cases 
71
. See generally Lawrence Hansen, In Brokers We Trust:  Using Mortgage Licensing Statutes as A Response 
to Predatory Lending, __ J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEV. __ (forthcoming 2005) (on file 
with author) (describing predatory practices by originators).
72
. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 716 (“If the secondary market has the incentive and 
ability to deter predatory lending through such market devices as pricing, contract provisions, due diligence, 
and monitoring, then the market for subprime mortgages arguably will self-correct.”).
73
. There is no systematic data on predatory lending in large part because the principle source of information 
on mortgage lending is data reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 USC § 2801, et seq.
(“HMDA”), and does not include reporting on interest rates, fees, points, and other costs that might be 
indicative of predatory practices.  See Harold L. Bunce et al., Subprime Foreclosures: The Smoking Gun of 
Predatory Lending?, 257, 257- 259, in HOUSING POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
(Susan M. Wachter and R. Leo Penne, eds., 2001).  Notwithstanding these limitations, HMDA data “is the 
most comprehensive source of information on primary mortgage originations and secondary market loan 
purchases.”  Randall M. Scheessele, HMDA COVERAGE OF THE MORTGAGE MARKET 4 (HUD Working Paper 
No. HF-007, 1998).  HMDA data does provide information on the borrower, such as income, race, ethnicity 
and sex, as well as information regarding the property to be mortgaged, such as location.  See id.
74
. Dan Immergluck, Stark Differences: Explosion of the Subprime Industry and Racial Hypersegmentation 
in Home Equity Lending, in HOUSING POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 235, 237 
(SUSAN M. WACHTER AND R. LEO PENNE, eds., 2001). 
75
. Charles Schorin et al., Home Equity Loans, in HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 79, 83.  The term “home 
equity loan” covers a many different products; it includes the traditional second lien mortgage, but “it more 
commonly today refers to first liens to borrowers with impaired credit histories” and/or high debt-to-income 
ratios.  Id. The boundaries between the secondary market for traditional residential mortgage-backed 
securities and HEL-backed securities are expected to blur over time.  Id.  Home equity loans are typically 
used to “consolidate consumer debt in a lower, tax deductible form[;] reduce a homeowner’s monthly 
mortgage payment by extending the loan’s term[;] finance home improvements[;] monetize equity in the 
home[;] finance temporary liquidity needs, such as for education or medical expenses.”  Id. at 84-85.
76
. See CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 20 (“According to federal and industry officials, most 
predatory mortgage lending involves home equity loans or loan refinancings rather than loans for home 
purchases.”).
77
. See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 45, at 649 (discussing difficulties of comprehensively defining predatory 
lending).
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in which a broker78 or originating lender takes unfair advantage of a borrower, often 
through deception, fraud, or manipulation, to make a loan that contains terms that are 
disadvantageous to the borrower.”79  Accordingly, the GAO has defined predatory 
lending so as to include the following abusive practices and loan terms:
• Excessive fees. Abusive loans may include fees that greatly exceed the amounts 
justified by the costs of the services provided and the credit and interest rate risks 
involved. Lenders may add these fees to the loan amounts rather than requiring 
payment up front, so the borrowers may not know the exact amount of the fees they 
are paying.
• Excessive interest rates. . . . [L]enders may charge interest rates that far exceed 
what would be justified by any risk based pricing calculation, or lenders may “steer” 
a borrower with an excellent credit record to a higher-rate loan intended for 
borrowers with poor credit histories. 
• Single- premium credit insurance. Credit insurance is a loan product that repays the 
lender should the borrower die or become disabled. In the case of single-premium 
credit insurance, the full premium is paid all at once—by being added to the amount 
financed in the loan—rather than on a monthly basis. . ..
• Lending without regard to ability to repay. Loans may be made without regard to a 
borrower’s ability to repay the loan. In these cases, the loan is approved based on the 
value of the asset (the home) that is used as collateral. In particularly egregious cases, 
monthly loan payments have equaled or exceeded the borrower’s total monthly 
income. Such lending can quickly lead to foreclosure of the property.
• Loan flipping. Mortgage originators may refinance borrowers’ loans repeatedly in a 
short period of time without any economic gain for the borrower. With each 
successive refinancing, these originators charge high fees that “strip” borrowers’ 
equity in their homes. 
• Fraud and deception. Predatory lenders may perpetrate outright fraud through 
actions such as inflating property appraisals and doctoring loan applications and 
settlement documents. Lenders may also deceive borrowers by using “bait and 
switch” tactics that mislead borrowers about the terms of their loan. Unscrupulous 
lenders may fail to disclose items as required by law or in other ways may take 
advantage of borrowers’ lack of financial sophistication.
78
. Independent mortgage brokers typically sell loans that they originate to lenders for premiums ranging 
from 2% to 5%.  FITCH IBCA, SUBPRIME HOME EQUITY:  WHAT NEXT? 8 (Apr. 27, 1999).
79
. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 18.
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• Prepayment penalties. Penalties for prepaying a loan are not necessarily abusive, 
but predatory lenders may use them to trap borrowers in high-cost loans.
• Balloon payments. Loans with balloon payments are structured so that monthly 
payments are lower but one large payment (the balloon payment) is due when the 
loan matures. Predatory loans may contain a balloon payment that the borrower is 
unlikely to be able to afford, resulting in foreclosure or refinancing with additional 
high costs and fees. Sometimes, lenders market a low monthly payment without 
adequate disclosure of the balloon payment.80
Predatory practices are not typically present in the prime market.  Indeed, they are not 
present in much of the subprime market,81 where low- and moderate-income borrowers 
are concentrated.82  But they are used to prey on unsophisticated homeowners, typically 
those who are not integrated in the sphere of mainstream financial institutions such as 
banks and credit unions.83
According to the Senate hearing testimony of an anonymous employee of a predatory 
lender, 
my perfect customer would be an uneducated widow who is on a fixed income –
hopefully from her deceased husband’s pension and social security – who has her 
house paid off, is living off of credit cards, but having a difficult time keeping up her 
payments, and who must make a car payment in addition to her credit card 
payments.84
Such predatory practices lead to foreclosure:  from January 1998 through September 
1999, “the foreclosure rate for subprime loans was more than 10 times the foreclosure 
rate for prime loans.”85  While the increased credit risk of subprime borrowers explains 
part of this extraordinary differential, it also appears to be the result, in large part, of
predatory lending.86
III. THE ROLE OF SECURITIZATION IN THE PREDATORY LENDING 
CRISIS
80
. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 18- 19 (footnote omitted).
81
. See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 45, at 655 -56 (discussing tactics of predatory lenders). 
82
. UNEQUAL BURDEN, supra note 69, at 3.
83
. See James H. Carr et al., August 2001. Financial Services in Distressed Communities: Framing the Issue, 
Finding Solutions 6 (August 2001) (Fannie Mae Foundation) (“As many as 12 million households in the 
United States either have no relationship with traditional financial institutions or depend on fringe lenders for 
financial services. These households are disproportionately poor and minority.”).
84
. EQUITY PREDATORS: STRIPPING, FLIPPING AND PACKING THEIR WAY TO PROFITS: HEARING BEFORE THE 
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of “Jim Dough,” Anonymous Employee, 
Finance Co.), available at http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr14jd.htm (Mar. 16, 1998). 
85
. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 23-24.
86
. Id. at 24 (arguing that predatory lending is probable factor in increase in rate of subprime foreclosures).
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Real estate has always been considered to be good collateral87 because it needs 
little monitoring compared to other types of collateral, such as inventory, equipment and 
other personal property.88  And yet, Wall Street investors have historically viewed 
mortgages as riskier investments than those assets because they were regulated by a 
patchwork of local and state laws.89  It is in large part because of this aversion that prior 
to the 1970s, all real estate lending, like all politics, was local.90  Local lenders lent to 
local borrowers.91  Wall Street had ceded these local mortgage markets to local lenders 
for these reasons and because of the common belief that local lenders had more insight 
into local conditions.92 This state of affairs was to change with the birth of securitization 
and the growth of the secondary market.
A. Securitization Explained
Most simply put, securitization “refers to the aggregation and pooling of assets 
with similar characteristics in such a way that investors may purchase interests or 
securities backed by those assets.”93  A more complex picture of securitization would add 
in the appraisals done to ensure the value of the collateral; the third party credit 
enhancements offered by entities such as insurance companies; and the complex 
structures of the securities themselves.94
Given this complexity, it is not surprising that the typical investor in a securitized 
pool is an institutional investor which is purchasing such securities either in the 
secondary market or through a private placement.95  Securitizations are carefully 
structured to achieve precise tax, accounting and regulatory treatment to make them 
87
. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient? 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1134-35 (2002) [hereinafter 
Secured Debt].
88
. See, e.g., id. 
89
. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.11.  They were also viewed as riskier because mortgages were 
necessarily tied to local economies and a local recession or natural disaster could increase defaults and 
decrease the value of a pool of geographically-concentrated mortgages.  Id.
90
. See Joseph Philip Forte, Capital Markets Mortgage: A Ratable Model For Main Street And Wall Street, in
COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION FOR REAL ESTATE LAWYERS REAL ESTATE FINANCE IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS: 
RISKS AND REWARDS 4-6 (ALI – ABA CLE, 2004).
91
. Id.
92
. See id. at 4-6. 
93. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 1.01.A.; see Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future 
of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. R. 1655, 1656 n.1 & 1657 n.6 (2004) (providing thorough, albeit not 
comprehensive, review of securitization literature).  The terms “securitization,” “asset securitization,” and 
“structured finance” are often used interchangeably.  DAVID G. GLENNIE et al., SECURITIZATION 205 (1998); 
see also TAMAR FRANKEL, I SECURITIZATION , at 3  (2004 supp.) (stating that securitization transforms 
“illiquid debt into securities”).
94
. See Claire A. Hill, Securitization:  A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L. Q.  1061, 1063 
(1996); LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.4 (identifying typical third party providers of credit 
enhancements as banks and insurance companies that offer various complex products to meet the needs of 
proposed securities issuances); JOHN FRANCIS HILSON AND JEFFREY S. TURNER, ASSET-BASED LENDING: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECURED FINANCING § 2:6.2 (2003) (describing various forms of credit enhancements). 
95
. See Hill, Secured Debt, at 1131.
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attractive to such investors.96 The net result of the securitization process is that the 
investors in asset-backed securities come to own “the rights to the present and future 
economic value of the assets.”97
Typically, securitizations are designed to result in “securities that are of high 
quality, as evidenced by a high rating, and saleable on the capital markets.”98 The 
process of securitization thereby allows a firm with a less-than-perfect credit rating to 
spin off some of its receivables, such as mortgages, into an instrument that is capable of 
having a higher rating than the firm itself.99  An additional benefit of securitization is that 
it allows investors to manage various forms of risk that are inherent in the underlying 
receivables.  Thus, the underlying credit risk of the receivables can be managed through
credit enhancements and due diligence; prepayment risk is managed through pricing; and 
litigation risk (bankruptcy consolidation, originator fraud) is managed by choice of 
securitization structure.100
The basic market requirements for securitizations to thrive are standardized 
contracts; grading of risk via underwriting; historical statistics of performance of similar 
assets;101 standardization of applicable laws; standardization of servicer quality; reliable 
supply of quality credit enhancers;102 and computers to handle the complexity of the 
necessary analyses.103
A typical securitization involves the following steps:
(1) selection ("pooling") of the receivables to be conveyed by the company 
originating the transaction (the “originator”); 
(2) creation of a special purpose entity (“SPE”) which buys rights to 
payment from the selected receivables from the originator;
(3) creation of a second SPE (the "pool") to which the rights to the selected 
receivables will be conveyed; 
(4) establishment of the terms of the securities to be issued by the pool;104
(5) conveyance of the receivables to the pool; 
96
. See id. at 1130.
97
. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 1.01.A. 
98
. Hill, supra note 94, at 1073.
99. See id.
100
. Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 728.
101
. Lewis S. Ranieri, The Origins of Securitization, Sources of Its Growth, and Its Future Potential, in A 
PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 31, 40 (Leon T. Kendall and Michael J. Fishman, eds., 1997) [hereinafter, 
PRIMER]; Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 720 (“ subprime securitizations are a fairly new 
phenomenon relative to their prime counterparts, meaning that the performance of subprime loan pools over 
time is not yet well understood.”).
102
. Richard Roll, Benefits to Homeowners from Mortgage Portfolios Retained by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, 23 J. OF FIN. SERVICES RES. 29, 29 (2003) (“It is impossible to overstate the importance of credit 
enhancement in the process of mortgage securitization, one of the most prominent and striking features of the 
secondary market.”).
103
. Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in PRIMER, supra note 101, at 7.
104
. The terms (the interest rate, for instance) of the securities are typically different from the terms of the 
underlying mortgages. See A Low-, supra note 93, at 1067- 68.
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(6) issuance of the pool securities in a public offering or by private 
placement;
(7) establishment of mechanisms by which the receivables will be collected 
(“serviced”), and the amounts collected will be held until payment to the 
pool's securities holders; and 
(8) issuance of the rating agency's rating and the insurer's guaranty.105
The conveyance of the receivables through two SPEs is done to protect them from being 
consolidated with the potential bankruptcy estate of the originator of the pool, which 
could interrupt the flow of payments to the investors.106  This disaggregation of the risk 
inherent in the receivables and the risk inherent in the issuer lowers the effective cost of a 
securitization and thereby increases the value of the receivables to the issuer.107
Once the securitization is complete, the second SPE uses the proceeds of the 
issuance to pay the first SPE for the transferred assets which in turn uses the proceeds to 
pay the originator.  The investors are repaid over time from the principal and interest 
payments made by the mortgagors (the borrowers in the underlying loan transactions).108
The resulting securities may be either debt or equity securities, depending on the structure 
of the transaction and the perceived needs of the potential investors.109  (The 
securitization process is outlined in Table 1.
While an individual securitization of receivables can easily top a billion 
dollars,110 the securitization process is conceptually much the same as any financing or 
receivables purchase transaction that could be obtained from a bank or finance 
company.111  Indeed, nearly any type of asset with a regular stream of cash payments can 
be securitized112 – although certain assets, such as residential mortgages have turned out 
to be particularly attractive candidates.
Key attractions of investing in asset-backed securities, as opposed to individual 
assets, are that it allows an investor to simultaneously choose a narrow type of investment 
that is likely to meet its investment criteria while (i) reducing due diligence costs by 
delegating a large portion of such tasks to specialized third parties such as rating 
105
. See Hill, supra note 94, at 1077- 78 (describing steps of typical securitization).
106
. Plank, supra note 93, at 1664.
107
. Id. at 1662.  This lowering of the cost of securitization effectively comes at the expense of potential 
creditors of the originator should it file for bankruptcy.  See id. at 1657 & n.6 (2004) (reviewing literature that 
suggests that securitization is detrimental to the unsecured creditors of the originator and that securitization 
can be a technique for judgment proofing).
108
. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539 (2004) (describing 
process of securitization), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=386601.
109
. Joseph Philip Forte, Solving the Mortgage Tax Barrier to Defeasance, in COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION 
FOR REAL ESTATE LAWYERS REAL ESTATE FINANCE IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS: RISKS AND REWARDS 416 (ALI 
– ABA CLE, 2004).
110
. See, e.g., WELLS FARGO HOME EQUITY TRUST 2004-1. 
111
. See HILSON & TURNER, supra note 94, at § 2:6.1 (2003); see also FRANKEL, supra note 93, at 4 (arguing 
that a security is much like a debt, albeit one that is very liquid).
112
. See COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, STRUCTURED FINANCING TECHNIQUES 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 532 (1995). 
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agencies;113 (ii) spreading interest rate, credit and geographic- and sector-concentration 
risk114 over a number of similar assets; (iii) reducing the likelihood of interruptions of 
cash flows by the systemization of cash flows from a large pool of assets; and (iv) 
providing greatly improved liquidity over that of the individual assets that are 
securitized.115
Issuers obviously incur certain transaction costs in securitizations, such as rating 
agency fees and insurance premiums, that they would not incur by holding the mortgages 
in their own investment portfolios, but securitization also allows for certain cost-savings 
that frequently outweigh the additional costs; indeed, a rational issuer will only securitize 
receivables where it believes that the benefits of securitization exceed the transactional 
costs.116
The securitization of residential mortgages, in particular, is attractive to loan 
originators because, mortgages themselves are not easily traded in a secondary market.117
To be attractive to investors, each mortgage would require its own extensive and 
expensive evaluation and monitoring as each typically has its own unique terms and risks.  
These unique characteristics would make mortgages of limited interest on secondary 
markets that rely on standardization to reduce the transaction costs associated with 
conveying assets from one party to another.118 Since the 1970s, investors have become 
quite comfortable investing in residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) because 
the standardization of mortgage terms overcame these problems.119 And the 
securitization of subprime mortgages, in particular, took off when RMBS were designed 
with characteristics that insulate them from the increased level of credit risk from the 
underlying subprime mortgage collateral pool.120
113
 . See Ranieri, supra note 101, at 38 (“Securitization starts to break down as a concept when the issuer 
imposes on the investor the responsibility of analyzing the underlying collateral.”).
114
. See BOROD, supra note 32, at § 1.03.B.1.  For instance, by pooling mortgages from across the country, 
the pool reduces risks associated with changes in local economic conditions as well as risks associated with 
natural disasters.  Id.
115
. See id. at §§ 1.01.D, 1.02A.2 and 1.02A.5 (outlining benefits of securitization); see Michael C. McGrath, 
Structural and Legal Issues in Securitization Transactions, in ASSET-BASED FINANCING 2004, at 612-13 (PLI, 
2004) (describing additional benefits of securitization); LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.19 (same); Alan 
C. Hess et al., Elements of Mortgage Securitization, 1 J. OF REAL EST. FIN. AND ECON. 331, 338 (1988)
(same).
116
. See Plank, supra note 93, at 16 69.
117
. See Hill, supra note 94, at 1074- 75; Peter M. Carrazzo, Marketing the American Mortgage:  The 
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 778 (2005) (“Without a standardized mortgage document and uniform lending 
techniques, the secondary market never would have gotten off the ground.”).
118
. See id.; Eric Bruskin et al., The Nonagency Mortgage Market:  Background and Overview, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 5, 20 (“Standardization of loan programs nationwide has been a key element 
facilitating the development and evolution of today’s massive MBS market.”).
119
. LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.11.  RMBS standardization in the 1970s was driven by secondary 
market purchasing standards set by Government-Sponsored Entities.  Carrazzo, supra note 117, at 797 
(noting that Fannie and Freddie agreed that first order of business was development of standard mortgage).
120
. See THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 9. 
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B. Government-Sponsored Entities Create the Secondary Market
Mortgages have always been bought and sold by investors, but until recently the 
secondary market has been an informal arrangement.121  The introduction of residential 
mortgage-backed securities changed that:  once RMBS are issued, they can be easily 
traded on the secondary market with comparatively few transaction costs.  
The most important factor in the development of the secondary market has been 
the creation of two Government-Sponsored Entities by the federal government:  the 
Federal National Mortgage Association122 (now known as “Fannie Mae” and sometimes 
referred to as “Fannie”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation123 (now 
known as “Freddie Mac” and sometimes referred to as “Freddie”).124  Indeed, these two 
entities, along with the Government National Mortgage Association125 (GNMA and 
often referred to as Ginnie Mae), have made the United States secondary residential 
mortgage market “the envy of every other country,”126 one that has driven down the cost 
of mortgage credit for tens of millions of borrowers.127  While these entities had created 
a secondary market for certain loans prior to 1970, the broad secondary market began in 
121
. Van Order, supra note 31, at 236. 
122
. Id. at 236-37.  Fannie Mae is the oldest of the GSEs, created in the 1930s as a government-owned 
secondary market for loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration.  Id.  At first it operated by issuing 
its debt and purchasing mortgages that it held in its portfolio.  Id. In 1954, it was reorganized to allow private 
capital to replace federal funds.  Historical Perspective, supra note 30, at 164. In 1968, it was moved off the 
federal budget and converted into a GSE.  In the 1970s, it switched its focus to conventional loans.  Van 
Order, supra note 31, at 236-37.
123
. Van Order, supra note 31, at 236 -37.  Freddie Mac was created in 1970 
to be a secondary market for the S&Ls. (At the time, it dealt only with S&Ls, and Fannie Mae dealt with 
mortgage bankers. Now both institutions deal with the same originators.) Like Fannie Mae, it is a private 
GSE and also is off-budget.  It initiated the first MBS program for conventional loans in 1971, while 
Fannie Mae began its conventional MBS program in 1981. Both GSEs’ MBS are similar to GNMA’s; 
for example, both protect investors against credit risk but not interest rate risk.   . . .  Both Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac fund a significant (about 40 percent) share of their mortgages with debt  . . ..”  
Id.
124
. Id.
125
. Id.  at 236-37.  GNMA was created in 1968 to handle Fannie Mae’s policy -related tasks and to provide a 
secondary market for government insured loans.  It is on the federal budget as part of the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD).   GNMA was responsible for promoting the major innovation in 
secondary markets, the MBS. . . .  GNMA deals only in federally insured mortgages, primarily those insured 
by the FHA and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, which account for 10 to 15 percent of the market.”  
Id.; see PETER J. WALLISON et al., NATIONALIZING MORTGAGE RISK: THE GROWTH OF FANNIE MAE AND 
FREDDIE MAC 7 (2000) (noting that because Ginnie Mae can obtain funds for FHA and VA loan purchases at 
lower rates than any of its competitors (including Fannie and Freddie), “it faces no competition for these 
products.”).
126
. ROLL, supra note 102, at 29.
127
. Van Order, supra note 31, at 236 -37.  Fannie and Freddie have both been rocked by accounting scandals 
in the last year; as a result, there are calls on many fronts to modify their regulatory status.  See, e.g., Stephen 
Labaton, Limits Urged in Mortgage Portfolios, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at C1 (describing attempts to 
increase oversight over the two companies).
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earnest with the passage of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, which allowed 
the GSEs to purchase and securitize conforming mortgages.128
In this section I will outline in more general terms the growth of the secondary 
market; in the following section, I will take a closer look at the role of the GSEs in the 
creation of the secondary market.
A leading commentator describes two distinct stages in the development of 
securitization.129  The first stage, in the 1970s, centered on the use of pass-through 
securities.130  But pass-through RMBS left prepayment, interest rate, and residual credit 
exposure risks with investors.  These risks significantly limited the pool of potential 
investors.131  The second stage, which began in earnest in the 1980s, centered on the 
division of cash flows and/or credit risk into tranches132 that met the specific needs of 
different classes of investors.133
In the late 1970s, “the primary condition” necessary for the explosion of RMBS 
securitization came about:  “a funding shortfall.”134  That is, the strong desire for home 
ownership and the rapid escalation of housing prices created a demand for residential 
mortgages that the S&Ls could not meet.135  Wall Street firms responded and were 
successful over time changing tax laws to permit the tax-free pass-through of cash 
flows from home loans to mortgage securities, thereby avoiding double taxation, in 
modernizing the investments powers of institutional investors and in developing the 
computer technology needed to create new securities out of cash flows and to track 
the cash flows.136
As investors needed to evaluate the risk of MBS default, and because that is a 
difficult task, specialists stepped forward to provide such services.  The Privileged Raters 
have become preeminent providers of evaluations of the riskiness of mortgage-backed 
securities.137  Thus, the development of credit ratings by rating agencies such as Standard 
128
. 12 USC § 1451 et seq.  See Carrazzo, supra note 114, at 765 (providing history of secondary mortgage 
market).
129
. Kendall, supra note 103, at 15.
130. Typically, the term “pass-through securities” refers to those securities for which investors are paid out of 
their percentage ownership share of a securitized pool’s cash flow.  See HILSON & TURNER, supra note 94, at
§ 2:6.2 (2003).
131
. See Kendall, supra note 103, at 15.
132
. A “tranche” is a set of securities secured by a particular pool of collateral that has risk, reward, and/or 
maturity characteristics that differ from the other tranches secured by the same pool.
133
. Securities and Exchange Commission, Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306 (April 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8570.pdf, at 11-20 (last visited August 12, 2005) [hereinafter 
Proposed Definition]. 
134
. See Kendall, supra note 103, at 6. 
135
. Id.
136
. Id.  (providing firsthand account of early history of securitization); see RANIERI, supra note 101, at 34 
(same).
137
. LOUIS H. EDERINGTON & Jess B. YAWITZ, THE BOND RATING PROCESS, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL 
MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS, Ch. 23, p. 3 (Edward I. Altman ed., 6th  ed., 1987).
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& Poor’s and Moody’s became key elements in the effort to increase confidence that 
investors had in such securities.138  And as investor confidence grew, so did the rating 
business.139
The impact of securitization has been so great, that it is no exaggeration to say 
that it is 
one of the most important and abiding innovations to emerge in financial markets 
since the 1930s.  It is changing the face of American and world finance.  A revolution 
has occurred in the way the borrowing needs of consumers and businesses are met.  
The historic use of financial intermediaries to gather deposits and lend them to those 
seeking funds is being supplemented and even replaced by securitization processes 
that bypass traditional intermediaries and link borrowers directly to money and 
capital markets.140
During the 1970s, the primary purchasers of RMBS were Fannie and Freddie as 
well as the thrifts.141  Since the funding shortfall of the late 1970s, commercial banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds and mutual funds, among other investors, have 
become large, frequent and active investors in that market.142  Investment in RMBS took 
off after those institutional investors entered the market:  indeed, the RMBS market has 
increased by more than 500 percent from 1984 through the early 2000s.143
Starting sporadically in the late 1970s, non-federally-related issuers such as 
commercial banks and mortgage companies began to issue residential mortgage-backed 
securities.144  These “private label” RMBS are issued without the governmental or quasi-
governmental guaranty that a federally-related issuer, such as a GSE, would give and are 
typically backed by non-conforming loans.145 The development, however, of private 
label RMBS was “hampered by credit risk concerns.”146  Private label securitization 
gained momentum during the Savings and Loan crisis in the early 1980s, when Wall 
Street firms identified “a unique opportunity to profit from the thrift crisis by proffering 
138
. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.11.
139
 . See Kendall, supra note 103, at 14 (“The credit rating agencies welcomed the emergence of ratable 
securities as a new product line that would increase corporate revenues through new issues and subsequent 
rating review fees.”); ROY C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, RATING AGENCIES: IS THERE AN AGENCY ISSUE?, in 
RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM  291 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) 
(“The rating business has grown with the process of financial disintermediation, as bank debt has been 
replaced by securities issued in one financial market after another . . ..”).
140
. Kendall, supra note 103, at 1.
141
. LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.3.
142
. Id. at § 1.3; Bruskin, supra note 118, at 9 (providing history of nonagency securitization from late 1970s 
through mid-1980s).
143
. LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 2.22 and § 1.3.
144
. Forte, supra note 90, at 4-6.
145
. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 2.22.
146
. Forte, supra note 90, at 4-6.
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the securitization exit strategy as the solution to the thrifts' residential portfolio 
dilemma.”147
By the 1990s, the types of mortgage-backed securities that were offered in the 
private-label mortgage market became increasingly complex, moving from single-class 
mortgage-backed securities to multiclass Collateralized Mortgage Obligation 
(“CMO”)148 and Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (“REMIC”) structures.149
And then, starting in the mid-1990s, a significant number of home equity lenders began to 
securitize their loans as “AAA” MBS.150  The net result of all of this growth is that “by 
the end of 2002 more than 58 percent of outstanding U.S. single-family residential 
mortgage debt was financed through securitization.”151
One cannot fully understand the RMBS market without understanding the role of 
the GSEs in creating, stabilizing and growing that market.  And so, I now turn to them.
C. The Ongoing Role of the GSEs in the Secondary Market
Fannie and Freddie participate in the secondary market in two ways:  (1) by 
issuing and guarantying RMBS and (2) by purchasing mortgages and RMBS for their 
own account.152  Indeed, they are monstrously large, together having $1.81 trillion in 
assets and $1.76 trillion in liabilities at the end of 2003.153  The GSEs, as the dominant 
purchasers of residential mortgages, have effectively standardized prime residential 
mortgages by promulgating buying guidelines.154  Such standardization has led to 
increases in the liquidity and attractiveness of mortgages as investments to a broad array 
of investors.155  And the GSEs themselves have seen their purchases of residential 
147
. Id.
148
. A Collateralized Mortgage Obligation is “a pay-through bond that directs the total payment of principal 
and interest of the collateral pool to structure different types and maturities of securities in order to meet 
investor requirements and reduce overall borrowing costs.”  LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 3.12.
149
. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 2.22.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 allowed CMOs to elect the 
favored tax status of a REMIC and since 1986, “most new CMOs have been issued in REMIC form to create 
tax and accounting advantages for the issuers.”  THE BOND MARKET ASSOCIATION, THE INVESTORS GUIDE TO 
PASS-THROUGH AND COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE SECURITIES 3 (2002).
150
. See Gangwani, supra note 41, at 35.
151
. Consumer Protection, supra note 38, at 72; see Lore & Cowan, supra note 7, at § 1.2 (listing additional 
factors in rapid growth of mortgage securitization).
152
. See Fannie Mae Website, at http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/industry/index.jhtml (describing 
business lines); Freddie Mac Website, at
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about/what_we_do/business.html (same).
153
. Carnell, supra note 6, at 13.  As of that date, they also guaranteed $1.64 trillion in outstanding MBS.  Id.
154
. See id.  Fannie and Freddie have also increased the safety of RMBS investments by offering credit 
guaranties, “which involves guaranteeing the credit performance of single-family and multifamily loans for a 
fee.”  Fannie Mae Website (mortgage backed securities), at
http://www.fanniemae.com/mbs/understanding/index.jhtml).
155
. See Raymond A. Jensen, Mortgage Standardization:  History of Interaction of Economics, Consumerism 
and Governmental Pressure, 7 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 397 (1972) (noting that Fannie Mae created task 
force to identify “substantive mortgage clauses which would be essential to make the [uniform form of] 
mortgage saleable to investors.”).
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mortgages rise dramatically from $69 billion in 1980.156  By 2003, Fannie and Freddie 
issued $1.91 trillion of RMBS and their total outstanding RMBS amounted to $3.01 
trillion.157  The net result of this growth is that the GSEs’ combined share of total bond 
market debt was 36% in 2003.158
The GSEs’ charters restrict the mortgages they may buy.159  In general, they 
must buy loans with loan-to-value ratios of 80 percent or less160  and may not buy 
mortgages with principal amounts greater than an amount set each year and fixed at 
$359,650 for a single family home for 2005.161  Loans that comply with the restrictions 
placed on Fannie and Freddie are known as “conforming” loans. Those that do not 
comply with either of these restrictions are known as “nonconforming” loans.162
Fannie and Freddie are now publicly traded corporations, “but they both have 
nebulous, implicit guarantees, a perception by the financial markets that the [federal] 
government stands behind their debt, which allows them to borrow (or sell RMBS) at 
interest rates lower than they would otherwise”163 In return for this guarantee (one not 
available to any other private secondary market entity), and certain other benefits that 
Fannie and Freddie are granted, they were expected to grow and stabilize the secondary 
market, and it is generally agreed that they achieved these goals.164  They were also 
expected to lower the cost of credit for borrowers, although there is significant dispute as 
to how much they have achieved this goal.165
156
. See Van Order, supra note 31, at 237; Wayne Passmore et al., GSEs, Mortgage Rates, and the Long-Run 
Effects of Mortgage Securitization 1 n.2 (FEDS Working Paper No. 2001-26, 2001), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=275008 (“During the 1990s, their yearly securitization rate is estimated to have 
fluctuated between 45 percent and 78 percent of conventional conforming mortgage originations.”).
157
. Carnell, supra note 6, at 14.
158
. Id. at 15.
159
. Passmore, supra note 156, at 3.
160
.Id.  This limitation may be lifted if other measures are taken to limit the mortgage’s credit risk.  Id.
161
. HOLDEN LEWIS, CONFORMING MORTGAGE LOAN LIMITS RISE FOR 2005, Bankrate.com, at
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20041203a1.asp (Dec. 2004).  The annual adjustment is 
based on the annual increase in the cost of the average house, as measured by the Federal Housing Finance 
Board.  Id.
162
. Passmore, supra note 156, at 5 (“Most private-sector securitizations are backed by jumbo mortgages or 
mortgages held by “sub-prime” borrowers, the bulk of which have blemished credit histories but adequate 
assets or income to support a mortgage.”); Bruskin, supra note 118, at 6-7 (identifying major categories of 
nonconforming loans as jumbos, B/C quality (which includes subprime and low-doc and no-doc loans).).  
Those loans that comply with Fannie and Freddie requirements except for the restriction on loan amount are 
typically referred to as “jumbo” mortgages.  Passmore, supra note 156, at 5.
163
. Van Order, supra note 31, at 236; see also Edward L. Toy, A Credit Intensive Approach to Analyzing 
Whole Loan CMOs, in HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 219, 219 (“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac supported 
securities are also treated by many as having the equivalent of U.S. government backing.”).
164
. See, e.g., Passmore, supra note 156, at 3 (Fannie and Freddie’s “objectives have been largely 
achieved”).
165
. Id. at 215 (“We find that GSEs generally–but not always—lower mortgage rates, particularly when the 
GSEs behave competitively, because the GSEs’ implicit government backing allows them to sell securities 
without the credit enhancements needed in the private sector.”).
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Over half of all residential mortgages are sold into the secondary market.166  Of 
those sold into the secondary market, Fannie and Freddie now own or securitize more 
than 80 percent of the outstanding stock of single-family mortgages.167  The remaining 
20 percent of the secondary market (other than the portion originated by Ginne Mae) 
comes from the “private label” firms, a large component of which is composed of jumbo 
mortgage securitizations.168
Private label firms are not in a position to compete head on with the GSEs 
because their cost of capital is greater.169  Because of this advantage, Fannie and Freddie 
can price their securities more attractively than private label issuers and they therefore 
have nearly the entire “conforming” market to themselves.170 The fact that private-label 
firms cannot compete with the GSEs is of key importance in the subprime market, 
because Fannie and Freddie are beginning to enter it.171
Freddie Mac began purchasing subprime loans in 1997 and Fannie Mae began in 
1999.  Both have moved slowly and have limited their purchases to the most creditworthy 
segment of the subprime market. They are believed to own a relatively small portion of 
outstanding subprime securities.172  Nonetheless, the GSEs have had and will have an 
extraordinary impact on the subprime secondary market as they become more 
comfortable operating in the subprime market.
166
. See Van Order, supra note 31, at 237.
167
. See Roll, supra note 102, at 32 (“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have supplied a large part of the growth 
in demand for mortgage debt via two distinct channels.  First, their traditional securitization activity increased 
in relative importance from 1990 through 1993 and now accounts for roughly 25% of all mortgage debt.  
Second, their retained portfolios of directly purchased whole loans and MBSs rose steadily during the past 
decade from about 5% to more than 16% of total mortgage debt.”).
168
. See Van Order, supra note 31, at 237; see NATIONALIZING MORTGAGE RISK, supra note 125, at 7-8 
(according to the Federal Reserve, FHA and VA loans constitute about 11 percent of the total residential 
mortgage market; commentators believe that jumbos make up another 15; Fannie and Freddie can compete 
for the remainder of the market, which includes conventional/conforming loans (the majority of the 
remainder) as well as subprime, home equity and multifamily housing loans).
169
. Forte, supra note 90, at 4-6; see WALLISON, supra note 125, at 1 (“The lower interest rates that Fannie 
and Freddie can command because of their government backing permit them to out-compete any private-
sector rival and to dominate any market they are permitted to enter.”).  Fannie and Freddie have a number of 
other competitive advantages over other RMBS issuers.  See Passmore, supra note 156, at 215, 4; Carnell, 
supra note 6, at 17-19.
170
. See STANDARD & POOR’S, PRICING AND PREPAYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF NONCONFORMING MORTGAGE 
POOLS 1 (Aug. 14, 2000).  The nonconforming rate is usually 25 to 50 basis points higher than the 
conforming rate.  Id.
171
. See Van Order, supra note 31, at 236-37; WALLISON, supra note 125, at 7-8 (“In the past, the GSEs 
purchased almost exclusively conventional/conforming loans, because those are the best credits available in 
the middle-class market.  But increasingly in recent years – as they have foreseen that their need for assets 
will outstrip the conventional/conforming market – the GSEs have entered the market for subprime, home 
equity, and multifamily housing loans.”). 
172
. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38,  at 73.  Fannie Mae “introduced a new and improved automated 
underwriting system in 1995 and began to accept higher risk loans. Subsequently, Fannie Mae began to vary 
the some of the terms with the loan’s level of risk.”  Wendy Edelberg, Risk-based Pricing of Interest Rates in 
Household Loan Markets, at 3 (FEDS Working Paper No. 2003-62, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=484522 (citation omitted).
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Fannie and Freddie have issued buying guidelines, indicating the types of 
subprime loans that they are willing to purchase.  Given their dominant role in the 
secondary market, their buying guidelines will likely affect the terms of the mortgages 
offered by many originators, so as to ensure that Fannie and Freddie are potential buyers 
of those mortgages.  What is most striking about the GSEs’ guidelines is that they are 
much more lenient than those that are found in the Privileged Raters pronouncements
described below.  
The only general category of mortgages regulated by state predatory lending laws 
that Fannie and Freddie indicated that they would not purchase are “high-cost home 
loans.”173  As we shall see below, the Privileged Raters, which have far more power than 
the GSEs to impact the entire subprime market, took a far more conservative approach to 
loans regulated by state predatory lending laws.
IV. THE ROLE OF RATING AGENCIES IN THE SECURITIZATION OF 
MORTGAGED-BACKED SECURITIES
All rating agencies derive their power in the secondary market from the value 
that investors place on the informational content of the ratings that they provide.174
Nearly every securitization of mortgage-backed securities is rated by one, and often two,
of the three dominant rating agencies, Standard & Poors, Moody’s and Fitch.175  The 
173
. Fannie Mae, Announcement 04-06: Authoritative Online Selling and Servicing Guides, Purchase of 
Massachusetts “High Cost Home Mortgage Loans,” Mortgage Loan Documents, Arbitration, Waiver of 
Prepayment Premium, Guaranty Fees, and Escrow Accounts, at 3 (Sept. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2004/fannie-04- 06.pdf [hereinafter FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 04-
06]; Fannie Mae, Announcement 03-12: Purchase of New Jersey and New Mexico “High-Cost Home Loans,” 
and Illinois “High-Risk Home Loans”(Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://mbaa.org/resident/2003/fannie03-
12.pdf [hereinafter FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 03-12]; Fannie Mae, Announcement 03-02: Purchase of Georgia 
and New York “High-Cost Home Loans” (2003), available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2003/fannie03-02.pdf [hereinafter FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 03-02]; 
Letter from Michael C. May, Senior Vice President, Freddie Mac, to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Services, 
Revisions to Freddie Mac’s Purchase Requirements Based on the Enactment of Antipredatory Lending 
Legislation in New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Illinois, Maine and Nevada (Nov. 26, 2003), available 
at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2003/ freddie_indyltr1126.pdf [hereinafter MICHAEL MAY 
LETTER].  Fannie also indicated that it would not purchase HOEPA “high-cost” home loans and loans with 
mandatory arbitration clauses.  FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 04-06, at 3-4.  Freddie Mac indicated that it would 
not buy “Mortgages originated with single-premium credit insurance; Mortgages with terms that exceed 
either the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) or the points and fees threshold under the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act HOEPA); or subprime Mortgages with prepayment terms that exceed three years.”  
MICHAEL MAY LETTER.
174
. Many commentators see this rating agency role as the dominant one.  See Partnoy, supra note 29, at 
633-34 n.62 (cataloging articles arguing that ratings have informational content).  Such articles ignore or 
discount the obvious privileged regulatory status of the NRSROs as well as the consistent finance literature 
that argues that “credit ratings are of scant informational value.”  Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit 
Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65 (Richard M. Levich et al.
eds., 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=285162.
175
. See GLENNIE, supra note 93 at 221; G. Rodney Thompson and Peter Vaz, Dual Bond Ratings:  A Test of 
the Certification Function of Rating Agencies, 25 FIN. REV. 457 (1990) (suggesting that typically two ratings 
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rating that the agency provides “is an assessment of the likelihood of timely payment on 
securities.”176  The function of the rating agencies is to reduce “the information 
asymmetry between issuers of and investors in securities.”177
The three dominant rating agencies (collectively, the “Privileged Raters”), derive 
additional power because they are granted a privileged status by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and other financial services regulators.  This privileged status 
results from the incorporation of the Privileged Raters’ ratings into government 
regulation of other companies.  For their labors, the Privileged Raters are compensated by 
fees from issuers of securities that solicit ratings from them.178
While regulators have incorporated the ratings of the Privileged Raters into their 
regulations, the Privileged Raters themselves are not regulated in any meaningful way.  
Thus, to the extent that they make systemic mistakes or demonstrate systemic biases, they 
are not accountable to anyone – unless their failings are significant enough to threaten 
investor confidence in their work product.
A. How Rating Agencies Rate
The rating process is typically initiated by or on behalf of a securities issuer.179
The issuer then provides the rating agency with information regarding the issuer’s 
background, strategy, operations systems, historical performance data and any other 
information that may be relevant.180  The issuer then typically meets with the rating 
agency to explain the proposed structure of the deal, the nature of the underlying assets 
and the operations of the originator of the assets.181
significantly decrease the yield of a security, thereby increasing issuer’s return); RICHARD CANTOR AND 
FRANK PACKER, MULTIPLE RATINGS AND CREDIT STANDARDS:  DIFFERENCES OF OPINION IN THE CREDIT 
RATING INDUSTRY, at 13 (FRBNY Research Paper No. 9527, 1995) (arguing that additional ratings “are likely 
to be most desirable when the degree of uncertainty about a firm’s prospects is large and when the amount of 
funds to be raised” is substantial).
176
. Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 2.
177
. Id.; see Partnoy, supra note 29, at 632 (“Information asymmetry exists in markets where sellers have 
superior information to buyers about product quality, yet cannot costlessly convey this information to buyers.  
If buyers are economically rational, prices in a market with information asymmetry will reflect the average 
quality of a product, and sellers with superior products will bear the cost of the information asymmetry. 
Consequently, sellers in such a market will have an incentive to disclose the superior nature of their product 
so that they can receive the highest price.”).
178
. See infra note 207 and accompanying text; STIMPSON, supra note 14, at 52.  For example, the SEC relies 
heavily upon the services of NRSROs in Rule 3a-7, relating to the 1940 Investment Company Act.  See Amy 
K. Rhodes, The Role of the SEC in the Regulation of the Rating Agencies: Well-Placed Reliance or Free-
Market Interference?, 20 Seton Hall Legis. J. 293, 344 (1996). Pursuant to Rule 3a-7, “a favorable rating by 
only one NRSRO of an asset-backed securities issuance exempts the transaction from the regulatory scheme 
of” that Act.  Id.  It is in this manner that the NRSRO rating reduces the transaction costs and provides other 
benefits to issuers of RMBS while also providing a benefit to the NRSRO itself because of the fees that it can 
charge to the issuer for the rating analysis prescribed by Rule 3a-7.
179
. See BOROD, supra note 32, at § 9.01.B.
180
. Id.
181
. Id. While RMBS securities issuers typically solicit a rating, it is also standard practice for Moody’s and 
S&P to rate a security even where an issuer has not solicited (and paid for) a rating.  Such ratings are based 
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In order to evaluate the “loss potential” of nonagency (nonagency RMBS are 
those that are not issued by GSEs nor by government agencies, like Ginnie Mae and are 
also referred to as private label RMBS)182 mortgage pools, rating agencies need to 
evaluate four key aspects of a securitization transaction:  
(1) frequency of default; 
(2) severity of loss given default; 
(3) pool characteristics; and 
(4) credit enhancement and the structure of the security.183
In order to understand these four key aspects of the transaction, rating agencies 
conduct four types of analyses:  (1) qualitative; (2) quantitative; (3) servicing; and (4) 
legal risk.184
Qualitative Analysis. Qualitative analysis “involves a review of those items that 
could result in a delay or failure of payment to the investors.”185 A primary concern here 
is the risk profile of the originator.186  The rating agency will also review the assets to be 
contributed into the collateral pool supporting the securities to be issued to determine, 
among other things, the predictability of their cash flow.187  For real property 
transactions, rating agencies review 
a host of issues relating to the underlying property including, for example, the 
location and accessibility of the property, the diversity and number of tenants of the 
property, local and regional vacancy rates and rents, the property’s physical 
condition, the property’s management, the terms of the leases of the property’s 
tenants, the credit ratings of the property’s principal tenants, the strength of the local 
economy, and possible hazards (such as earthquakes), among other things.188
Quantitative Analysis.  Quantitative analysis involves a review of the cash flow 
aspects of the transaction.189 This quantitative analysis is a key part of valuating the 
collateral and determining the credit enhancement levels;  it also is key to determining 
solely on public information.  Alexander W. Butler, and Kimberly J. Rodgers, RELATIONSHIP RATING: HOW 
DO BOND RATING AGENCIES PROCESS INFORMATION?, at 16 n.17 (EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper No. 
491, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=345860 (reviewing Moody’s unsolicited ratings practices). 
182
. Sources of Funds, supra note 30, at 143.
183
. Douglas L. Bendt, et al., The Rating Agencies’ Approach, in HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 191, 192; see 
Plank, supra note 93, at 1667 n.42 (“For example, if securities backed by a pool of receivables need loss 
coverage or credit enhancement equal to seven percent of the original principal balance of the receivables to 
achieve the desired rating, this loss coverage could be in the form of additional collateral: An issuance of $ 
100 million of debt securities backed by a pool of $ 107 million receivables”).
184
. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 9.01.C.
185
. Id. at § 9.01.C.1.
186
. Id. 
187
. Id. 
188
. Id.
189
. Id. at § 9.01.C.2. 
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the sizing of the principal amount of the securities to be issued and determining whether 
the issued securities will be able to make timely payment of the rated securities.190
Underwriting Criteria and Servicer Characteristics.  Rating agencies review the 
originators’ underwriting criteria as well as the capabilities of the servicers of the loans 
that are placed within the pool.191  Rating agencies will review individual loans to ensure
that they comply with the originators stated underwriting criteria.192 The rating agency 
will do an independent review of the servicer where the originator is not acting as 
servicer; this is undertaken to evaluate the risk of delays in payments due to operational 
problems of the servicer or its own credit problems.193
Legal Analysis.  Legal analysis involves a review of the legal risks associated 
with the proposed transaction.194 These legal risks, also called “litigation risks,” include 
the risk that RMBS investors will be liable for violations of predatory lending laws by the 
originators of the mortgages in any given RMBS pool.195  Other legal risks evaluated by 
the rating agencies include
• the effects of a bankruptcy of the issuer on the structure and cash 
flows;196
• the regulatory issues of the issuer/industry;
• the legal structure of the sale (i.e., true sale or a loan);
190
. Id.; STIMPSON, supra note 14, at 470 (“Accounting for the potential variability of collateral losses is 
important in the structured finance rating process because more variable pool losses, with constant expected 
pool losses, generally implies higher expected losses for investors.”).
191
. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 9.01.C.4.; Schorin, supra note 75, at 83 (“Loan servicers who have extensive 
experience with A borrowers have found that their expertise in that arena does not necessarily, or even 
generally, carry over into the B and C sector.  The cost of servicing B and C loans could easily double that of 
servicing A loans.”).  
192
. Id. at § 9.01.C.4.
193
. Id. at § 9.01.C.4.; Bruskin, supra note 118, at 29 (“Many of the servicer’s functions are critical to the 
credit quality of a transaction.  In addition to collecting the monthly payments and passing the cash flows to 
the trustee, the servicer handles delinquent loans, initiates foreclosure procedures, and liquidates properties 
when necessary.”).
194
. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 9.01.C.3.
195
. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 723 (“Litigation risk is the possibility that borrowers 
will bring predatory lending claims or, when charged with nonpayment, raise predatory lending defenses 
against the trusts that own their loans.”); LORE & COWAN, supra note 12, at § 9.6 (“Another legal 
consideration that can be expected to affect the rating of a mortgage-backed security relates to what legal 
remedies and procedural rules are available to the issuer under state and local laws to enforce mortgage loan 
covenants, particularly upon default in payment of principal and interest of the mortgages. Usury statutes 
may operate to limit enforcement of interest rate provisions of mortgage loans in default; foreclosure laws 
(such as homestead laws and statutory rights of redemption) and local procedural rules may prevent the 
holder from obtaining title to property securing defaulted mortgage loans in a timely manner; and anti-
deficiency laws effectively may preclude the possibility of timely resale of foreclosed property by the issuer.  
Additional protection may be required to achieve a desired securities rating, depending upon the terms of the
collateral instruments and the jurisdictions where the mortgaged properties are located.”).
196
. Historically, “[t]he main legal and regulatory considerations in structured financings are concerned with 
the potential insolvency of the user of other participants in the transaction.”.  STIMPSON, supra  note 14, at 
497.
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• the requirements necessary for a perfection of security interests; 
• contractual restrictions (such as negative pledge covenants); and 
• the tax implications on the Special Purpose Entity and investors.197
This article will focus on the legal risk that investors in a RMBS pool will be 
held liable for violations of predatory lending laws by the originators of the mortgages in 
any given pool.
B. The Dominant Rating Agencies Enjoy Privileged Regulatory Status as 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
For the purposes of this article, the term “privileged regulatory status” refers to 
the role of the Privileged Raters as gatekeepers to other private financial entities which 
are attempting to access the financial markets.198  This status results from the favorable 
treatment that government regulators grant to securities issued by private companies and 
other entities that are highly rated by the Privileged Raters.  This privileged regulatory 
status is granted by various government bodies in exchange for the quasi-public 
responsibilities the Privileged Raters take on by providing ratings to the investment 
community, but is not paired with any commensurate monitoring of the Privileged Raters 
themselves.  Thus, the Privileged Raters themselves are privileged because regulators 
have incorporated the service (ratings) that they sell into the regulatory structure of the 
capital markets.  In addition, the investment-grade ratings that the Privileged Raters issue 
are themselves equivalent to a “regulatory license”199 that confers a significant financial 
benefit on its recipient.200
197
. See DAVID W. FORTI AND BLASÉ  B. IACONELLI, SECURITIZATIONS § 19.05 (Patrick D. Dolan and C. 
VanLeer Davis III, eds., 2000). 
198
. See Paul Robbe and Ronald J. Mahieu, Are the Standards Too Poor? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Timeliness and Predictability of Credit Rating Changes 1 (Jan. 2005) (“In the United States, banks and other 
financial institutions have only been allowed to hold bonds of investment grade quality (i.e., bonds that are 
rated BBB- or better) ever since 1936. As a consequence, having a credit rating has become a necessity in 
order to acquire external debt capital.”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=648561; Schwarcz, supra note 
29, at 2 (“To a large extent, the almost universal demand by investors for ratings makes rating agencies 
gatekeepers of the types of securities that investors will buy.  . . .  This unprecedented power, and the de facto 
control of rating agencies over international debt markets, make the issue of whether rating agencies should 
remain unregulated more urgent.”); Richard Cantor, Moody’s Investors Service Response to the Consultative 
Paper Issued by the Basel Committee on Bank Super vision “A New Capital Adequacy Framework,” 25 J. of 
BANKING AND FIN. 171, 179 (2001) (“By using ratings as a tool of regulation, regulators fundamentally 
change the nature of the rating agency product.  Issuers pay rating fees, not to facilitate access to the capital 
market, but to purchase a privileged status for their securities from the regulator.  As a result, licensed rating 
agencies will have a product to sell regardless of the analytic quality of their ratings and their credibility with 
the investor community.”).
199
. Frank Partnoy uses the term “regulatory license” to describe “the valuable property rights associated 
with the ability of a private entity, rather than a regulator, to determine the substantive effect of legal rules.”  
See Partnoy, supra note 29, at 623.
200
. Id.
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Rating agencies have been actively rating securities in the United States since the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century.201 The main source of the privileged regulatory 
status of the Privileged Raters, that select subset of rating agencies, derives from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, which had granted them (or their predecessors-in-
interest) nationally recognized statistical rating organization status (each, a “NRSRO”) in 
1975.202 NRSRO status initially referred to those rating agencies whose ratings could be 
used in implementing the net capital requirements for broker-dealers, the first instance of 
a high rating by a rating agency resulting in favorable regulatory treatment.203  At that 
time, the SEC essentially grandfathered three rating agencies: Fitch, Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s.204
Currently, a credit rating agency must request a no-action letter (the means by 
which the SEC makes a case-by-case regulatory determination) from the SEC before that 
agency attains NRSRO status, presumably until that agency ceases to exist.205  While six 
such no-action letters have been granted by the SEC since 1975, due to consolidation 
only five NRSROs remain: A.M. Best Company, Inc. (“A.M. Best”), Dominion Bond
Rating Service Limited (“DBRS”), Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P.206  The first two are very 
small and have only a tiny impact on the RMBS market.207
The SEC did not define an NRSRO in 1975 and has intermittently attempted to 
do so since then.  The lead-up to the current rule proposal to define the term NRSRO 
began in 1994 when the SEC issued a Concept Release requesting comments on the 
Commission’s use of NRSRO ratings.208  The Concept Release was followed by a 1997 
201 See Rhodes, supra note 178, at 294-302 (discussing the growth of rating agencies in the United States).  
202
. Hill, supra note 29, at 44; see Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 2 (noting, for instance, that Rule 3a-7 of the 
Investment Company Act of 194 Rule 3a-7 “exempts certain financings from registration and compliance 
with that Act if, among other requirements, the securities are rated ‘investment grade’ by at least one 
NRSRO.”).
203 Id. at 321.  
204 Id.
205 See id. at 8-10.
206 See id. at 5.  See also letter from Kent Wideman, Group Managing Director, Financial Institutions & 
Policy, Dominion Bond Rating Service to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, 1 (June 10, 2005) (hereinafter 
DBRS Letter), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/dbrs061005.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005), 
letter from Larry G. Mayewski, Executive Vice President and Chief Rating Officer, A.M. Best Company, Inc. 
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, 1-2 (June 9, 2005), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/ambestco060905.pdf (last visited August 14, 2005).  
207
. Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited was recently granted NRSRO status on February 23, 2003. Id.
A.M. Best specializes in ratings of insurance-related organizations.  See A. M. Best Website, available at
http://www3.ambest.com/ratings/default.asp (last visited August 14, 2005).  The Egan-Jones Jones Rating 
Company has been the most forceful of the currently non-NRSRO rating agencies in pressing the SEC to 
grant it NRSRO status, but has not prevailed as of yet.  See Press Release, Egan-Jones Rating Company, 
November 15, 2002 Hearing on Credit Rating Agencies, at 3 (Nov. 10, 2002).
208
. For a fuller discussion of the recent attempts to define the term NRSRO and the process by which credit 
rating agencies are designated NRSROs, see Proposed Definition, supra note 133, at 11-20 and SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE 
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS AS REQUIRED BY §702(B) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 
10-25 (Jan. 2003), (describing the use of NRSRO ratings in government regulations and legislation, as well 
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Rule Proposal to define the term NRSRO.209  The 1997 Rule Proposal would have 
established a formal application process for recognizing NRSROs en lieu of the no-action 
letter process.210  The 1997 Rule Proposal continued the reliance on market-based 
acceptance of a rating agency through a criteria requiring “national recognition by 
predominant users of securities ratings.”211  However, the SEC did not act upon this 1997 
proposal and by 2002 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs launched 
investigations into the Enron Corp. collapse that questioned why the NRSROs had 
continued to rate Enron a good credit risk until only four days before the firm declared 
bankruptcy.212
Additionally, in November 2002 the SEC conducted public hearings on the use 
of credit rating agencies in the U.S. securities markets.213  Furthermore, in January of 
2003 the SEC submitted a report required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the role 
and function of rating agencies that addressed the outstanding issues from the 1997 Rule 
Proposal and the 2002 hearings.214  In June 2003, the SEC issued another Concept 
Release seeking comments on a number of issues related to credit rating agencies.215
Among many other issues, most commenters supported the concept of regulatory 
oversight of NRSROs to determine whether an agency continues to meet the NRSRO
criteria on an ongoing basis.216  Internationally, in December 2004, the Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) 
published a “Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies” that provided a 
voluntary code of conduct for rating agencies that addressed how to manage or eliminate 
conflicts of interest, help prevent misuse of nonpublic information,, and how to protect 
agency analytical independence.217
as by foreign jurisdictions) (hereinafter SEC Report), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005).
209
. Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 
34-39457 (December 17, 1997), 62 FR 68018 (December 30, 1997).  See SEC Report, supra note 208, at 12-
15.  
210
. See SEC Report, supra note 208, at 13.  
211
. See id.  Other criteria included organizational structure, adequate staffing, financial resources, use of 
systematic procedures to ensure credible and accurate ratings, contacts with the management of issuers, and 
internal procedures to prevent misuse of nonpublic information.  The rule asked for comments on prohibition 
of charging issuers fees based upon the size of a transaction, whether a time period should be required for 
action on an application for NRSRO designation, whether NRSROs should make their ratings publicly 
available, whether objective criteria should be used for NRSRO recognition, and whether statistical models 
could serve as substitutes for NRSRO credit ratings. See id. at 14-15.  
212
. See id. at 16-18.
213
. Topics addressed included: (a) the current role and functioning of rating agencies; (b) informational flow 
in the rating process; (c) concerns regarding potential conflicts of interests or abusive practices; and (d) the 
regulatory treatment of rating agencies, including concerns regarding barriers to entry.  See id. at 20-21.
214
. SEC Report, supra note 208.
215
. See Proposed Definition, supra note 133, at 17-18.
216
. See id. at 19.
217
. See id. at 19-20 (citing THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF IOSCO, CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (December 2004)).
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In 2005, the SEC has again released a Rule Proposal to define “NRSRO.”218  In 
the proposed new definition, the Commission states that “[a]n entity that meets the 
proposed definition would be an NRSRO,” clearly describing a self-designating process, 
absent affirmative Commission action.219  The Commission’s proposal also notes that 
their staff will be available to provide no-action letters as appropriate to rating agencies 
that choose to seek them.220
Public comments regarding a renewal process for NRSRO no-action letters have 
varied in response to whether requiring a renewal of NRSRO status is a positive 
development.  Unsurprisingly, Standard & Poor’s found a renewal requirement for 
existing NRSROs to be an additional, unneeded cost because of a potential agreement 
between existing NRSROs and the Commission to require a detailed compliance report 
on an ongoing basis.221
On the other hand, the Investment Company Institute agrees that no-action letters 
should only be granted for a specified period of time, after which a renewal process or 
otherwise reconsideration of the agency should be necessary in order to ensure the 
NRSRO still satisfies the criteria necessary for such status.222  The Association of 
Financial Professionals also supports expiration dates on no-action letters through 
periodic reviews to ensure that NRSROs continue to meet the initial recognition criteria 
no less than every five years.223  The Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance 
Professionals support an annual affirmation by the NRSRO that they continue to meet the 
definitional requirements.224
The fact that the pool of NRSROs has been capped is of great significance 
because in order to be sold, residential mortgage-backed securities must have a rating 
218
. See id..
219
. Id. at 55.  See also letter from Charles S. Morrison, Money Market Group Leader, Fidelity Management 
& Research Company to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (June 23, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/s70405-8.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005), letter from Amy B.R. 
Lancellotta, Senior Counsel, The Investment Company Institute to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, 2-3 
(June 9, 2005) (hereinafter Lancellotta Letter), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/ici060905.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005).  
220
. Proposed Definition, supra note 133, at 55-56.  In addition, due to the possibility of “changing market 
conditions,” the SEC proposal calls for the staff to include “expiration dates” in NRSRO no-action letters that 
it issues.  Id. at 59.
221
. See letter from Kathleen A. Corbet, President, Standard & Poor’s to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, 
Annex A, at 13 (June 9, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/standardpoors060905.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005).  No 
additional information regarding this “Framework” is available.  The Dominion Bond Rating Service (A4 at 
9) states that the NRSRO designation should remain in effect unless and until it is withdrawn for cause.  
DBRS Letter, supra note 206, at 9.
222
. Lancellotta Letter, supra note 219, at 2-3.
223
. Letter from James A. Kaitz, President and CEO, Association for Financial Professionals to Jonathan G. 
Katz, Secretary, SEC, 6 (June 7, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/afp060705.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005).
224
. Letter from Securities Law Committee, Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals 
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, 3 (June 2, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/slcscsgp060205.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005).  
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from one or more of them.225  This is because financial institutions that purchase asset-
backed securities require the rating to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements,
investment guidelines, covenant restrictions and/or internal policies.226  Indeed, as a 
practical matter, “securitizations cannot be completed without rating agency 
approval.”227
Since the SEC anointed the chosen NRSROs in 1975, federal and state financial 
regulators have “found that ratings may serve a variety of uses.”228 The current 
regulatory environment “requires or encourages various entities—broker-dealers, banks, 
money-market funds, insurance companies, trust companies, pension funds, and many 
others—to purchase financial instruments rated investment grade” by a NRSRO.229
While the NRSROs thereby bestow significant regulatory benefits upon issuers of 
securities, they themselves “are not subject to substantive monitoring.”230 The 
Privileged Raters have been described as operating a “regulation-induced oligopoly”.231
The Privileged Raters have been criticized for a range of wrongs that relate both 
to their function as providers of information and to their privileged regulatory status.  
Many of these criticisms appear warranted, although it is unclear how they can be 
resolved.
The most vehement criticism is that the Privileged Raters do not provide accurate 
and valuable information to the markets.  The most commonly cited evidence of this is 
that the Privileged Raters often disagree in their ratings.232  One rating agency critic has 
noted that it is unclear “what kind of information rating agencies intend to summarize” 
and whether ratings “efficiently aggregate this information.”233  At a minimum, the 
225
. GLENNIE, supra note 93, at 221.
226
. Id.; see Partnoy, supra note 29, at 711 (“credit ratings have been incorporated into hundreds of rules, 
releases, and regulations, in various substantive areas, including securities, pension, banking, real estate, and 
insurance regulation.”); Rhodes, supra note 178, at 313 n.116 (cataloging statutory and regulatory references 
to ratings).
227
. GLENNIE, supra note 93 at 221; see Kendall, supra note 103 at 2 (“Since most securitized assets are sold 
with double-A or triple-A ratings from a national credit-rating agency, the rating agencies are involved in the 
securitization process.”).
228
. STIMPSON, supra note 14 at 59; see Partnoy, supra note 29, at 74 (listing eight places in USC and 
references 60 places in CFR where NRSRO status is referenced.).
229
. Hill, supra note 29, at 44; see Partnoy, supra note 29, at 7 4 (charting history of increasing use of ratings 
in legislation and regulation).
230
. Id.
231
. Butler & Rodgers, supra note 181, at 16;  see William H. Beaver et al., Differential Properties in the 
Ratings of Certified vs. Non-Certified Bond Rating Agencies at 8 (Sept. 2004) (“Moody’s is protected from 
most competition and is practically guaranteed business by virtue of legal requirements for all public bond 
issuances to be rated by an NRSRO.”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=596626.
232. Larry G. Perry, The Effect of Bond Rating Agencies on Bond Rating Models, J. OF FIN. RES. 307, 307 
(Winter 1985) (noting that S&P and Moody’s disagree 58 percent of the time). 
233
. Gunter Loffler, An Anatomy of Rating through the Cycle, 28 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 695 (“there is plenty 
of academic and anecdotal evidence which suggests that agency ratings do not fully reflect available 
information.”); see Perry, supra note 232, at 307 (“One of the problems associated with predicting bond 
ratings is that the rating services often disagree when assigning ratings.  Since the rating is a reflection of the 
risk, which affects price, rating errors can affect investors and the issuing firms.”).  
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financial markets perceive S&P and Moody’s “as conservative, and comparably so, in 
their ratings practices. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence that the two have become 
more conservative over the years.” 234
One leading rating agency scholar argues that the Privileged Raters have 
survived not
because they produce credible and accurate information. They have not 
maintained good reputations based on the informational content of their credit 
ratings. Instead, the credit rating agencies have thrived, profited, and become 
exceedingly powerful because they have begun selling regulatory licenses, i.e., 
the right to be in compliance with regulation. Credit ratings therefore are an 
excellent example of how not to privatize a regulatory function. Those who 
advocate privatizing other regulatory functions should heed this warning.235
C. Ratings by the Privileged Raters Are Biased against the Public Interest
Privileged Raters claim to sell their independent judgment:  in the words of a 
senior Moody’s employee, “it is widely recognized that a rating agency and its analysts 
should be independent – not subject to influence by interested market forces, such as 
financial intermediaries, governments, or issuers themselves.”236  But it appears that 
NRSRO ratings are subject to biases that are not consistent with the public interest.  This 
is borne out both by empirical research as well as by admissions of NRSRO employees.
A recent study (the “Beaver Study”) has demonstrated that Moody’s approach to 
ratings (and suggests that all NRSRO ratings) is conservative, when compared to that of 
the Egan-Jones Rating Company, a credible non-NRSRO rating company.237  The 
Beaver Study argues that there is an incentive for Privileged Raters to “be more 
conservative because there is greater cost to losses due to overvalued assets than foregone 
gains because of undervaluation” and that this incentive results from their for quasi-
regulatory role.238  For the purposes of the Beaver Study, this means that NRSRO ratings 
are “more stable to minimize unnecessary consequences.”239
234
. Hill, supra note 29, at 44; see also Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 22 (noting that “the rating agency 
system, as presently constituted, is conservatively biased against innovation.”).
235
. Partnoy, supra note 29, at 711; see Dieter Kerwer, Standardising as Governance: The Case of Credit 
Rating Agencies. MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2001/3 (March 2001) (“despite the fact that rating 
agencies have become increasingly influential in global financial markets, it is very hard to hold them 
accountable for their action: rating agencies almost never have to justify their decisions, let alone provide 
compensation to others for the adverse consequences of their mistakes.”), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=269311.
236
. Stimpson, supra note 14, at 52.
237
. Beaver, supra note 231, at 5.  In particular, the Beaver Study found that Egan-Jones provided more 
timely and accurate information when changing ratings.  Id.; see also Robbe & Mahieu supra note 198, at 28 
(finding that ratings are accurate but not timely).
238
. Beaver, supra note 231, at 2. The Beaver Study compared the performance of NRSROs with another 
reputable non-NRSRO rating agency, Egan-Jones Rating Company, and found that Egan-Jones provided 
more timely and accurate information when changing ratings.  Id.  The study could not conclude that the 
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While the conservatism found in the Beaver Study was related to the timing and 
frequency of rating changes by Moody’s, the Beaver Study offers evidence that 
Privileged Raters are quasi-regulators who are mindful of the impact that their 
gatekeeping function has on the capital markets and take that impact into account, 
demonstrably more so than Egan-Jones, when setting their ratings policy.  In other words, 
Privileged Raters are not merely providers of independent information, but are also quasi-
regulators that are subject to institutional pressures.240
In addition to this empirically demonstrated bias, the Privileged Raters often 
describe themselves as “advocates” for investors.241  Indeed, S&P has made this point 
explicitly in the context of anti-predatory lending laws:  “Absent clarity on these issues, 
in order to best protect investors in rated securities, Standard & Poor's may adopt a 
conservative interpretation of an anti-predatory lending law and may, in instances where 
liability is not clearly limited, exclude mortgage loans from transactions it rates.”242
While it is unclear the extent to which Privileged Rater biases impact their 
predatory lending law guidelines, it is clear that their ratings policies are not the 
independent Delphic pronouncements that they represent them to be.  And their treatment 
of state predatory lending laws, particularly when contrasted with that of the GSEs, 
shows how the Privileged Raters benefit investors at the expense of subprime borrowers.  
This offers a case study of how the public interest suffers from the biases of the 
Privileged Raters.
As discussed in Part VI.C. below, the Privileged Raters, whether driven by bias  
or merely by their own mandate to protect investors first and foremost, have come to 
control a veto over state legislators who are attempting to stop predatory lending in their 
jurisdictions.  This veto by unelected, unaccountable, profit-driven corporations is highly 
disturbing, to say the least.
difference is attributable to a conflict of interest by the Privileged Raters. It attributed the difference to the 
Privileged Raters conservative approach to ratings changes. In contrast to the Privileged Raters, Egan-Jones 
charges investors, rather than issuers, for their services. Thus, they have an incentive to provide investors 
with timely information. Regardless of whether the NRSROs’ bias is consciously attributable to their issuer-
paid fee business model, the ratings are inaccurate consistent with their clients’ best interest and not those of 
investors.
239 Id. This contrasts with the Egan-Jones ratings which is generally more timely and more responsive to 
new information. Id.
240
. Egan-Jones argues that one such form of institutional pressure results from the compensation structure 
that Privileged Raters have developed:  “[i]f rating firms are dependent on issuers for support, they will bow 
to the wishes of those issuers . . ..”. Letter from Egan-Jones Ratings Company to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, 
SEC, 1 (May 26, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/eganjones052605.pdf (last 
visited August 25, 2005).  While there is no empirical evidence that the Privileged Raters have succumbed to 
such pressure in the development of their predatory lending legislation guidelines, it is also unquestionably 
true that the interests of the Privileged Raters and issuers of RMBS both benefit from less state regulation and 
from a strong Holder in Due Course doctrine.
241
. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 9.01.A. 
242. Testimony of Frank Raiter (Managing Director, Standard & Poor's Credit Market Services) At U.S. 
Congress Financial Services; Financial Institutions And Consumer Credit Subcommittee 14 (June 23, 2004) 
(emphasis added).
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V. PRIVILEGED RATERS GUT STRONG STATE PREDATORY LENDING 
LEGISLATION
New Jersey recently felt compelled to amend one of its premier consumer 
protection laws, the Home Ownership Security Act (the “NJ Law”), even though it was 
enacted with broad partisan support in 2003.243  The NJ Law was designed to control a 
small number of unscrupulous brokers and lenders that originate predatory loans.244
That same year, Georgia found itself doing the same thing -- amending its own 
anti-predatory lending law, the “Fair Lending Act,” that it had enacted mere months 
before. 245
These changes are cause for great concern as they were driven in large part by 
the Privileged Raters which had decided, in effect, that the laws had to change.  And 
change they did.  The Privileged Raters, which promote themselves as no more than 
information-analyzing handmaidens to the invisible hand of the market, have taken it 
upon themselves to prevent states from regulating in their traditional spheres of authority:  
mortgage and consumer protection laws.246  As a result of these actions by the Privileged 
Raters, the judgment about the suitability of such laws is becoming less and less the 
domain of the duly elected representatives of state citizens; rather, it has shifted into the 
domain of financial services firms that are advocates for investors, not the public.
S&P, Moody’s and Fitch each have their own approach to rating RMBS pools, 
but they all pay particular attention to the impact of predatory lending statutes on such 
pools.  All of the Privileged Raters review such statutes in order to determine whether 
they are 1) ambiguous, 2) allow for assignee liability,247 and 3) allow for unquantifiable 
damages. 
While the Privileged Raters differ on their approaches to assessing the risk in the 
RMBS market, they eventually arrived at similar conclusions regarding anti-predatory 
lending laws.  The Privileged Raters rate RMBS transactions by categorizing each state 
statute based upon the nature and degree of the assignee liability and damages provisions 
of its anti-predatory lending law.  Based on those evaluations, the Privileged Raters 
decide whether the transaction can be rated and, if it can be rated, how much credit 
enhancement is necessary to achieve the desired rating.  In states where there is both 
assignee liability and unquantifiable damages, some of the Privileged Raters have refused 
to rate transactions containing mortgage loans from such jurisdictions.248  Moreover, the 
Privileged Raters have determined that the legal risks in certain states (as well as in 
certain municipalities that have enacted anti-predatory lending legislation) require that 
243. See infra Part V.F.
244. See id.
245. See infra Part V.D.
246
. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 716 (“The ratings agencies have interposed
themselves as the ultimate arbiters of these laws by refusing to rate subprime RMBS in jurisdictions whose 
assignee liability provisions they deemed too harsh.”).
247
. That is, the law allows for liability for a wrong perpetrated by the originator of a note to attach to an 
assignee of the note.
248
. See Parts V.D. & V.F.
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RMBS transactions either bar loans originating from such jurisdictions or, if a pool does 
contain loans from such jurisdictions, implement expensive credit enhancements to 
achieve the ratings desired by the securitizers of such pools.249  That is, these actions can 
effectively shut down the entire mortgage market of a state that passes strong predatory 
lending legislation.
A result of the Privileged Raters’ analysis has been that they have pushed states 
to standardize their predatory lending laws.  This standardization benefits secondary 
market players because it reduces their risks and tends to increase the size of the RMBS 
market by reducing transaction costs.  And unlike the standardization that took place in 
the prime market in the 1970s, this standardization is not implemented with the needs of 
homeowners in mind.  The evidence of this is clear from the discussion that follows in 
this Part regarding the Georgia and New Jersey predatory lending laws.  But it is also 
clear that key players in the more than twenty other states that passed predatory lending 
legislation watched the interplay between the Privileged Raters and these two state 
governments250 and modified their own bills to comply with the standardization that the 
Privileged Raters imposed in those two cases.
A. The Home Ownership Equity Protection Act Provides Limited 
Protection
In addition to state predatory lending laws, there have been many attempts to 
respond to the explosion of predatory lending.  State attorneys general have initiated 
lawsuits.251  Regulators have taken administrative action.252  And Congress has passed 
new laws.253  These efforts have had varying success, with the Holder in Due Course254
doctrine frequently standing in the way of remedies for predatory lending’s victims.  This 
is because the Holder in Due Course doctrine protects the ultimate funders of predatory 
249
. See infra Part V.F.
250
. See, e.g., Diane Velasco, Others Have Tried Something Similar, ALBUQUERQUE J., January 26, 2004, at 
9 (spokesman for ACORN, which was instrumental in drafting New Mexico's predatory lending legislation 
stated that "During the last (legislative) session, we made sure that the [secondary market’s] problems with 
the Georgia law were not duplicated in the New Mexico law so we wouldn't have the same difficulties"); see 
also Jack Milligan, Learning the Hard Way, Mortgage Banking, September 1, 2004, at 26, 26 (“There are 
three important lessons that can be learned from the Georgia experience, and states that have yet to pass their 
own predatory lending law would do well to pay heed.”).  For a thorough review of the legislation in those 
other states, see Azmy, supra note 66, at 361-78; see also Giang Ho and Anthony N. Pennington-Cross, The 
Impact of Local Predatory Lending Laws (FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2005-049A, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=761106 (quantifying differences among predatory lending laws). 
251
. In one such settlement, coordinated by over a dozen state attorneys general, Household Finance and its 
affiliates, all major mortgage lenders, agreed to pay tens of thousands of borrowers up to $484 million.  
Michael Slackman, Borrowers To Share Mortgage Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, at B4.
252
. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38,  at 23-24. (listing major regulatory enforcement actions).
253
. See infra Part V.A.
254
. The Holder in Due Course doctrine has been codified at U.C.C. § 3-302 (2003).  Article 3 of the U.C.C. 
(which contains section 3-302) has been adopted, albeit with some variations, in all fifty states as well as the 
District of Columbia.  Gregory E. Maggs, Determining The Rights and Liabilities of The Remitter of a 
Negotiable Instrument: A Theory Applied to Some Unsettled Questions, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 619, 626 (1995).
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practices, secondary market investors who purchase mortgage notes.255  The Holder in 
Due Course doctrine immunizes them, as good faith purchasers, from liability for any 
fraud perpetrated by the originator of a loan.256  The net result of the application of the 
doctrine is that a borrower who has been the victim of a fraud not only cannot be 
compensated for the harm caused by the fraud, but even more, cannot assert the existence 
of the fraud as a defense against payment on the mortgage note.257
Federal law does not provide much by way of protection for homeowners seeking 
to secure a mortgage.  The Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), originally enacted in 
1968, requires certain important disclosures to a borrower by a lender in connection with 
the origination of a home loan,258 TILA, however, has not been successful in stemming 
the tide of predatory lending practices.259  The Home Ownership Equity Protection Act, 
an amendment to TILA, enacted in 1994, went beyond disclosure requirements and 
placed direct limits on certain practices if made in connection with “high cost loans.”260
HOEPA’s protections are triggered by either a (i) “rate trigger” or an “APR trigger,” 
where the Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”) of the loan exceeds by 8% the yield on 
Treasury securities of comparable maturity261 for first lien loans (or above 10% for 
subordinate lien loans); or (ii) the “fee-trigger,” where the total of the loan’s points and 
fees exceeds 8% of the loan total or $400 (adjusted for inflation), whichever is greater.262
HOEPA prohibits the inclusion of certain loan terms in high cost loans that are 
considered abusive:  negative amortization;263 balloon payments where a loan has a term 
of less than five years;264 increases in the interest rate in the event of a default;265 and, in 
certain cases, prepayment penalties.266  Moreover, a lender originating a HOEPA loan 
cannot engage in a pattern and practice of asset-based lending, that is, lending without 
regard to a borrower’s ability to pay.267  The Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Z, 
which implements HOEPA, also places limits on loan flipping: lenders and their affiliates 
255
. Eggert, Held Up, supra note 28, at 511 -13 (describing link between securitization in subprime market 
and predatory lending).
256
. See generally id. (discussing impact of Holder in Due Course Doctrine on subprime market). 
257
. See generally id.
258
. 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2000).
259
. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical 
Context of the Truth In Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 898 (2003).
260
. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
261
. That is, if a loan had a fifteen year term, the relevant comparable Treasury would be one with a fifteen 
year term as well.
262
. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1), (3) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2004).
263
. 15 U.S.C. § 1539(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(2).  “Negative amortization” refers to loans for which the 
principal amount of the loan increases (rather than decreases as with the typical loan) over the term of the 
loan.  See JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 53, at 91.
264
. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(3), (d)(1) (Official Staff Commentary). For loan terms that 
exceed five years, balloon payments are permissible, but must be disclosed. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(3).
265
. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(4). 
266
. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)(1)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(6).
267
. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h). HOEPA defines this conduct as extending credit “based on the consumer’s 
collateral without regard to the consumers’ repayment ability, including the consumers’ current and expected 
income, current obligations, and employment.” Id.
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cannot refinance a HOEPA loan within a year unless the refinance is “in the borrower’s 
interest.”268
HOEPA has not materially reduced predatory lending because of two major 
shortcomings.  First, it does not apply to purchase money mortgages (those used to 
purchase homes) or open-end lines of credit (such as home equity lines of credit).269
Second, it only covers a small portion of the mortgage market because its triggers are set 
very high.270  Thus many states have enacted their own predatory lending laws to 
compensate for these and other shortcomings in the federal response to predatory 
lending.271
In the last few sessions, Congress has considered a predatory lending bill first 
introduced by Representative Robert Ney (R-OH) and now co-sponsored by 
Representative Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) that seeks to preempt state predatory lending laws 
and enact a uniform federal law in their place.272  This bill contains consumer protections 
that are considerably weaker than those found in the leading state laws, and is seen as a
pro-industry initiative.273  As I argue in Part VI.A., it is premature to replace these state 
268
. 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3) (2004). In considering whether a refinancing is in the borrower’s interest, 
Regulation Z instructs lenders to consider the totality of the borrower’s circumstances at the time the credit 
was extended. Id. (Official Staff Commentary).
269
. Open-end credit is a credit extension where the exact amount of money lent or advanced at any given 
time is not fixed. Id. § 1602(i). It is, in short, a line of credit.  Open-end lines of credit are replacing 
traditional home equity loans in part to avoid HOEPA regulation. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN 
LENDING § 9.2.4.3 (4th ed., 1999).
270
. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38,  at 5. (“it appears that HOEPA covers only a limited portion of 
all subprime loans.”).  Notwithstanding HOEPA’s abrogation of the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 
Moody’s has rated transactions that contain loans that trigger HOEPA.  See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTOR 
SERVICE, MOODY’S EXPANDS CONSIDERATION OF ASSIGNEE LIABILITY RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES IN 
SECURITIZATIONS (Jan. 30, 2003) (indicating that Moody’s has rated pools containing HOEPA loans), 
available at http://www.moodys.com/.  S&P, on the other hand, does not rate HOEPA loans.  Standard & 
Poor's. S&P Comments on High-Cost Residential Mortgage Loans (August 16 2001) available at
http://www.rebuz.com/research/0801-real-estate-research/standard-&-poors.htm.  Additional federal statutes 
provide other grounds for liability for predatory practices.  Lenders may be liable for violations of the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (2000), by engaging in kickback schemes.  12 
U.S.C. § 2607 (2000).  Certain predatory practices that are targeted based on age, race, national origin, 
gender, or other prohibited characteristics can also result in violations of Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq. (2000), or the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2000).  Finally, “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices” by predatory lenders may expose them to liability under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (2000).  See generally, OCC, Avoiding Predatory and Abusive 
Lending Practices in Brokered and Purchased Loans at 4 (OCC Advisory Letter, February 21, 2003).
271
. See supra note 250.
272
. Legislative Update, American Banker at 5 (June 9, 2005); Legislative Update, American Banker at 5 
(June 9, 2005); see RESPONSIBLE LENDING ACT, 109TH CONG, 1ST SESS., H.R. 1295 (Ney/Kanjorski bill).
273
. See Azmy, supra note 66, at 389 (arguing that the Ney bill “fails to address many predatory lending 
practices that states regulat[e], including balloon payments, negative amortization loans, loan flipping, asset 
based lending, and others. . . .  Not surprisingly, the lending industry supports preemption efforts in general 
and the Ney bill in particular . . ..”).
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efforts to address a new, complex and rapidly evolving problem with an untested uniform 
federal standard.274
B. North Carolina Enacts a Predatory Lending Law That Builds 
Incrementally on Federal Law
North Carolina enacted the first state predatory lending law on July 22, 1999, 
effective July 21, 2000 (the “NC Law”). The NC Law is closely modeled on the federal 
Home Owner Equity Protection Act.275  It also builds upon protections in North 
Carolina’s usury statute276 by prohibiting specific types of loan provisions and lending 
practices for two categories of loans:   “consumer home loans”277 (“NC Home Loans”) 
and “high cost home loans” (“NC High Cost Home Loans”).278 A recent empirical study 
(the Quercia Study) has found that the NC Law operates as designed:  predatory loan 
terms were reduced without materially reducing the supply of subprime credit to low-
income borrowers.279
274
. Id. (“Forestalling preemption of these important state laws will assist federal and other state regulators to 
better understand and address the predatory lending problem.”).
275
. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000) .
276
. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24- 2 (West 2004).
277
. Id. at § 24-10.2(a) (defining "consumer home loans" to include all mortgage loans that are made to 
natural persons, primarily for personal, family and household purposes; and are loans secured by liens on 
one-to-four family residences that are or will become the borrower's principal dwelling.”); and id. at § 24-
10.2(a).  Prohibited practices for NC Home Loans include financing (directly or indirectly) any credit life, 
disability, or unemployment insurance, or any other life health insurance premium; and flipping. Id.
278
. Id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(4) (defining “high cost home loans” to include loans, other than open-end credit 
plans and reverse mortgage loans, (i) for which the principal amount of the loan does not exceed the lesser of 
the Fannie Mae conforming loan size limit for a single-family dwelling or $300,000; (ii) made to a natural 
person; (iii) incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes; (iv) secured by either a security 
interest in a manufactured home or a mortgage or deed of trust on real property upon which is located a 
structure designed principally for occupancy by one-to-four families, either of which is or will be occupied 
by the borrower as his or her principal dwelling; and (v) meeting one or more of the "thresholds" included in 
the act.  The statute prohibits the following provisions in NC High Cost Home Loans:   call provisions, 
balloon payments, negative amortizations, default interest rates, advance payments, and modification or 
deferral fees.  Id. at § 24-1.1E.  Certain lending practices are also prohibited for NC High Cost Home Loans, 
including: lending without regard to ability to repay, financing points and fees, charging refinancing fees with 
the same lender, and the direct payment of home improvement contractors. Id.  Additionally, all NC High 
Cost Home Loan borrowers must receive home ownership counseling.  Id.
279
. Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Impact of North Carolina's Anti-Predatory Lending Law: A Descriptive 
Assessment 1 (2003), available at http://www.kenan- flagler.unc.edu/assets/documents/CC NC Anti 
Predatory Law Impact.pdf.  An earlier study had concluded that the NC Law reduced the supply of credit to 
low-income borrowers, but the Quercia Study appears to have been better designed and to have relied on 
superior data.  See Azmy, supra note 66, at 380-81(criticizing study by Gregory Elliehausen & Michael 
Staten, Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law
14-15 (Credit Research Ctr., Georgetown Univ., Working Paper No. 66, 2002), available at 
http://www.msb.edu/prog/crc/pdf/ RevisedWP66.pdf.).
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A review of the NC Law reveals that it 1) clearly delineates between these two 
categories of loans, 2) does not provide for assignee liability,280 and 3) limits damages 
such that they are a quantifiable liability.281 These three aspects of the NC Law are of 
primary concern for the Privileged Raters as they rate RMBS transactions containing 
North Carolina loans.
C. The Privileged Raters Initially Underestimate the Impact of State 
Predatory Lending Legislation
As discussed above, when rating mortgage pools, Privileged Raters typically 
undertake four distinct analyses:  qualitative; quantitative; underwriter and servicer 
characteristics; and legal risks.282  The Privileged Raters have significantly adjusted their 
legal risks analysis of RMBS transactions to account for the new predatory lending laws.  
On April 28, 2000, Moody’s became the first Privileged Rater to publicly address 
the phenomenon of predatory lending, nine months after North Carolina passed its law 
and three months before that law was to take effect.  Moody’s initially concluded that 
allegations of predatory lending practices by mortgage originators would not affect most 
subprime securitizations, regardless of litigation outcomes, since the transactions are 
monoline-insured,283 meaning that the company that has insured a pool of given 
mortgages would bear the risk of adverse litigation outcomes.284  Moody’s also 
suggested that a senior-subordinated securitization structure285 would limit potential 
280
. But see Press Release, Standard & Poors, Standard & Poor’s Addresses North Carolina Anti-Predatory 
Lending Law (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.mbaa.org/state_update/index.cfm (arguing that, under 
North Carolina case law, mortgage holders may have assignee liability); see also OVERTON V. TARKINGTON, 
249 N.C. 340 (1959) (holding that defendant had right to assert usurious interest payments as affirmative 
defense against assignee of mortgage).
281
. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-2 (West 2004) (usury statute permits damages of twice the amount of 
interest paid in action in nature of action for debt); id. at § 75-1.1 (unfair and deceptive practices act 
authorizes treble damages and attorney’s fees); § 24-10.2(e) (“Any person seeking damages or penalties 
under the provisions of this section may recover damages under either this Chapter or Chapter 75, but not 
both.”).  Since the damages are not applied cumulatively and are statutorily defined they are a quantifiable 
liability.
282
. See supra Part IV.A.
283
. A monoline insurer is an “insurance company that is restricted, by the terms of its charter, to writing 
insurance policies related to a single type of risk.  In a financial context, the monoline insurer unconditionally 
guarantees the repayment of certain securities issued in connection with specified types of transactions, 
usually a securitization . . . in return for the payments of a fee or premium.” Standard & Poor’s Structured 
Finance:   Glossary of Securitization Terms, at 18 (available at 
http://www.securitization.net/pdf/sp_gloss_060103.pdf ).
284
. MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, PREDATORY LENDING AND HOME EQUITY SECURITIZATIONS (April 28, 
2000), available at http://moodys.com. [hereinafter MOODY’S PREDATORY LENDING 1/28/00] (“First, a large 
number of deals are fully insured by a monoline bond insurer. In these transactions, the risk of a litigation 
outcome that impairs the loans in a securitization rests solely with the insurer, not with the security holders. 
Insured deals constitute 53.25% of the subprime mortgage- backed securities issued during the period from 
1997 through the end of 1999.”).
285
. MOODY’S PREDATORY LENDING 1/28/00, supra note 284. (“among the approximately 46.75% of 
securities issued in transactions that used the senior-subordinate manner of credit enhancement, there is 
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liability to issuers who (i) engage regularly in predatory lending practices, (ii) are subject 
to well-publicized allegations286 and (iii) have geographically concentrated loan 
pools.287  Based on this analysis, Moody’s concluded that the “the economic 
consequences of predatory lending accusations for securitization investors will be 
limited.”288 This conclusion was based in part upon assumptions as to the limited 
remedies available to borrowers should a court find that a lender’s practices were 
predatory.289  Indeed, Moody’s predicted that a borrower’s remedies would be limited to 
rescission of the loan contract and/or recoupment of any damages from the loan amount 
owed.290  These remedies in individual actions would not pose a significant concern to 
investors.291  Given the limited remedies, sufficient bond insurance, and appropriate 
structuring of a securitization, Moody’s predicted that the effect of anti-predatory lending 
laws on RMBS transactions would be minimal.  It appears that Moody’s underestimated 
the extent to which other states would follow North Carolina’s lead and enact their own 
predatory lending laws because it dramatically changed its analysis in 18 months.292
Nearly two years later, Fitch became the next Privileged Rater to address the 
impact of predatory lending on the RMBS market.293  Fitch reviewed the assignee 
liability sections of newly enacted predatory lending statutes and identified the legal risks 
posed by certain ambiguous provisions in anti-predatory lending laws.294  Fitch found 
protection in the subordination levels to withstand some unexpected litigation. At the Aaa level, in particular, 
there is a cushion to protect investors from unforeseen difficulties like lawsuits. Only widespread and 
concerted litigation against an issuer and its practices, that focuses on a large proportion of that originator’s 
production, would be broad enough to imperil the rating of a Aaa-rated class of securities.”).  Senior-
subordinated securities as a pass-through mortgage issue with two classes, with the subordinated class 
absorbing the payment risks for both classes.  LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at APP. A.
286
. MOODY’S, supra note 284. (“the complexity of reconstructing the past practices of challenged lenders is 
likely to lead banking regulators and attorneys general to focus on modifying lenders’ future conduct to 
comply with applicable laws, rather than pursuing claims relating to past acts.”).
287
. Id. (“potential plaintiffs in any given loan pool are often geographically dispersed, which makes 
coordinated, widespread litigation difficult. Originators benefit from this difficulty, because many borrowers 
will not risk losing their homes without the safety of a large and organized effort to challenge a lender.”).
288
. Id.
289
. Id.
290
. Id. (“Set-off or recoupment is the reduction of the loan amount owed by the borrower by the amount of 
any claims for damages of the borrower against the lender. The borrower would simply reduce the amount 
owed on his loan by the amount of any damage claims relating to unlawful (predatory) acts. The resulting 
reduction in the loan amounts would be a loss to the subordinate securities.”).
291
. Id.
292
. See generally Azmy, supra note 66, at 362-78 (2005) (describing more than two dozen state and local 
predatory lending laws enacted since NC Law was enacted).
293
. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Comments on Recent Predatory Lending Legislation 
(December 24, 2002) available at
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/sectors/rmbs_predatory_lending.cfm?sector_flag=3&marketsector=2
&detail=&body_content=pred_lend [hereinafter FITCH RATINGS COMMENTS 12/24/02].
294
. Id. (referring to the “reasonable tangible net benefit” test contained in HOSA).
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that such ambiguity “may negatively impact mortgage markets and their participants.”295
Despite these risks, Fitch’s concluded, in large part based on discussion with originators, 
that there were no inherent increased risks to the RMBS market posed by the newly 
enacted predatory lending laws.296
Moody’s and Fitch were soon to change their relatively sanguine legal analysis of 
predatory lending legislation.  Moody’s came to put more weight on the statutes’ punitive 
damages provisions.  Fitch appeared to reduce its reliance upon statements by subprime 
lenders as to their own practices and align itself with the more critical voices of the 
Privileged Raters.  And Standard & Poors, while last to address state predatory lending 
laws, was the first to come out highly critical of their impact on RMBS investors.
D. The Georgia Experience:  Pushing Forward, Pulled Back
Georgia attempted to take a more aggressive tack than the one taken by North 
Carolina.  It is highly unlikely that they were aware of how the Privileged Raters would 
respond.  The Privileged Raters effectively shut down the Georgia mortgage market 
because they found the Georgia legislation to be too much of a risk to the secondary 
market because it threatened the standard application of the Holder in Due Course 
Doctrine to RMBS transactions, thereby exposing investors to new forms of potential 
liability.  And not until Georgia amended its law to meet the Privileged Raters concerns 
did the Georgia market reopen.
1. The Georgia Fair Lending Act Provides for Assignee Liability and 
Unquantifiable Damages
The Georgia Fair Lending Act (the “Georgia Law”) became effective on October 
1, 2002.297  Below is a brief description of its provisions.  Of particular relevance are the 
provisions for assignee liability298 and for punitive damages.299
The Georgia Law created three categories of loans:  “home loans” (“GA Home 
Loans”), “covered home loans” (“GA Covered Home Loans”) and “high-cost home 
295
. Id.  Fitch’s opinion was based on “discussions with the majority of the subprime mortgage loan 
originators who have confirmed that they do not originate or purchase high cost loans.”  Id.
296
. Id. (“Fitch will continue its discussions with various market participants, including originators, sellers 
and servicers, to confirm its current belief that risks to transactions have not increased.”).
297
. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-1: 7-6A-13 (West 2004).
298
. Id. at § 7-6A-5(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, where a home loan was made, 
arranged, or assigned by a person selling either a manufactured home or home improvements to the dwelling 
of a borrower, the borrower may assert all affirmative claims and any defenses that the borrower may have 
against the seller or home improvement contractor against the creditor, any assignee, holder, or servicer in 
any capacity.”).
299
. Id. at § 7-6A-6(a) (“Any person found by a preponderance of the evidence to have violated this chapter 
shall be liable to the borrower for the following . . . (3) Punitive damages, when the violation was malicious 
or reckless...”).
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loans” (“GA High-Cost Home Loans”).300  GA Home Loans, the broadest category, 
covered all loans secured by mortgage, security deed, or secured debt within the Fannie 
Mae conforming loan size.301  GA Covered Home Loans included all (i) first lien loans 
with interest rates that are greater than four percentage points above the prime rate or two 
percentage points above the comparable Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and (ii) junior-liens 
five and one half percentage points above the prime rate or three percentage points above 
the comparable Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac rates, loans in which the total points and 
fees, excluding bona fide discount points302, exceed three percentage points, and (iii) all 
GA High-Cost Home Loans.303  GA High-Cost Home Loans were those loans that either 
exceed an Annual Percentage Rate tied to the HOEPA interest rate trigger304 or a fees 
trigger that is typically 5 points.305
The Georgia Law prohibited 15 specific practices for GA High-Cost Home 
Loans:306 and five prohibited lending practices for all GA Home Loans, including a ban 
on loan flipping.307  Loan flipping had been the most contested of these prohibitions, 
since it required that all GA Covered Loans that were refinanced from an existing GA 
Home Loan provide a “reasonable tangible net benefit” to the borrower.308
The Georgia Law granted remedies that may be asserted against assignees for 
violations of the statute; in particular, it granted a borrower the right to assert all 
affirmative claims and defenses against assignee purchasers of GA High Cost Home 
Loans.309  For GA Covered Home Loans, it offered a more limited right:  borrowers 
300
. Id. at § 7-6A-5.
301
. Id. at § 7-6A-2(9).
302
. Id. at § 7-6A-2 (4) (“‘Bona fide discount points’ means loan discount points knowingly paid by the 
borrower for the express purpose of reducing, and which in fact do result in a bona fide reduction of, the 
interest rate applicable to the home loan; provided, however, that the undiscounted interest rate for the home 
loan does not exceed by more than one percentage point the required net yield for a 90 day standard 
mandatory delivery commitment for a home loan with a reasonably comparable term from either the Federal 
National Mortgage Association or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, whichever is greater.”)
303
. Id. at § 7-6A-2(6).
304
. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2000).
305
. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A -2 (19)(B) (West 2004).  The fee trigger is different for loans that are for the 
principal amount of $20,000 or less; in that case, the fee trigger is the lesser of 8% or $1,000.  Id.
306
. Id. at § 7-6A-5.  The 15 prohibited practices are prepayment penalties greater than 2% of the outstanding 
balance; balloon payments; negative amortization; default interest rates; advance payments; limitations on 
access to legal remedies; lending without counseling; lending without regard to borrower’s ability to repay; 
direct payment to home improvement contractors; loan modification fees; foreclosure without certified 
notification 14 day prior to initiating proceedings; limits on the right to cure default prior to an acceleration 
clause; foreclosure without notice of the right to cure default; acceleration clauses at the lender’s sole 
discretion; and, finally, making loans without disclosure of the assignee liability of the Georgia Law.  Id.
307
. Id. The 5 prohibited practices are the selling of single premium credit insurance; encouraging default; 
imposing late penalties greater than 5%; and charging more $10 for transmitting information on the balance 
due.
308
. Id.
309
. Id.
SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION
9/10/ 2005 44
could assert claims against assignees to offset the outstanding debt.310  The damages 
included: actual damages, treble damages, punitive damages, and reasonable costs and 
attorney’s fees, each of which may be applied cumulatively or individually.311  The 
Georgia Law’s assignee liability and damages provisions caused the Privileged Raters to 
rethink their positions on predatory lending legislation.
2. The Privileged Raters Exclude Georgia Loans from Their Rated 
Transactions because of Concerns That Investors Will Be Liable for 
Uncapped Damages
Just a few months after the Georgia Law became effective, the Privileged Raters 
concluded that Georgia’s assignee liability provisions created potentially unlimited 
damages for purchasers of GA High Cost Home Loans and thus pools containing them 
were too risky to be rated.312  The Privileged Raters’ announcements caused turmoil 
among Georgia lenders who depended heavily on their ability to sell their loans on the 
secondary market; a number of these lenders indicated that they were on the verge of 
abandoning residential lending in Georgia.313  S&P first addressed the Georgia Law on 
January 16, 2003, stating that it would not rate transactions that contained GA Home 
Loans.314
Moody’s staked out a similar position on January 30, 2003, stating that the 
inclusion of GA Home Loans in securitization transactions was too risky.315  Moody’s 
position marked a change of course from its original position that predatory lending laws 
would not severely impact the secondary market.316  Fitch also retreated from its original 
position on predatory lending legislation on February 5, 2003, stating that it would not 
rate transactions with uncapped assignee liability, disallowing the Georgia Law loans 
from its rated transactions.317 By refusing to rate transactions containing Georgia Home 
310
. Id.
311
. Id.
312
. Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, Standard and Poor’s To Disallow Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans
(Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html [hereinafter S&P DISALLOWS 
GA 1/16/03]; MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, MOODY’S EXPANDS CONSIDERATION OF ASSIGNEE LIABILITY 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES IN SECURITIZATIONS (Jan. 30, 2003) available at http://www.moodys.com/ 
[hereinafter MOODY’S EXPANDS CONSIDERATION 1/30/03]; Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings 
Declines To Rate Georgia Loans In RMBS Pools Considers Impact To Other Predatory Lending Legislation
(Feb. 5, 2003) available at http://www.fitchratings.com/ [hereinafter FITCH DECLINES GA 2/5/03]
313
. See GA. BANKER’S ASS’N, GAFLA:   THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 2 (2003), available at
http://www.gabankers.com/issuespredatorylendingwhitepaper.pdf (Jan. 2003). 
314
. S&P DISALLOWS GA 1/16/03, supra note 312. (“S&P stated it would rate mortgages on properties in 
Georgia not governed by the Georgia Law; most notably those outside the conforming Fannie Mae balance [. 
. .], reverse mortgages, and bridge loans).  Id.
315
. MOODY’S EXPANDS CONSIDERATION 1/30/03, supra note 312.
316
. See supra text accompanying note 284.
317
. FITCH DECLINES GA 2/5/03, supra note 312. (“Fitch has concluded that it will not rate transactions with 
uncapped assignee liability as detailed in the current Georgia Fair Lending Act (GFLA), as it stands today”).
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Loans and thereby blocking access to the secondary market, the Privileged Raters forced 
the Georgia legislature to reevaluate and amend the Georgia Law.
While S&P was concerned to some extent with ambiguities in the Georgia Law, 
its main concern was the assignee liability that could attach to the secondary market 
parties to a securitized transaction containing Georgia Home Loans.318  Moody’s echoed 
S&P’s position, stating that since there was no cap on punitive damage awards, 319 the 
potential unlimited liability that might attach to assignees under the Georgia Law 
prevented the inclusion of such loans in rated transactions.320 Moody’s also reversed its 
position that securitizations could be structured to limit the litigation risks.321
Moody's gave direction to the legislature, stating that any Moody’s analysis of an 
amended Georgia Law would focus on the risk of assignee liability.322   Moody’s was 
particularly concerned with the risks associated with the accidental misclassification of 
loans (that is, misclassifying a high-risk GA High Cost Home Loan as a low-risk GA 
Home Loan),323 the difficulty of lender compliance with the restrictions on loans in each 
category,324 and, above all else, the unlimited liability of the assignee.325
Fitch stated that it would not rate transactions with uncapped assignee 
liability.326  Fitch based its position on surveys of RMBS issuers and on an analysis of 20 
settled predatory lending cases.327  Fitch’s method was to examine the frequency and 
severity of loss for each loan that is subject to a predatory lending statute such as the 
Georgia Law to identify the risk that it poses to the RMBS transaction.328  Analysis of 20 
318
. S&P DISALLOWS GA 1/16/03, supra note 312. (“transaction parties in securitizations, including 
depositors, issuers and servicers, might all be subject to penalties for violations under the GFLA.”); see also
Milligan, supra note 250, at 26 (“Susan Barnes, a managing director in S&P's residential mortgage group, 
said the agency was concerned that originators wouldn't be able to adequately determine the threshold 
between normal home, covered and high-cost loans because of some fuzziness in the language of the law. But 
the law's unlimited assignee liability was S&P's ‘foremost concern,’ says Barnes.”).
319
. MOODY’S EXPANDS CONSIDERATION 1/30/03, supra note 312 (“The risks are theoretically immeasurable 
because there is no cap on punitive damage awards. Further, the statute extends liability to loan assignees, 
which would include securitization trusts.”).
320
. Id. (“The potential unlimited trust liability makes the risk posed by those Georgia loans inconsistent with 
Moody's standards for rated securities.”).  Like S&P, Moody’s stated it would continue to rate non-
conforming Georgia loans.  Id.
321
. Id.
322
. Id.
323
. Id. (“Because some of the criteria for categorizing loans into these tiers may be difficult to measure 
(e.g., determining indirect compensation to a broker from any source), satisfactory compliance procedures for 
properly categorizing each loan would prove burdensome and would unlikely be foolproof.”).
324
. Id. (“the restrictions on "covered" loans include qualitative elements (i.e., providing a tangible net 
benefit to the borrower) that raise burdensome compliance issues. Furthermore, the even more onerous 
additional restrictions on "high-cost" loans likely present an insurmountable burden to including such loans in 
a rated securitization.”).
325
. Id.
326
. FITCH DECLINES GA 2/5/03, supra note 312.
327
. Id.
328
. Id. (“The current legal issue concerning predatory lending presents unique challenges to adequately 
assess the frequency and severity, and ultimately the risk, to a securitization. For example, certain legislation 
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settled cases showed an average award of $76 million per case, although they were 
primarily class action suits.329  Of particular interest to Fitch was a recent action for 
$100,000 in compensatory damages for which the court awarded $6 million in punitive 
damages.330
Fitch recommended that rated securitization trusts remove any exposure to loans 
that were subject to assignee liability provisions in predatory lending statutes,331 since 
compliance procedures alone are not enough to eliminate the risk of loss.332  The 
existence of an assignee liability clause represents a meaningful risk to the transaction.  
And so, Fitch stated it would not rate any transaction where assignee liability is combined 
with unlimited liability, such as is the case with the Georgia Law.333  To rate a 
transaction, Fitch requires that it be able to quantify the potential losses.334  Anti-
predatory laws with assignee liability clauses but capped liability allow Fitch to quantify 
such losses.335   Fitch refused to rate all Georgia loans subject to the Georgia Law as long 
as there was a potential for uncapped assignee liability.336
The Privileged Raters all refused to rate RMBS pools containing Georgia loans.  
This response by the Privileged Raters evoked harsh criticism from consumer advocacy 
groups, the mainstream media and some academics.337  Nonetheless, a number of lenders 
indicated that they were preparing to pull out of the Georgia residential lending market 
within days of the Privileged Raters’ announcements.338  And the Georgia legislature 
found that it had to act to meet the Privileged Raters’ concerns as mortgage originators in 
Georgia stated that they would not be able to make any more mortgage loans.339
Georgia had to act notwithstanding the fact that the GSEs disagreed with the 
Privileged Raters’ assessment of the risks that investors faced from the Georgia Law.340
provides an assignee liability clause that adds all parties associated with the trust to the list of potential 
defendants in a litigation case.”).
329
. Id.
330
. Id.
331
. Id.
332
. Id.
333
. Id.
334
. Id.
335
. Id.
336
. Id.
337
. Id. See infra note 344.
338
. Milligan, supra note 250, at 26 (“’Of course, cutting off Georgia mortgage originators from the 
secondary market could have led to a catastrophic situation.  It was going to cause a collapse of the mortgage 
market in Georgia, and it came very close to happening before the law was amended,’ says [mortgage broker 
industry representative] Rose. ‘We had over 40 lenders send us letters saying they would no longer do 
business in the state of Georgia, except for jumbo loans.’").
339
. Id (“Adds Allen Ken Knight, president of the Mortgage Bankers Association of Georgia, Macon, 
Georgia, and vice president in charge of production at Dunwoody, Georgia-based Prestige Mortgage Co., 
"We were within days of not being able to write mortgage loans.").
340
. See, e.g., Kelly K. Spors, Subprime Bill Aims to Mute State Laws: Republican’s 
Proposal to Police Predatory Lending Would Set Weaker National Standards, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 2003, at 
A4 (noting that Fannie and Freddie continued to buy some loans made in Georgia); FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 
SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION
9/10/ 2005 47
The GSEs assessment appears to have been borne out by (i) the fact that no investor has 
suffered the effects that the Privileged Raters had predicted would result from the 
purchase of loans that were subject to the Georgia Law341 and (ii) the legal analysis of 
scholars that study predatory lending laws does not bear out the Chicken Little 
interpretation of the Privileged Raters, but rather is in line with that of the GSEs.342
3. As Its Mortgage Market Dries Up, Georgia Acquiesces to the 
Demands of the Privileged Raters
Notwithstanding the weak analysis of the Privileged Raters, the Georgia 
legislature quickly responded to the Privileged Raters by introducing an amendment to 
the Georgia Law, which was enacted on March 7, 2003.343  In the months prior to the 
enactment of the amendment, there were fruitless negotiations between consumer 
advocacy groups and Privileged Raters as well as continuing disagreement among 
legislators regarding how to respond to the Privileged Raters’ concerns.344
Notwithstanding this debate, the Georgia legislature amended the Georgia Law on March 
7, 2003 (the “Amended Georgia Law”).  In order to address the concerns of the 
Privileged Raters, the Amended Georgia Law specified “when and against whom” claims 
may be asserted, limited the liability that attached, and removed the “covered-loan” 
category.345  The Amended Georgia Law provides a safe harbor to its assignee liability 
provision, allowing assignees to avert liability by a showing of “reasonable due 
diligence” to prevent the acquisition of GA High-Cost Home Loans.346  Assignee 
liability is capped at the remaining indebtedness of the loan plus reasonable attorney’s 
fees and may only attach from an individual lawsuit, not a class action.347
03-12, supra  note 173; FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 03-02, supra  note 173; Michael May Letter, supra  note 
173 (stating that Freddie Mac would continue to buy all loans made in New Jersey other than NJ High-Cost 
Home Loans).
341
. This evidence is far from compelling on its own because there are only a small number of loans that are 
subject to the unamended Georgia Law.
342 See generally Azmy & Reiss, supra note 45 (analyzing risks posed by NJ Law); see also Engel & 
McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 728 (“Costly  litigation and significant judgments arguably could have 
an adverse impact on the value of a loan pool. The reality, however, is that the risk that a securitized loan 
pool will actually suffer losses from predatory lending litigation is quite small. This is because there are 
practical impediments to bringing predatory lending claims and also because securitization deals are 
intentionally structured to reduce such risk.”).
343
. 2003 GEORGIA LAWS ACT 1 (S.B. 53).
344
. See, e.g., Robert Luke & Henry Unger, Compromise Reached on GA. Lending Law, Legislature to Move 
Quickly on Deal with Rating Agency, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 1, 2003, at F1; Henry Unger and Rhonda 
Cook, Predatory Lending Law To Be Tweaked, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 24, 2003, at F1; Ernest Holsendolph 
& Robert Luke, Mortgage Lenders Push to Rewrite Fair Lending Act, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 23, 2003, at 
A1.
345
. 2003 GEORGIA LAWS ACT 1. 
346
. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6(b) (West 2004).
347
. Id.
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4. The Privileged Raters Allow Georgia Loans To Be Securitized Under 
an Amended Georgia Law
The Amended Georgia Law would prove to be more investor friendly, as the 
Privileged Raters re-admitted Georgia Home Loans to their rated transactions within days 
of the amendment.348  S&P responded on March 11, 2003, stating it would rate 
transactions including Georgia Home Loans originated after March 7, 2003.349  It would 
selectively allow Georgia High-Cost Home Loans, since the liability was capped, so long 
as there was some credit support in place.350  This credit support could take the form of, 
for instance, an agreement by a creditworthy institution to repurchase loans that were 
made in violation of the law, to limit a securitization trust’s exposure to liability.351  S&P 
also requires a compliance representation, a statement by a third party verifying the 
Georgia Home Loan originators’ compliance with the statute, as part of its requirement to 
rate a transaction containing such loans.352
Moody’s acted two days later, also finding that the risks associated with Georgia 
Home Loans were permissible within its rated transactions.353  Moody’s discussion of 
the statute identified practices that lenders and securitizers could implement to protect 
securitization trusts from liability.354  Since the Amended Georgia Law includes 
disclosure requirements,355 reasonableness standards,356 and imposes the strictest 
requirements on “high-cost” home loans only,357 the Privileged Raters found that it gave 
adequate direction to lenders.358  The Amended Georgia Law also addresses Moody’s 
concerns regarding miscategorization of loans by removing the “covered-loan” category, 
thus making it easier to identify the risks associated with individual loans.359  Even more 
348
. S&P and Moody’s both announced that they would rate all pools that do not contain Georgia High-Cost 
Home Loans.  Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor's Will Admit Georgia Mortgage Loans 
Into Rated Structured Finance Transactions (Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.standardandpoors.com
[hereinafter S&P ADMITS GA 3/11/03];  MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S TO RATE RMBS BACKED 
BY GEORGIA HOME LOANS (Mar. 13, 2003), at http://www.moodys.com/. [hereinafter MOODY’S RATES GA 
3/13/03];  Fitch announced that it would rate all residential mortgage pools, including those that contained 
Georgia High-Cost Home Loans, if they also included additional credit enhancements.  See Press Release, 
Fitch Ratings, Fitch To Rate RMBS after Amendment to Georgia Predatory Lending Statute, GFLA (Mar. 
14, 2003), at
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/sectors/rmbs_predatory_lending.cfm?sector_flag=3&marketsector=2
&detail=&body_content=pred_lend [hereinafter FITCH RATES GA 3/14/03].
349
. S&P ADMITS GA 3/11/03, supra note 348.
350
. Id.
351
. Id.
352
. See, e.g., id.
353
. MOODY’S RATES GA 3/13/03, supra note 348.
354
. Id.
355
. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(12)(B) (West 2004).
356
. Id. at § 7-6A-4.
357
. See generally MOODY’S RATES GA 3/13/03, supra note 348.
358
. Id. 
359
. MOODY’S RATES GA 3/13/03, supra note 348.
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important to Moody’s, is the limitation on assignee liability to the remaining 
indebtedness and reasonable attorney’s fees.360  Under the Amended Georgia Law, 
Moody’s permits Georgia Home Loans in rated transactions so long as the issuer did the 
following:  gave representations and warranties that the loans were originated in 
compliance with the law; gave a warranty to repurchase any loans that were, in fact, 
originated in violation of the statute; and created due diligence procedures to satisfy the 
safe harbor provisions of the law.361
Like S&P, Moody’s stated that it would selectively rate pools containing Georgia 
High-Cost Home Loans, so long as such pools had no more than two percent of the total 
loans in the pool and so long as such loans were within the clear, objective standards of 
the statute.  For instance, refinanced Georgia High-Cost Home Loans that could run afoul 
of the law’s anti-flipping “reasonable tangible net benefit” test would not fall within a 
clear, objective standard.362  While in theory Moody’s would rate pools with more than 
two percent Georgia High-Cost Home Loans, it indicated that the credit support required 
to rate such pools would be of prohibitive cost.363
On February 14, 2003, and closely following the path taken by S&P and 
Moody’s, Fitch announced that it would rate pools including Georgia High-Cost Home 
Loans, subject to additional credit enhancements.364  Fitch indicated that the changes to 
the assignee liability provisions and limitations on damages assessed against assignees 
prompted its change of position.365  Fitch did differ from the analysis of the other 
Privileged Raters to some extent:  it found that while the addition of the safe harbor 
provision for “reasonable due diligence” reduces the risk of assignee liability,366  the safe 
harbor provision was subjective because it did not define what “reasonable due diligence” 
was.367  Nonetheless, because the law’s liability is in any case capped at the remaining 
indebtedness of the loan plus reasonable attorney’s fees,368 Fitch stated it would rate 
pools with Georgia Home Loans, subject to appropriate credit enhancements.369
360
. Id. (“Finally, and perhaps most importantly to MBS investors, the Amended Act limits assignee liability 
to the remaining indebtedness on the loan and reasonable attorney's fees, and limits class actions against 
assignees.”). 
361
. Id.
362
. Id.
363
. Id. (“Solid representations from financially strong issuers would take on increased importance where 
high cost loans are included. Transactions containing more than two percent of such "high cost" loans, or 
which contain any "high cost" loans where statutory compliance is a matter of judgment, may be subject to 
additional protections that have a prohibitive cost. Ultimately, the risk to investors will vary depending on the 
amount of "high cost" loans in question and the issuer's financial strength.”).  The cost of including loans 
originated prior to the enactment of the Amended Georgia Law but after the enactment of the Georgia Law 
would also likely be prohibitively high since the amendment is not applied retroactively.  Id.
364
. FITCH RATES GA 3/14/03, supra note 348.
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. Id.
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. Id.
367
. Id.
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. Id.
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While the Privileged Raters’ decisions to rate transactions containing post-
Amended Georgia Law loans resolved Georgia’s funding crisis, they also bring to a head 
questions as to the role that these private actors should have in setting standards for local 
regulations of property and consumer finance transactions.  In particular, to the extent 
that the Privileged Raters are advocates for investors and thereby inaccurately evaluate 
the risk posed by state predatory lending laws,370 it is important to ask whether 
Privileged Raters should have the power to veto laws enacted by the several states.
E. The Privileged Raters Take a Stance against Strong Predatory Lending 
Legislation
Shortly after admitting Georgia loans into securitization transactions, each of the 
three Privileged Raters issued reports detailing rating criteria for transactions containing 
loans subject to anti-predatory lending laws.  These reports put state legislatures on notice 
as to the Privileged Raters’ rating requirements and effectively set a framework for 
standardizing predatory lending legislation that followed.
Moody’s was first to issue such a comprehensive report on March 26, 2003. 
Moody’s released a special report regarding the impact of predatory lending on RMBS 
transactions, changing its position from that of its April, 2000 report in light of recently-
enacted anti-predatory lending laws “without well-defined compliance procedures” and 
which “entail unlimited potential liability.”371   Moody’s report stated that such 
problematic statutes cause difficulty in the securitization process372  because violations 
of anti-predatory lending statutes reduce the amount of available cash to pay investors.373
Although, it acknowledged that there were measures that lenders could take to reduce 
their potential liability, Moody’s stated it would not rate transactions unless certain 
additional conditions for securitization are met.374  Those conditions included (i) 
sufficiently clear statutes so that the lender may comply and (ii) limited statutory 
penalties for non-compliance.375  Even with such conditions, Moody’s indicated that 
there remains a risk to investors, because lenders may, in certain circumstances, choose to 
default rather than repurchase afflicted loans.376
370
. See supra Part V.D.2. 
371
. Press Release, Moody’s Investor Service, Moody’s Reports on Impact of Predatory Lending Laws on 
RMBS (Mar. 26, 2003).
372
. Id.
373
. Id.
374
. Id.
375
. Id.  The other conditions included the lender’s demonstration of effective compliance procedures; lender 
representations that loans comply with statutory requirements; lender agreement to repurchase loans that do 
not comply with statutory requirements; lender indemnification for damages from the statute under certain 
circumstances; lender’s demonstration that it has the “financial resources and commitment to the business” to 
demonstrate willingness and ability to honor its repurchase and indemnification obligations;” and
agreement to concentration limits where the penalties are great or the statutes are ambiguous.  Id.
376
. Id.
SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION
9/10/ 2005 51
S&P released its report on April 15, 2003, stating that it would subject RMBS 
pools containing loans from jurisdictions with anti-predatory lending laws to a legal 
evaluation of the statute of each state.377  Its legal evaluation methodology was quite 
similar to that of Moody’s.  It first considered whether a state’s anti-predatory lending 
statute provides for assignee liability.378  Where predatory lending laws do provide for 
assignee liability, S&P would look for clearly delineated loan categories, analyzing 
whether a purchaser (or servicer) can reasonably determine the category of loan.379  S&P 
then would analyze the severity of penalties, including monetary damages, though even 
capped categorical damages may pose unlimited liability under the cumulative effect of 
some laws, such as those that allow for class actions suits.380  S&P would not rate 
transactions containing loans that fall into statutory categories that allow for assignee 
liability combined with uncapped damages.381  S&P would, however, rate loans with 
capped liability; though the cost of required credit enhancements for some capped 
liability categories of loans could be prohibitive of securitization.382
Fitch responded to the other two Privileged Raters’ rating criteria with its own 
document on May 1, 2003, which announced changes to its rating methodology.383  Fitch 
maintains the position, like the other Privileged Raters, that it would not rate pools 
containing loans subject to unlimited assignee liability.384  Fitch also required warranties 
of compliance385 and, if no high cost home loans are in the transaction, a representation 
and warranty of such.386  Fitch reserved the right to rate RMBS transactions in 
jurisdictions where there is assignee liability where that liability is “reasonably 
377
. Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws: Standard & Poor's Explains Its 
Approach (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html. [hereinafter S&P 
EVALUATING PREDATORY LENDING 4/15/03]
378
. Id.  Loans subject to predatory lending laws that do not provide for assignee liability will not raise rating 
difficulties for S&P.  Id.
379
. Id.
380
. Id.
381
. Id.
382
. Id.  A statute’s clarity in its provisions for violations and safe harbor practices may mitigate the required 
credit enhancements.  Id.  S&P also stated that ratings of pools subject to predatory lending laws must include 
a qualitative determination of a seller’s compliance procedures and the ability to identify predatory loans and 
loans subject to assignee liability.    Id. S&P also requires a determination of the seller’s creditworthiness, to 
establish “if the seller is willing and financially able to repurchase predatory loans for a purchase price that 
would make the securitization trust whole for any costs incurred in connection with the predatory loan.”  Id. 
This rating methodology would determine what credit enhancement was necessary for a particular 
securitization. Id.
383
. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Revises Rating Criteria in Wake of Predatory Lending Legislation 
(May 1, 2003), at 
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/events/press_releases_detail.cfm?pr_id=85826&sector_flag=3&marke
tsector=2&detail [hereinafter FITCH REVISES CRITERIA 5/1/03].
384
. Id.
385
. Id. (“Fitch expects the representation and warranty from the issuer to identify the loans by:   1) type 
(high cost, covered, etc.), 2) quantity, 3) aggregate dollar amount, and, 4) jurisdiction.”)
386
. Id.
SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION
9/10/ 2005 52
limited.”387  Where a breach of those warranties takes place, Fitch requires a repurchase 
of the affected loan.388
Like the other Privileged Raters, Fitch may require credit enhancements based 
upon measurements of the severity and frequency of loss for loans covered by predatory 
lending statutes contained within a securitization trust.389  Frequency of loss considers 
three factors:   the number of prohibited acts under the statute,390 safe harbor 
provisions,391 and statutory clarity.392  Fitch’s credit enhancement analysis will also 
include a legal and qualitative analysis of the applicable statute by jurisdiction; the type 
of loans included in the transaction; compliance procedures by the originator/servicer; 
and the due diligence review by the relevant parties, such as the originator.393
These reports by the three Privileged Raters represent the most comprehensive 
statements by each of them regarding predatory lending legislation.  Each of the 
Privileged Raters took issue with specific types of provisions:   subjective standards, 
statutory clarity, assignee liability and unlimited liability.  It is of note that the Privileged 
Raters all acted within five weeks of each other and issued mostly parallel guidelines as 
to the treatment of predatory lending laws that allowed for assignee liability and 
unquantifiable damages.  These parallel moves could be troubling, given that the 
Privileged Raters do not face any competition in the grant of regulatory rating licenses.  
As a result, if the three Privileged Raters mistakenly interpret the predatory lending laws, 
there is little hope that market pressures will make them correct themselves.
387
. Id.
388
. Id. (“In the event of a breach of any such representation or warranty, Fitch will expect a repurchase of 
the affected loan at the applicable repurchase price. The repurchase price should be equal to: 1) the 
outstanding indebtedness of the loan (including, but not limited to late fees), plus accrued interest, plus, 2) 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs and all other damages which may be incurred by an RMBS transaction 
under any applicable predatory or abusive lending law. Since the repurchase of the loan will not necessarily 
insulate an RMBS transaction from assignee or purchaser liability, credit enhancement levels may be 
adjusted for those RMBS transactions which contain loans originated in jurisdictions with laws that contain 
such provisions.”)
389
. Id. Loss severity is calculated by determining the maximum recovery allowed by law under a worst-case 
scenario.  Id.
390
. Id. (“loans subject to a high number of prohibitive acts (e.g. 'high cost' or 'covered' loans) result in an 
increased likelihood of a violation. These loans are subject to a higher frequency than loans which are subject 
to a low number of prohibitive act violations (e.g. 'home' loans).”).
391
. Id. (“Fitch believes that assignee 'safe harbor' clauses may reduce the ability of a borrower to recover 
from an assignee or purchaser of a loan. Therefore, if the legislation contains safe harbor provisions which 
limit the exposure of the RMBS transaction to the borrower and if Fitch is comfortable that the safe harbor 
provisions are available to the RMBS transaction, the additional frequency assigned to a particular loan in 
that jurisdiction may be significantly reduced.”).
392
. Id. (“Due to potential errors, such as APRs being calculated incorrectly for loans in certain categories, 
lenders may unintentionally code a loan as a 'home loan' that is later determined to be a 'high cost' or 
'covered' loan - which may ultimately subject the RMBS issuer to assignee liability. In order to protect 
against this risk, Fitch may assign an added frequency factor to loans originated in jurisdictions with laws that 
contain assignee or purchaser liability provisions.”).
393
. Id.
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F. The New Jersey Experience:  Testing the Privileged Raters’ Resolve
New Jersey’s Home Ownership Security Act (the “New Jersey Law” or 
“HOSA”) became effective on November 26, 2003 after the three Privileged Raters 
issued their comprehensive guidelines on predatory lending statutes.  New Jersey 
amended HOSA (the “Amended New Jersey Law”) on July 6th, 2004, after the Privileged 
Raters decided not to rate pools containing certain types of New Jersey loans.  Like the 
Georgia Law, the New Jersey Law prohibits specific lender practices for three categories 
of loans and it includes assignee liability394 and punitive damages provisions because 
they expose investors to unlimited liability.395  These two provisions were most 
problematic for the Privileged Raters.  
New Jersey original statute attempted to hew its own path on solving the problem 
of predatory lending, but the Privileged Raters ultimately forced New Jersey back to the 
standardized path that they had promulgated in their guidelines when New Jersey 
amended its law the year after it was first enacted.
1. The Original New Jersey Law
The New Jersey Law, like the Georgia Law, created three categories of loans 
which are subject to increasing levels of regulation and follows similar thresholds to 
define its categories.  “New Jersey Home Loans” were the broadest category, applicable 
to one-to-six family principle dwelling secured by a mortgage or deed of trust, or a 
security interest in a manufactured home.396 Unlike the comparable Georgia Law 
category, “New Jersey Covered Home Loans” were defined by a points and fees trigger 
only; that is, it does not have an APR trigger.  New Jersey Covered Home Loans included 
loans that had points and fees greater than 4% for loans greater than $40,000, and a 
higher trigger for other loans.397  Like the Georgia Law, the New Jersey Law 
incorporated HOEPA’s APR trigger to define “NJ High-Cost Home Loans.” The New 
Jersey Law also set a points and fees trigger on a sliding scale, all lower than HOEPA’s 
standards:   (i) for total loan amounts of $40,000 or greater, 5% or more of the total loan 
394
. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-27 (West 2004) (setting forth assignee liability for certain types of loans).
395
. Id. § 46:10B-29(b) (“Punitive damages, when the violation was malicious or reckless in appropriate 
circumstances as determined by the fact-finder;”).
396
. Id. § 46:10B-24(3) (“Home Loan”).  The New Jersey Law prohibits as economically unjustifiable the 
same practices as the Georgia Law for all New Jersey Home Loans.  Those practices include:   packing single 
premium credit insurance into fees, Id. § 46:10B-25(a); encouraging default, Id. § 46:10B-25(c); late payment 
fees outside set limitations, Id. § 46:10B -25(d)(1-5) (i); discretionary loan acceleration, Id. § 46:10B-
25(4)(e); and charging fees for a payoff letter.  Id. § 46:10B -25(f).  Of course, these prohibitions also apply to 
all New Jersey Covered Home Loans and New Jersey High-Cost Home Loans, as such loans are types of the 
New Jersey Home Loans.
397
. Id. § 46:10B-24 (“Covered Home Loan”).  The points and fees trigger is 4.5% for loans that have 
principal amounts of less than $40,000 or if insured by the Fair Housing Administration (“FHA”) or 
guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”).
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amount and higher proportions for smaller loans.398  The New Jersey Law also added 
two new subcategories of Home Loans, “Home Improvement Loans,” which were Home 
Loans made in connection with home improvements; and “Manufactured Housing 
Loans,” which were Home Loans made in connection with manufactured homes.399
Like its Georgia Law counterpart, the New Jersey Law’s “New Jersey Covered 
Home Loan” category had only one limitation particular to that category of loan:  it bans 
loan flipping where there is no “reasonable tangible net benefit.”400  The New Jersey 
High-Cost Home Loan category also incorporated similar prohibitions as the comparable 
Georgia Law category.401
The New Jersey Law’s assignee liability provision allowed New Jersey High 
Cost Home Loan borrowers to assert all affirmative claims and defenses against 
purchasers and assignees.402  The New Jersey Law did provide a safe harbor provision 
for unwary secondary market purchasers who can show that they exercised due diligence 
in identifying and avoiding the purchase of “High Cost Home Loans.”403 Like the 
Georgia Law, the New Jersey Law limited assignee liability for the “Covered Home 
Loan” category to the outstanding obligation plus costs and attorney’s fees.404 Remedies 
under the act included statutory damages,405 punitive damages,406 reasonable costs and 
attorney’s fees,407 injunctive relief, declaratory and equitable relief.408
2. The Privileged Raters Quickly Respond
Although it did not go into effect until November 26, 2003, Governor 
McGreevey signed the New Jersey Law on May 1, 2003.  The day after the Governor 
signed HOSA, S&P announced that it would not rate pools that contain certain New 
398
. Id. (“total points and fees threshold”).  The thresholds for smaller loans are as follows:  for total loan 
amounts of $20,000 to $39,999, 6% of the total loan amount; and for total loan amounts of $1 to $19,999, the 
lesser of $1,000 or 6%.
399
. See generally Azmy & Reiss, supra note 45, at 645 (describing treatment under New Jersey Law of 
Home Improvement Loans and Manufactured Housing Loans).  Manufactured homes include the following:  
modular homes, panelized homes, pre-cut homes, and mobile homes.  See id.
400
. § 46:10B-25(b).
401
. § 46:10B-26.  These prohibitions include those on balloon payments, negative amortization, default 
interest rates, prepaid finance charges, limitations on access to legal remedies, the making of loans without 
mandatory notices, the making of loans without mandatory counseling, the direct payment to home 
improvement contractors (that is, the bypassing of the borrower when lender makes payments on home 
improvement loans), loan modification fees, same-creditor refinances of existing New Jersey High Cost 
Home Loans, and the financing of fees greater than 2% of the total loan balance.  Id.
402
. § 46:10B-27(a).
403
. § 46:10B-29(c). 
404
. Id.
405
. § 46:10B-29(b)(1)(a).
406
. § 46:10B-29(b)(1)(b).
407
. § 46:10B-29(b)(1)(c).
408
. § 46:10B-29(b)(2).
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Jersey residential loans.409  In contrast to S&P, Moody’s and Fitch quickly concluded 
that, despite some ambiguities in the Act’s damages provisions, the risks to assignees 
were low enough that they would continue to rate pools containing most types of New 
Jersey residential loans.  Thus, despite similarities between the original Georgia Law and 
the New Jersey Law, Moody’s and Fitch reacted differently to New Jersey’s law, 
appearing to prevent a repeat of the funding crisis that occurred in Georgia despite S&P’s 
more restrictive position.
S&P reported its position regarding the New Jersey Law more than 6 months 
before the law would become effective.  S&P stated that it would not allow several 
categories of New Jersey loans within securitizations that it rated, claiming that several of 
the Act’s damages provisions were unclear and, therefore might expose assignees to 
unlimited liability.410  Those categories include “High-Cost Home Loans,” “Covered 
Home Loans,” “Home Improvement Loans,” and “Manufactured Housing Loans.” S&P 
stated it would allow “Home Loans,” reverse mortgages and loans on non-primary 
residences in its rated transactions.411
Even though Moody’s and Fitch indicated that they would still rate transactions 
containing New Jersey mortgage loans, S&P’s position threatened to destabilize the New 
Jersey mortgage market and motivated the lending industry in New Jersey to lobby for a 
significant dilution of the New Jersey Law’s assignee liability provisions.412 However, 
many of S&P’s concerns were unmerited.  For example, S&P asserted, without clear 
explanation, that the Act creates unlimited liability for assignees of “Covered Home 
Loans.”413  However, assignee liability for New Jersey Covered Home Loans is 
specifically limited by the Act (i) to suits brought in an individual capacity and (ii) for 
damages that cannot exceed the borrower’s remaining obligation under the loan plus 
costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.414
Fitch took a more accepting opinion of the New Jersey Law on June 5, 2003,415
following its revised criteria.416 In contrast to S&P’s position, Fitch stated it would rate 
409
. Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, S&P Report Addresses New Jersey State Predatory Lending Law
(May 2, 2003), at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html [hereinafter S&P REPORT ADDRESSES NJ]; 
see Randy Diamond, Mortgage Reform Law In Trouble From Start; Rating Service Raises Worries about 
Liability, BERGEN COUNTY REC., May 3, 2003, A1 (“S&P said it was concerned the law would hold issuers, 
and in some cases buyers, of mortgage-backed securities liable for violations.”).
410
. Id.
411
. Id.
412
. S&P SURPRISES LENDERS; DECISION NOT TO RATE CERTAIN POOLS CUTS NEW PREDATORY LAW 
SUPPORT, BROKER, JUNE/JULY 2003, at 30 (quoting E. Robert Levy, Executive Director, Mortgage Bankers 
Ass’n of New Jersey/League of Mortgage Lenders, “We obviously are not going to be able to live with the 
bill in the present form, unless S&P changes their position”).   
413
. S&P EVALUATING PREDATORY LENDING 4/15/03, supra note 377.
414
. Azmy & Reiss, supra note 45, at 702 -03; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-27(b)-(c) (West 2004).
415
. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Responds to New Jersey Predatory Lending Legislation 
(June 5, 2003) at
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/sectors/rmbs_predatory_lending.cfm?sector_flag=3&marketsector=2
&detail=&body_content=pred_lend [hereinafter FITCH RATINGS RESPONDS TO NJ].
416
. Id.
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“Covered Home Loans,” “Manufactured Home Loans,” and “Home Improvement Loans” 
in its rated transactions,417 subject to the appropriate credit enhancement.418 Fitch 
believed that the risks posed by New Jersey were less than those posed by Georgia 
because the New Jersey Law allows for mitigating factors.419  Predictably, Fitch declined 
to rate New Jersey High Cost Home Loans since the combination of unlimited liability 
and assignee liability present an unquantifiable liability to investors.420
While New Jersey High Cost Home Loans can be part of a rated transaction due 
to errors in the origination process,421 Fitch recognized the adequacy of New Jersey’s 
safe harbor provisions which limit the exposure of lenders with reasonable compliance 
procedures in place.422  Fitch determined that a third party certification of the loan pool, 
which includes recalculation of the APRs based on information taken from the loans 
documents would be sufficient to satisfy Fitch’s due diligence requirements.423  While 
Fitch questioned what “reasonable due diligence” would suffice to invoke the New Jersey 
Law’s safe harbor provisions,424 it stated that it would not rate any transactions where 
sellers could not show evidence that its compliance procedures fall within the safe harbor 
provisions, as those provisions were interpreted by Fitch.425
Unlike S&P and Fitch, Moody’s stated on September 22, 2003 that it would rate 
pools containing New Jersey High Cost Home Loans and New Jersey Covered Home 
Loans.426  While recognizing that these two categories pose greater risk to investors than 
ordinary “Home Loans,” Moody’s stated that few of those loans would be securitized 
based on that inherent risk.427 New Jersey High Cost Home Loans bear the risk of 
damages including the outstanding balance of the loan plus costs, as well as the potential 
for class action lawsuits.428 Refinanced New Jersey High Cost Home Loans pose even 
greater risk to the investor based on the requirement that the refinance provide a 
417
. Id.
418
. Id.
419
. Richard Newman, Fitch Won’t Rate High-Cost Loans in New Jersey; Predatory Lending Laws Causing 
Concern on Wall Street, BERGEN COUNTY REC., June 6, 2003, at B1 (“ "Georgia had unlimited liability that 
could not be mitigated," said Fitch's senior director, Michael Nelson.”).
420
. FITCH RATINGS RESPONDS TO NJ, supra note 415.
421
. Id.
422
. Id.
423
. Id.
424
. Id. (“The Act is unclear as to what will be considered reasonable due diligence in New Jersey under the 
limited damages provision of the Act.”).
425
. Id.
426
. MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, MOODY’S TO CONTINUE TO RATE RMBS BACKED BY NEW JERSEY HOME 
LOANS (Sept 22, 2003) [hereinafter MOODY’S TO CONTINUE TO RATE NJ].
427
. Id.  (Moody's “believes that two categories of loans defined in the New Jersey Act – ‘high cost home 
loans’ and refinanced ‘covered home loans’ - represent increased risks to RMBS securitizations. Thus, the 
agency expects that few of the "high cost home loans" and refinanced "covered home loans" originated in 
New Jersey will be securitized.”).
428
. Id.
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“reasonable tangible net benefit.”429 Because of the subjective standard, Moody’s stated 
it would exclude refinanced high cost home loans from its rated transactions.430
Otherwise, Moody’s will rate pools that have less than 2% purchase money (e.g., not 
refinanced) New Jersey High Cost Home Loans.431 Moody’s will allow up to 5%  
refinanced New Jersey Covered Home Loans432 even though such loans are subject to 
the “reasonable tangible net benefit” requirement, because New Jersey Covered Home
Loans are not exposed to unlimited liability and are not subject to class action 
lawsuits.433 Moody’s placed no limit on purchase money “Covered Home Loans.” 434
Moody’s also requires the repurchase of loans that violate its guidelines and 
indemnification of the securitization trust for any losses incurred because of the inclusion 
of such a loan.435 All other loans may be included in rated transactions as long as the 
issuer demonstrates strong compliance procedures with the New Jersey Law,436 and due 
diligence procedures to avail themselves of the safe harbor provision.437 While S&P 
stated that the loan categories were unclear,438 subjecting assignees to potential liability, 
Moody’s stated that the New Jersey Law provided clear and defined thresholds which 
permit effective compliance procedures.439 Consumer advocates lauded Moody’s 
position, stating that it correctly balanced the needs of consumers and investors.440  And 
indeed, this seemed to be the case.  But just getting Moody’s on board would not be 
enough to satisfy secondary market players; given that RMBS transactions typically need 
a rating from both Moody’s and S&P, S&P’s actions were closely watched.
3. S&P Backs Down
429
. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 (“Covered Home Loan”) (West 2004).
430
. MOODY’S TO CONTINUE TO RATE NJ, supra note 426. (“Among other things, the New Jersey Act requires 
"high cost home loans" that refinance existing loans to provide a "tangible net benefit" to borrowers. 
Christine Lachnicht, a Moody's vice president-senior analyst, indicated that "because the New Jersey Act 
does not provide an objective standard for what constitutes a "tangible net benefit," it will be more difficult 
for lenders and issuers to implement and demonstrate effective compliance and due diligence procedures for 
refinanced "high cost home loans." Therefore, Moody's anticipates that the risk of including refinanced high 
cost loans in RMBS deals will eliminate their inclusion in future deals.”).
431
. Id.
432
. Id.
433
. Id. 
434
. Id.
435
. Id.
436
. Id.
437
. Id.
438
. See supra Part V.F.1.
439
. MOODY’S TO CONTINUE TO RATE NJ, supra note 426.
440
. See, e.g., Richard Newman, Moody’s Differs On Predatory Lending Law; Will Rate Pools Including 
High-Cost Mortgages, BERGEN COUNTY REC., Sept. 23, 2003 at L8 (quoting Debbie Goldstein, a consumer 
advocate, as saying , “Moody's successfully balanced the needs of consumers in protecting their homes from 
foreclosure and in protecting investors against "unintended consequences" - such as catastrophic liability for 
an inadvertent purchase of a loan that's in violation of the law.”).
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H. Robert Tillman, head of the New Jersey Department of Banking and Finance, 
commented on the relative positions of the Privileged Raters, stating, “All of the major 
rating agencies do not have to agree on how to treat New Jersey loans.  The market can 
function with Moody's and Fitch."441  This proved to be an optimistic assessment.
From the day after the law was signed to the day before it came into 
effectiveness, S&P maintained its position that the New Jersey Law lacked clarity and as 
such, New Jersey loans could not be included in their rated transactions.  Then, S&P 
backed down from its original position on the New Jersey Law two days prior to the 
effective date of the New Jersey Law.  Notwithstanding its denial, it appears that S&P’s 
purpose in responding so quickly to the New Jersey law was to push New Jersey to 
amend the law prior to its effective date while ensuring that it could keep this business if 
the NJ Law was not amended.
As it appeared that the NJ Law would not be amended, S&P released a report on 
the role of predatory lending laws in RMBS transactions on October 7, 2003.  The report 
speculates generally on the effect of laws, such as the New Jersey Law, on lender’s 
practices, stating that lenders may reduce lending in a particular state to protect 
themselves, the increased compliance cost may make such loans unprofitable, and that a 
decreased purchase market may prompt a reduction in originations.442 S&P goes on to 
state that predatory lending laws may reduce the funds available to pay investors in 
RMBS transactions that contain loans from jurisdictions with tough predatory lending 
laws,443 which is most relevant to S&P and is determinative of its ratings.444 S&P then 
reiterated its previous issues with assignee liability and uncapped liability.445 S&P 
concludes by stating that while it is in favor of predatory lending laws, its role is to assess 
risk associated with RMBS transactions and not to make public policy.446  This statement 
is inconsistent with its actions.
While S&P’s October 7th report did not address the New Jersey Law directly, it 
takes a less restrictive position on anti-predatory lending laws than that contained in its 
May 2, 2003 statement on the New Jersey Law.  Interestingly, the report serves one of 
three conceivable purposes.  First, it is possible that S&P expected an upcoming 
amendment to the New Jersey Law but needed a basis to amend its previous report in 
case the law did not change.  Second, S&P may have felt pressured to reaffirm its stance, 
separate from those of Moody’s and Fitch, after Moody’s September 22, 2003 report 
441
. Id.
442
. Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, Anti-Predatory Lending Laws Assume a Prominent Role in the US 
RMBS Market (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html.
443
. Id.
444
. Id.
445
. Id.
446
. Id. (“Standard & Poor's has stated that, as a public policy matter, it is in favor of statutes that attempt to 
curb predatory lending. Standard & Poor's also acknowledges, however, that its role is to evaluate the credit 
risk to investors associated with anti-predatory lending legislation and not to recommend public policy. The 
making of public policy is the responsibility of elected officials.”).  While facially attractive, there is 
something incoherent about this position:  if S&P cannot consider public policy in its assessments, the fact 
that it favors something as a matter of public policy is of no practical effect.
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directly contradicted S&P’s position that the statute was unclear as to the categorization 
of loans.  Last, S&P having faced scrutiny in the press from consumer advocacy groups, 
may have needed to assuage the tensions it generated by undercutting the effectiveness of 
a consumer protection law.
S&P revised its position on November 25, 2003,447 two days before the New 
Jersey Law would go into effect, stating it would rate the formerly disallowed “Covered 
Home Loans,” “Manufactured Home Loans” and “Home Improvement Loans.”448  Like 
Fitch’s and Moody’s positions, S&P now required compliance representations and 
demonstrated compliance procedures sufficient to identify New Jersey High-Cost Home 
Loans, New Jersey Covered Home Loans and whether such loans are in violation of the 
statute.449  Unlike Moody’s, S&P still excluded “High-Cost Home Loans.”450 To that 
extent, S&P requires an “exclusion representation,” that is, representations of effective 
procedures to exclude New Jersey High Cost Home Loans so the loans in a pool can fall 
within the New Jersey Law’s safe harbor provision.451 Finally, the party making 
compliance and exclusion representations must be financially stable enough to repurchase 
loans that violate S&P’s guidelines and indemnify the securitization trust for losses 
incurred by such violations.452
As of the New Jersey Law’s effective date, the New Jersey experience stands in 
stark contrast to the lending catastrophe that nearly occurred in Georgia.  Differences in 
the laws arguably demonstrate an intent by New Jersey state legislature to afford 
investors greater ability to avoid harsh penalties while remaining steadfastly opposed to 
predatory lending practices.  Yet, S&P’s markedly similar responses to the two laws, as 
compared to the more nuanced responses of its competitors, raise concerns as to whether 
it is biased.  Their initial position highlights their interest in supporting secondary market 
investors rather than fair and equitable lending practices.  Even so, New Jersey would not 
be able to withstand S&P’s next change of position which occurred on May 13, 2004.
4. S&P Reverses Course and Imposes New Restrictions, Forcing New 
Jersey To Amend Its Law
On that date, S&P released its new evaluation criteria for rating RMBS 
transactions.453  The new criteria subjected loans in each jurisdiction to a quantitative 
447
 Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, Standard & Poor's Permits Additional New Jersey Mortgage Loans 
Into Rated Single Family Transactions (Nov. 25, 2003), available at 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html. 
448
. Id.
449
. Id.
450
. Id. (“Standard & Poor's will continue to exclude High-Cost Home Loans because of the potential for 
uncapped statutory and punitive damages.”).
451
. Id.
452
. Id.
453
. Press Release, Standard & Poor's , Standard & Poor's Clarifies Credit Risk Posed by Anti-Predatory 
Lending Laws (May 2004), at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/04/0518.html [hereinafter 
STANDARD & POOR'S CLARIFIES]. 
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analysis to account for the clarity of the statutory provision,454 the potential loss 
severity,455 and potential mitigating factors.456  “Standard & Poor's believes that when 
the risk associated with violating an anti-predatory lending law is quantifiable, Standard 
& Poor's will allow loans governed by that law in its rated transactions.”457  In 
jurisdictions with assignee liability and the potential for liability in excess of the original 
balance of the loan,458 it took the position that the risk assessment must be increased 
where the anti-predatory lending laws have subjective standards.  S&P requires credit 
enhancements to properly evaluate those risks in specific jurisdictions.459
In deciding that sellers of NC High Cost Home Loans did not require further 
credit enhancements, S&P found that the NC Law had among the highest loss severity 
percentages460 among jurisdictions with quantifiable damages461 and subjective 
standards;462 but also had sufficient mitigating factors463 which are determinative of the 
credit enhancement requirement for jurisdictions with assignee liability and quantifiable 
damages.464 In contrast, S&P refused to rate both Georgia and New Jersey high cost 
home loans because of the lack of quantifiable damages and sufficient safe harbors, even 
though they had lower loss severity percentages.  Because S&P’s required credit 
enhancements would impose unacceptable costs on the New Jersey mortgage market, the 
454
. Press Release, Standard & Poor's Implements Credit Enhancement Criteria and Revises Representation 
and Warranty Criteria for Including Anti-Predatory Lending Law Loans in U.S. Rated Structured Finance 
Transactions (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/04/0518.html
[hereinafter S&P IMPLEMENTS CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS]. 
455
. Id. (“The loss severity on each affected loan will be calculated based on the jurisdiction, taking into 
account the principal balance of each loan, the interest rate, and the term of the loan. After calculating this 
loss severity, Standard & Poor's will determine the number of defensive claims (claims raised by the 
borrower in a foreclosure action) by using the appropriate foreclosure frequency. It will then determine the 
frequency of affirmative claims (claims made against the lender prior to default of the loans) by assuming 
that a percentage of the nondefaulted loans are likely to be subject to affirmative claims. The total credit 
enhancement for affected loans is then calculated based on the percentage of losses on affirmative and 
defensive claims. Therefore, the total credit enhancement will depend on the number loans in each pool, 
foreclosure frequencies, and the jurisdictional distribution of the loans.”).
456
. Id.
457
. Id.
458
. STANDARD & POOR'S CLARIFIES, supra note 453.
459
. S&P IMPLEMENTS CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, supra note 454 (“Standard & Poor's credit enhancement is 
based on an assessment of potential losses to the securitization transaction. This calculation involves an 
evaluation of several factors, including the number of successful lawsuits likely to be asserted against the 
issuer based on the jurisdictions involved, statutory borrower rights, the maximum potential damages that 
could be awarded, and an assessment of the likely amount of damages to be awarded.”).
460
. Id. (finding that North Carolina has loss severity percentage of 275%).
461
. Id. (noting that loans with unquantifiable liability are excluded from S&P’s ratings). 
462
. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24:10:2(c) (West 2004) (setting “reasonable and tangible net benefit” standard).
463
. S&P IMPLEMENTS CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, supra note 454.
464
. Id. (comparing (i) Cleveland Heights, Ohio’s statute with a loss severity percentage of 37% and no 
mitigating factors that requires credit enhancements with (ii) North Carolina’s statute with a loss severity of 
275% and mitigating factors that does not require credit enhancements).
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New Jersey legislature was forced to acquiesce and amend its predatory lending law on 
July 6, 2004.465
There were three important amendments to HOSA that were in response to rating 
agency concerns.466 First, the Covered Home Loan category was removed because the 
Privileged Raters found the loan flipping test too ambiguous.467  Second, the amendment 
limited plaintiffs from seeking HOSA’s remedies in class actions; this change (in addition 
to reducing potential recoveries for plaintiffs) allowed the Privileged Raters to more 
easily quantify potential damages under the law.468  Finally, the amendment granted New 
Jersey’s Department of Banking and Insurance the power to promulgate regulations to 
effectuate the intent and purpose of all of the provisions of HOSA (as opposed to the 
handful of provisions that DOBI had authority over in the original statute), a change that 
would again reduce ambiguity for the Privileged Raters.469 While these changes are not 
uniformly bad, they tend to be pro-lender and were adopted largely to satisfy the 
demands of Standard & Poors.
VI. THREE FORCES MAY STANDARDIZE THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
SUBPRIME MARKET
In addition to Privileged Rater predatory lending law underwriting guidelines, 
there are two other forces that may impose greater standardization upon the subprime 
mortgage market:  (1) federal preemption by legislation and/or regulation and (2) GSE 
buying guidelines.  Standardization can take many forms and can vary in scope.  Each 
push to standardize must be independently evaluated to determine whether it is desirable.
A. Federal Preemption Is Premature
The United States has a dual banking system, one in which both states and the 
federal government charter and regulate banks and other savings institutions.  Within this 
dual system, the federal government has the power to preempt state lending regulations.  
Indeed, federal regulators have already preempted the application of state predatory 
lending laws to a broad array of lending institutions and Congress is considering 
legislation to preempt their application to the remaining financial institutions that are still 
465
. See, e.g., Erick Bergquist, Predatory Laws:  S&P’s Awkward Position, AM. BANKER, May 18, 2004, at 
1, 1 (finding that S&P credit enhancements for New Jersey loans would be “high enough to scare lenders 
away.”).
466
. 2004 N.J. Laws 84.
467
. Id.  As an apparent compromise for eliminating the Covered Home Loan category the amended law 
broadened the scope of the NJ High-Cost Home Loan category to include more loans.  Another important, 
pro-lender change was the exclusion of prepayment penalties from the “points and fees calculation” when a 
refinancing occurs by the same broker but with a different lender. Id.
468
. Id.
469
. Id.
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regulated by such laws.  Professor Azmy has exhaustively reviewed these efforts and they 
merely require summarizing and updating for my purposes.470
1. Regulatory Preemption
The Office of Thrift Supervision, which regulates savings and loans and savings 
banks, has preempted state predatory loans as to those entities and their operating 
subsidiaries.471  The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has also preempted state 
predatory lending laws as to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.472
These preemption actions will only have a modest effect on the efficacy of 
predatory lending laws; it is generally agreed that federally-regulated lenders do not 
engage in much predatory lending.473  The only aspect of these preemption rulings that 
will significantly impact predatory lending is that they also apply to the state-chartered 
operating subsidiaries of nationally-chartered lenders.  Major nationally chartered lenders 
have purchased subprime lenders that have been accused of predatory behaviors474 which 
will not be subject to state predatory lending laws.  But there is reason to believe that 
470
. See generally Azmy, supra note 66, at 382-90.
471
. See, e.g., Carolyn J. Buck, Preemption of New Mexico Home Loan Protection Act 1-2 (Office of Thrift 
Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Opinion of Chief Counsel No. P-2003-6, 2003) [hereinafter OTS 
Opinion of Chief Counsel No. P-2003-6]; Carolyn J. Buck, Preemption of New Jersey Predatory Lending Act 
1 (Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Opinion of Chief Counsel P-2003-5); Carolyn J. 
Buck, Preemption of New York Predatory Lending Law 1 (Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the 
Treasury, Opinion of Chief Counsel P-2003- 2); Carolyn J. Buck, Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act 1 
(Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Opinion of Chief Counsel P-2003- 1).
472
. 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34 (2004).  The National Credit Union Administration has also preempted HOSA as to 
federal credit unions, New Jersey Homeownership Security Act of 2002, NCUA Op. Assoc. Gen. Counsel 
(Jan. 28, 2004), available at http://www.ncua.gov/RegulationsOpinionsLaws/opinion_letters/2003_letters/03 -
1106.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2005), and has promulgated regulations that preempt a broad swath of state 
lending laws. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(b) (2004).  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is also considering a 
Petition for Rulemaking to Preempt Certain State Laws, which may preempt state predatory lending laws as 
to the interstate operations of state-chartered members of the FDIC.  70 Fed. Reg. 13413 (Mar. 21, 2005).  
But again, FDIC-insured entities do not appear to among the main predatory lenders.  See Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection's Examination Assessment of 
Subprime Lending at 2 (Audit Report No. 03-019, March 18, 2003) (estimating that 1.35 percent of all FDIC-
insured institutions  had significant holdings of subprime assets.).
473
. The OCC has determined that as far as national banks are concerned, “there were 178 lenders whose 
business focus was subprime mortgage lending in 2001. The majority, or 112 (63%), were independent 
mortgage companies. Of the remaining lenders, 30 (17%) were non-bank affiliates and only 36 (20%) were 
depository institutions or their direct subsidiaries.”  Comptroller of the Currency Adm’r of Nat’l Banks, 
Economic Issues in Predatory Lending 4 (Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Working Paper, 2003), 
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/workingpaper.pdf  (July 30, 2003); WEICHER, , supra note 54, at 37.
474
. See, e.g., HSBC Holdings PLC: Regulators, Shareholders Clear Household International Deal, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 31, 2003, at B4 (describing HSBC’s acquisition of subprime lender Household International); 
Chiwon Yom, Limited-Purpose Banks:  Their Specialties, Performance, and Prospects at 18-20 (FDIC Draft 
FOB-2004-07-.1, June 2004) (describing First Union National Bank’s acquisition of subprime lender The 
Money Store); Citigroup Closes Associates Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at C12  (describing Citigroup’s 
acquisition of subprime lender Associates First Capital Corporation).
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nationally chartered lenders will not tolerate predatory behaviors in their operating 
subsidiaries because of reputational concerns475 and existing regulation.476
It is difficult to answer two important questions that arise from the federal 
preemption of these laws:  how many subprime lenders are impacted and what share of 
the market do they have.  But I preliminarily conclude that this preemption, while unwise 
in our dual banking system, will only have a moderately negative impact on the 
effectiveness of state predatory lending laws because few predatory lenders and only a 
small portion of predatory loans are originated by entities that benefit from preemption.
2. Possible Congressional Preemption.
Two bills introduced in the current Congressional session address predatory 
lending.  The Ney/Kanjorski bill makes minor modifications to HOEPA that, while 
apparently consumer friendly, come at the price of complete preemption of state 
predatory lending laws.477  Representatives Barney Frank (D-MA), Brad Miller (D-NC) 
and Melvin Watt (D-NC) have recently introduced an alternative bill that expressly does 
not preempt state predatory lending laws and models its substantive provisions on the 
stringent North Carolina predatory lending law.478  There is no evidence that either of 
these bills is likely to be passed this year.
Preemption, either regulatory or Congressional is premature, as Professor 
Azmy argues.  Because predatory lending is difficult to define, the trial and error 
approach of the states has provided a fertile ‘laboratory of experimentation.’479  The 
Frank/Miller/Watt bill recognizes this by adopting the useful provisions of the North 
Carolina Law without preempting ongoing innovations by the states.
B. Government-Sponsored Entities Will Have an Incremental Impact
Fannie and Freddie are the largest purchasers of residential mortgages on the 
secondary market and are becoming more significant players in the subprime market.  
Building on their buying guidelines for prime, conforming mortgages, Fannie and 
Freddie have issued guidelines so that subprime originators can design their loans to 
comply with their requirements.
475
. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, HSBC to Buy a U.S. Lender for $14.2 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2002, at C1 (suggesting that most banks are concerned with reputational risks); Richard A. Oppel Jr. and 
Patrick Mcgeehan, Along With a Lender, Is Citigroup Buying Trouble?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, § 3; at 1 
(describing Citigroup’s reputational considerations upon entering subprime field).
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. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Advisory Letter 2003-2, 
Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices 1-2 (2003) 
[hereinafter OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2] (prohibiting national banks from engaging in certain lending 
practices that are prone to abuse), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-2.pdf..
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. H.R. 1295 § 102 (lowering HOEPA points and fees trigger to 5%, albeit with a less restrictive definition 
of points and fees) and § 106 (preempting state laws).
478
. Legislative Update, American Banker at 5 (June 9, 2005); see Prohibit Predatory Lending Act 109TH
CONG, 1ST SESS., H.R. 1182 (Frank/Miller/Watt bill).
479
. See generally Azmy, supra note 66, at 295.
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Fannie and Freddie have indicated that they will not purchase high cost home 
loans and other loans with certain terms that they deem to be abusive, such as harsh 
prepayment penalties.480  They have also indicated that they will not purchase high cost 
home loans, as defined in the HOEPA.481  Fannie has also indicated that it will not buy 
loans with mandatory arbitration clauses482 and Freddie has indicated that it will not buy 
loans originated with single-premium credit insurance.483
The GSEs’ buying guidelines are far less restrictive than the policies of the 
Privileged Raters.  Because the GSEs impact a smaller portion of the subprime market 
than the Privileged Raters do and because the GSEs are only imposing incremental 
standardization on the subprime market, their impact should probably be more beneficial 
than not.484  Their impact will be beneficial not only because of its limited impact, but 
also because they have made good choices in drafting their buying guidelines:  drawn 
neither too restrictively nor too broadly, they have identified genuinely problematic 
practices and loan terms to exclude.  Whether the drafters of these guidelines were 
conscious of the GSEs’ duty to the public interest or not, they struck a balance that few 
found fault with.
C. Privileged Raters Are Standardizing the Subprime Market at the 
Expense of the Public Interest
The Privileged Raters have indicated that they will not rate securities backed by 
pools of residential mortgages if any of those mortgages violate their rating guidelines 
relating to predatory lending laws.  Because the lack of a rating from at least one of these 
agencies is the financial equivalent of a death sentence for a residential mortgage-backed 
securities offering, the Privileged Raters are able to impose their own form of 
standardization on the entire subprime market.
The Privileged Raters make more money in a growing residential mortgage-
backed securities market because they charge issuers for their work in rating new 
securities; thus, it is in the agencies’ self-interest to keep states from passing laws that 
slow secondary market growth and cut into their income.  Moreover, the Privileged 
Raters’ own statements provide evidence that they are biased in favor of investors.  
480
. FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 04-06, supra  note 173, at 3; F ANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 03-12, supra  note 173; 
FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 03-02, supra  note 173; Letter from Michael C. May, Senior Vice President, Freddie 
Mac, to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Services, Revisions to Freddie Mac’s Purchase Requirements Based on 
the Enactment of Antipredatory Lending Legislation in New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Illinois, Maine 
and Nevada (Nov. 26, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2003/ 
freddie_indyltr1126.pdf.
481
. MICHAEL MAY LETTER, supra note 173; FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 04-06, supra  note 173, at 3-4. 
482
. FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 04-06, supra note 173, at 3-4.
483
. See supra note 173.
484
. See William N. Eskridge, One Hundred Years of Ineptitude:  The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant 
with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transactions, 70 VA L. REV.
1083 (1984) (arguing that Fannie and Freddie are in best position to standardize loan terms and balance 
consumer protection with market needs).
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In addition to the theory that Privileged Raters are biased against the public 
interest, there are other hypotheses, presented below, that may explain their behavior.  
But even if these theories more accurately described the state of affairs, the history of the 
Privileged Raters’ reaction to state predatory lending laws indicates that there are 
systemic problems that result from the ability of the Privileged Raters to sell regulatory 
licenses.485  Fundamentally, these problems derive from the power of the Privileged 
Raters to standardize the subprime market on their terms and their terms alone.  
In response to the critique outline in this Part, Privileged Raters may argue that 
the tension between Privileged Rater actions and state predatory lending legislation 
results from the fact that they are attempting to answer a different question than the one 
that the state legislatures want them to answer.  Privileged Raters, in their capacity as 
advocates for investors, may be concerned with the incredibly remote possibility of a 
catastrophic loss to a mortgage pool caused by a mammoth award in a predatory lending 
suit.  The state may just want them to address the average risk and severity of such 
occurrences, which appear minimal.486  Thus, the Privileged Raters may argue, there is 
no bias, just different goals.
This argument is not compelling.  First, ratings, even investment-grade ratings, 
are not intended to provide complete assurance of payment to investors, just an accurate 
assessment of that risk.487  Second, the risk of catastrophic loss is limited to the 
investors’ investment in a given pool.488  This type of risk of catastrophic loss is no 
different from the risk that nearly all other securities bear for one reason or another; it is 
just the particular potential cause, predatory lending laws, that differs.
Privileged Raters may also argue that while I have accurately described recent 
events and their negative consequences for the public interest, such localized 
consequences are acceptable “collateral damage” as the capital markets promote 
globalized standardization and efficiency.  For this argument to have merit, it should 
demonstrate that the standardization that it is imposing is (1) relatively cost-free; and (2) 
a material, even if just incremental, improvement in the efficiency of the capital markets.  
The first prong is materially false:  predatory lending costs consumers many billions of 
dollars a year and preliminary studies suggest that predatory lending laws reduce 
predatory lending.489  And there is no evidence that the second prong is true:  lenders are 
already required to comply with an extraordinarily complex set of regulations and the 
predatory lending statutes do not materially add to such compliance costs.  Indeed, 
companies offer software packages to deal with the web of lending regulations.490  A 
485
.  See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
486
. See supra note 342.
487
. Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 716.
488
. See supra note 107.
489
. See, e.g., QUERCIA STUDY, supra note 279 (arguing that NC Law reduced predatory loans without 
materially reducing subprime loans generally).
490
. See, e.g., Appintelligence Website (describing web-based predatory lending due diligence product for 
lenders), at http://www.appintelligence.com/preventpredatory/index.html; See CompliancEase Web 
Site,available at 
http://www.complianceease.com/mainsite/prod/prod_ac_overview.jsp?content=/opencms/CEContent/prod/pr
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related argument may be that the Privileged Raters should have the ability, at least more 
so than the states, to determine how the secondary market functions because they are 
bigger stakeholders in that market.  This, of course, would be an extraordinary transfer of 
power to private actors and should be the subject of an explicit decision-making process, 
not the result of a slow and unseen accretion of power over decades.
Privileged Raters might also argue that standardization that benefits investors 
ultimately benefits subprime borrowers because these two classes overlap and the 
benefits to the former class negate the harm to the latter class.  This argument, while 
somewhat intuitive, does not hold up at all.  While there is, indeed, some overlap between 
the two classes it is neither a significant overlap, nor is there a way to ensure that those 
harmed by the inappropriate standardization imposed by the Privileged Raters get a 
proportionate share of the benefits that accrue to the investor class generally.
Privileged Raters might also argue that I am incorrect in describing their rating 
guidelines as inaccurate.  They might argue that if that were so, others would be able to 
arbitrage loans governed by predatory lending statutes to their benefit.  For instance, an 
investor might accept private placements of unrated pools containing loans governed by 
predatory lending statutes at a price that accurately reflects the risk of such statutes.  
While theoretically true, the fact is that the immense power of the Privileged Raters can 
dry up a mortgage market like Georgia’s so quickly that there is no time for such an 
alternate market to develop.
Finally, Privileged Raters may argue that while I have accurately described 
recent events, I have misinterpreted them.  They might argue that their predatory lending 
law guidelines are appropriate and unbiased.  This position does not seem to have merit, 
given the biases demonstrated in this article and given the less restrictive positions taken 
by the GSEs.491
Fundamentally, the arguments of the Privileged Raters are quite hollow.  There is 
every reason, from their own statements to the empirical evidence to the structure of their 
business models, to think that they take a pro-investor and/or pro-issuer stance on the 
policies that they evaluate.  There is no reason to believe that the Privileged Raters are 
constituted to address the concerns of subprime borrowers and there is no reason to 
believe that they consider the various sides of an issue as a legislature is likely (or, at 
least, more likely) to do.
od_ac_overview_m.jsp&right=/opencms/CEContent/prod/r_power_to_protect.jsp (combining internet-based 
compliance tool with insurance product).
491
. Moody’s and Fitch may also argue that I am tarring them with too broad a brush, by grouping them with 
S&P, which has taken the most draconian approach to state predatory lending laws.  For my purposes, the 
differences among the Privileged Raters are not that important because the typical securitization has ratings 
by both Moody’s and S&P, at a minimum.  See supra note 175.  The failure to get a rating from S&P would 
signal something is amiss to investors.  Thus, the nature of the Privileged Raters oligopoly is that the market 
and state legislatures must typically respond to the most draconian of S&P and Moody’s.  And, much like a 
good cop/bad cop duo, they both benefit from the systemic dilution of state predatory lending laws, 
notwithstanding the fact that one of the partners presents a more kindly face.
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Thus, it appears that the standardization imposed upon the subprime market by 
the Privileged Raters is biased against the public interest and is not acceptable as 
‘collateral damage’ in the fight to create standardized capital markets.
VII. MAKING THE PRIVILEGED RATERS TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
THEIR IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Rating agencies are entities that were historically considered to be mere 
commentators on the comings and goings of the players in our free market economy 
ensuring that objective information is widely disseminated to all.492  This view, however, 
fails to take into account the privileged regulatory status that the SEC and other 
government regulators have granted to the Privileged Raters.  And as the scope of that 
status increases, Privileged Raters have exploded in size and profitability.493  They now 
have a gatekeeper function in the secondary market and they can allow their bias in favor 
of a growing secondary market to influence decisions that also effect matters of great 
concern to the public.  This state of affairs should be remedied.  The existing rating 
agency literature provides a starting point for solving the problem of rating agency bias.
The existing rating agency literature does not look at them from the public’s 
perspective, as does this article.  Rather, it looks at rating agencies from the perspective 
of investors and sometimes issuers.  Nonetheless, the literature does suggest some ways 
to limit the excessive power of the Privileged Raters so as to protect the public interest:
A.  wait and see whether the subprime market standardizes in such a way as to make 
concerns about rating agency bias irrelevant;
B. deregulate the Privileged Raters so as to remove their regulatory privileged 
status; and
C. increase regulation of the Privileged Raters so as to ensure that they do not 
negatively impact the public interest.
A. Wait and See
If the history of the prime mortgage market is any guide, there is reason to 
believe that the subprime market will standardize over time and that many predatory 
behaviors will be driven from the market by various forces.  In addition to the Privileged 
Raters, this article has identified two standardizing forces:  proposed federal legislation 
and the Government Sponsored Entities.
Indeed, federal regulators are creating a unified regulatory regime that applies to 
many of the largest subprime lenders.  This standardization, in itself, will not drive out 
predatory practices because the applicable federal standards are pro-issuer and because 
many of the predatory lenders are not subject to the federal regulatory regime.494  The 
492
. See supra note 174.
493
. Partnoy, supra note 29, at 648.
494
. See generally Azmy, supra note 66, at 295.
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same holds true for the Ney/Kanjorski bill.  That is, the mere fact that the federal 
government is standardizing the subprime market does not mean that it is doing it in a 
way that helps subprime borrowers.495  The Frank/Miller/Watt bill, on the other hand, 
may promote pro-consumer standardization because it creates a floor of protections 
without limiting states from building additional protections up from that floor.
Fannie and Freddie are also driving some of the standardization in the subprime 
market.  They are doing this by refusing to purchase loans with certain terms that they 
consider to be abusive.  But while GSEs were able to impose standardization on the 
prime mortgage market, it is unclear that they will be able to do the same in the subprime 
mortgage market.  The subprime market, unlike the early prime market, has a number of 
large lenders who need not follow the GSEs’ lead.  The subprime market also has, by 
definition, less consistency amongst its loan products.  Thus, GSE-driven standardization, 
while potentially beneficial, does not offer a sure-fire way to end predatory behavior.  
The standardization imposed by the Privileged Raters is particularly troubling because 
they perform a gatekeeping function to the capital markets.  This gatekeeping function 
gives an inordinate amount of power to the Privileged Raters and interferes with the 
market’s ability to correct for the Privileged Raters’ bias against the public interest.
Because no standardization push looks like it will standardize the subprime 
market in the near future and because predatory lending costs consumers billions of 
dollars each year, the wait-and-see approach does not offer much promise.496
B. Deregulation
There have been vociferous complaints that the SEC has created the Privileged 
Rater oligopoly497.  The SEC is in the process of issuing final, more transparent, rules 
regarding NRSRO designation.498  As noted above, the Privileged Raters have been 
criticized for a number of failings, not least of which is that they do not provide 
particularly accurate information.499  Some argue that increased competition from other 
rating agencies will increase the accuracy of the Privileged Raters’ pronouncements.  
Such competition could push the Privileged Raters to accurately evaluate the risks 
associated with state predatory lending legislation, instead of adopting a biased view that 
495
. Id.
496
. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 716 (“Predatory lending continues to thrive despite 
claims that the market will correct the problem. Investors, who because of information asymmetries could 
potentially absorb some of the risks of predatory lending, are protected by pricing and securitization deals 
and, therefore, have no incentive to police predatory lenders.”).  There are plenty of examples of industries 
with predatory practices that survive for decades, which also speaks against a wait-and-see approach.  See, 
e.g., Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Brandeis Way; a Case Study in the Workings of Democracy. (1938) 
(describing long-term predatory practices in life insurance industry).
497
. See supra Part IV.B.
498
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February 25, 2005, Washington Post at E02. 
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helps secondary market players by reducing investors’ risks and standardizing the 
operation of the secondary market at the expense of subprime borrowers.
Indeed, Professor Azmy has argued that experimentation by the states in the 
realm of predatory lending statutes has led to healthy innovation as states have struggled 
with the problem of predatory lending.500  A similar argument applies in the context of 
competition among rating agencies to provide the most accurate information to 
investors.501  The more rating agencies that are involved in the assessment of the risks 
that predatory lending statutes pose to investors, the more likely that the secondary 
market will adopt appropriate standardization that would not be solely on the terms of the 
Privileged Raters, but would also consider the interests of subprime borrowers.  For this 
to occur, the pool of rating agencies must expand so that there is competition among them 
to provide the most accurate rating guidelines for predatory lending laws.
Some commentators, including Professor Partnoy, have suggested that rating 
agencies should be extricated from government regulation altogether, leaving them as 
pure providers of information and ending their role as sellers of regulatory licenses.502
Partnoy has argued that regulators could substitute reliance on a rating with reliance on a 
“credit spread,” which is “the difference between the yield on the bond and the yield on a 
risk-free bond of comparable structure and maturity.”503  Such a system would return the 
Privileged Raters to their roots as providers of information and leave the granting of 
regulatory licenses to regulators.  No one, at least in the academic literature, has 
persuasively demonstrated why this proposal is unworkable.504  Such a proposal would 
end the Privileged Raters oligopoly and should increase the number of rating agencies 
that consider the impact of predatory lending statutes.  Just as experimentation by the 
states is valuable to arrive at a well-balanced predatory lending law, empirical and 
analytic experimentation by multiple rating agencies will help the secondary market 
accurately evaluate the risk that such laws pose to investors.
Deregulating the Privileged Raters has much facial appeal,505 but ultimately, the 
problem with this proposal is that their ratings are deeply enmeshed with a broad array of 
500
. Azmy, supra note 66.
501
. See Beaver, supra note 231, at 7 (noting that regulation can reduce rating agency incentives to provide 
good services).
502 See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 29, at 624 (arguing that SEC and other regulators should discontinue 
regulatory licensing “by excising the portions of their rules that depend substantively on credit ratings”).
503
. Id. at 705 n.388. 
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. Cf. SEC Report, supra note 208, at 39 n. 106 (quoting Steven Schwarcz that rating agency ratings are 
“intended to be . . . more conservatively stable” than credit spreads).
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. Indeed, the Privileged Raters themselves sometimes recommend this course.  See Jerome S. Fons, Policy 
Issues Facing Rating Agencies, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM  344 
(Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) (““Historically, the major rating agencies have been against the use of 
credit ratings in the regulatory process due to potential impact of rating changes on financial markets, 
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regulatory regimes.506  Decoupling them throughout the international capital markets in 
order to resolve the problems of the subprime mortgage market (a significant, but small 
part of the entire international financial system) might amount to letting the tail wag the 
dog.  If deregulation of Privileged Raters is ultimately accomplished, it will be as a result 
of broader forces than those present in the subprime market.
C. Increased Regulation
Some have argued that rating agencies should be subject to greater regulation as 
they are active participants in the secondary market underwriting process.507  Regulation 
can take a number of forms, including traditional oversight by means of inspections and 
record-keeping requirements; government input into the ratings process itself; and some 
kind of periodic public review of the performance of the Privileged Raters.
There is general agreement that traditional regulation of rating agencies will not 
be helpful as it is in other industries such as banking.508  And Professor Steven Schwarcz 
warns that government input into the ratings process itself may impair the quality and 
perceived quality of agency ratings: 
if rating agency regulation were based on factors other than economic efficiency, 
ratings would to some extent reflect those other factors.  Investors, who typically 
look for the highest economic return for a given level of safety, then would be 
misled, undermining their confidence in the rating system and their willingness to 
invest in rated securities.509
Professor Schwarcz argues that, at least in an economic context, “where health 
and safety are not at issue, regulatory policy generally views” efficiency as the most 
important concern of any given regulatory regime, although he does acknowledge that an 
“exception might arise, however, where society has objectives in addition to economic 
efficiency,” such as distributional objectives.510  Here, while there are no distributional 
objectives, there is a concern that the Privileged Raters have a negative impact on the 
public interest that must be addressed.  Nonetheless, Schwarz is right to warn regulators 
opportunistic (that is, Privileged Raters continue to benefit from their privileged regulatory status while 
denying that it is important to their business model).
506. See, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards, A Revised Framework (June 2004) (describing new international standards for risk-
based capital requirements that heavily relies on rating agencies).
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. See Gerard Uzzi, A Conceptual Framework for Imposing Statutory Underwriter Duties on Rating 
Agencies Involved in the Structuring of Private Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
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not to kill the rating agency goose to get to the golden egg of bias-free ratings.  The final
possible type of regulation, increased public comment, may help reduce that bias without 
interfering with the content of the ratings themselves.
There have been a variety of proposals for increased public scrutiny regarding the 
Privileged Raters, ranging from opportunities to comment to the right to appeal rating 
decisions.  One proposal has been to adopt a process like that used to renew broadcast 
licenses.511  Under this proposal, NRSRO status would be periodically reviewed and the 
public would be given the opportunity to comment.  This proposal rests on the 
assumption that NRSRO status will not be threatened if there are public complaints, but 
rather that the Privileged Raters will (like broadcasters) seek to avoid public shaming for 
acting inappropriately.512  While this proposal has merit, it is clearly no panacea.
The SEC’s 2005 Rule Proposal has made the increased regulation of Privileged 
Raters a timely proposal.  The renewal of broadcasting licenses provides a good 
precedent for what that increased regulation can look like.  And, while renewal
proceedings will not be a panacea (keeping in mind that S&P withstood some virulent 
criticism for its actions in New Jersey), they should offer forum for addressing the 
negative impact that the Privileged Raters have on the public interest.
Francis Bottini has proposed that the SEC be granted the power to issue a Writ of 
Review to a rating agency to suggest that the agency reconsider a rating.513  This 
proposal could be expanded to grant the SEC the power to suggest that a rating agency 
reconsider an underwriting standard that appears to be too conservative or biased against 
the public interest.  If such a power was granted as part of greater regulatory oversight of 
NRSROs, it might be an effective means of ensuring that Privileged Raters did not let 
their biases interfere with their predatory lending legislation guidelines.  Working out the 
details of such a proposal must be left to another article and would probably only make 
sense as part of an overhaul of the entire regulatory scheme for NRSROs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Subprime lending has given low-income and moderate-income homeowners 
some of the same financial options and resources that had been previously reserved for 
prime borrowers.  Unfortunately, this positive development has been shadowed by the 
growing problem of predatory lending.  This article builds on work of other scholars who 
have demonstrated how the structure of the secondary market has allowed predatory 
lending to explode in the subprime market.  It ties this literature to the ratings agency 
literature which suggests that Privileged Raters are biased against the public interest.
511
. See Hill, supra note 29, at 89 (describing proposals of Fidelity and the Investment Company Institute).  
512
. Id. at 90.
513
 Francis A. Bottini, Jr., An Examination of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals for 
Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579, 612 (1993).  Some rating agencies allow 
issuers to informally appeal a rating prior to it being released to the public. Rhodes, supra note 178, at 313 
n.116.
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This article demonstrates how Privileged Raters have allowed their biases to 
interfere with state efforts to end predatory lending in their jurisdictions.  This article then 
vets proposed Privileged Rater reforms and concludes that increased regulation of 
Privileged Raters is called for to ensure that there is a way to hold them accountable for 
their actions that negatively impact the public interest.
This article has implications for two important and broader areas of study:  (i) the 
gatekeeping function of Privileged Raters in the international financial markets;514 and 
(ii) the replacement of local property law regimes with international, investor-friendly 
regimes as globalization increases.515  By making visible the impact of Privileged Raters 
on state predatory lending laws, this article makes clear that the increased standardization 
that benefits the international investment community comes at a cost of localized 
concerns like consumer protection.  By doing so, it provides a theoretical basis for 
arguing that regulators of rating agencies should consider the public interest when 
regulating rating agencies.
514
. The “gatekeeping” literature has, like most of the literature regarding rating agencies, focused on the 
impact of regulation on investors, not the public interest.   See, e.g., Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping" 29 IOWA J. OF 
CORP. L., 735, 741 (2004) (describing gatekeeping function as a “duty to investors”).
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. See, e.g., Marc Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes of a Property 
Theorist, 33 ENVT’L L. 851 (2003) (arguing that NAFTA inappropriately replaces local regimes of property 
law with investor-friendly ones).
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SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION:
HOW RATING AGENCIES ALLOW PREDATORY LENDING TO 
FLOURISH IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
[David Reiss*]
ABSTRACT
Predatory lending, the origination of loans with abusive terms to homeowners, is 
rampant in the subprime mortgage market.  In the last few years, many states 
responded to this problem by enacting consumer protection laws.  Large segments 
of the lending industry have opposed these laws.  In large part because of these 
complaints, momentum is building on three fronts to standardize the operations of 
the subprime mortgage market.  
First, federal regulators are preempting the application of these laws to a broad 
array of lending institutions and Congress is considering legislation to preempt 
their application to the remaining financial institutions that are still regulated by 
such laws.   Second, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the largest purchasers of 
residential mortgages on the secondary market, have indicated that they will not 
purchase loans with certain terms that they deem to be abusive.  And finally, the 
three major rating agencies indicated that they will not rate securities backed by 
pools of residential mortgages if any of those mortgages violate their rating 
guidelines relating to predatory lending laws.  
While the lending industry frequently promotes the increased standardization of 
the secondary mortgage market as an approach that will reduce predatory 
behavior without hurting legitimate lenders, this article reviews these three pushes 
to standardize the subprime mortgage market to determine if they will achieve 
that goal.  It concludes that the federal preemption of these laws is premature, that 
the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchasing guidelines will have an 
incrementally beneficial impact and, most importantly, that the rating agency 
guidelines will benefit investors in and issuers of mortgage-backed securities at 
the expense of homeowners.
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